Faculty
Research: Professor Beverly Walther, Accounting
Bucks
not a matter of luck
Kellogg
accounting expert shows top stock analysts have persistent
skill
By
Kari Richardson
It's
a perennial debate among investors and financial professionals:
Should greater market returns be attributed to superior
stock-picking acumen or to mere luck?
Research
by Kellogg School Associate Professor of Accounting Beverly
Walther and two co-authors considers the question with
respect to sell-side analysts — professionals employed
by brokerage houses to manage accounts and create publicly
available research often relied upon by investors.
"We
examined whether certain analysts were better than others,"
says Walther, who, along with Michael B. Mikhail of the W.
P. Carey School of Business and Richard H. Willis of the Owen
Graduate School of Management, published "Do security
analysts exhibit persistent differences in stock picking ability?"
in the Journal of Financial Economics in 2004.
"Can
you earn greater returns following their advice?" asks
Walther. "If I focus on a small number of analysts, can
I assume that some have greater skills and some have more
luck? It's documented that there are differences, but are
there persistent differences?"
Yes,
indicates the research. Says Walther: "Some are more
skilled in giving good advice. We found there is persistence
in the profitability of their stock recommendations; the ones
who performed well in the past continued to do so and vice
versa."
Recently,
sell-side analysts have reacted to criticisms, including charges
that research picks are little more than a way to generate
business for the firms that employ them, and that their recommendations
are heavily influenced by investment-banking business their
employers hope to capture. Some financial columnists advise
investors to read analysts' reports and take the opposite
position — buy when they say sell and sell when they
say buy. Others contend that legislative reforms will soon
put sell-side analysts out of jobs.
Whatever
the future may hold for these analysts, Walther's research
makes one thing clear: Some are better at their jobs than
others.
In
their study, Walther and co-authors looked at recommendations
issued by 4,923 analysts from 1985 to 1999, examining their
results at one-, three- and five-year intervals. The authors
conclude that "analysts who have issued more (less) profitable
recommendations in the past tend to issue more (less) profitable
recommendations in the future, which is consistent with relative
persistence in stock picking ability."
Moreover,
differences between the skilled and unskilled group became
greater with time, increasing at both the three- and five-year
intervals and lending some credence to ranking surveys such
as those compiled by The Wall Street Journal.
Walther
and her co-authors build upon previous research that suggests
while investors might do well to look to past performance
when selecting a pension plan, there is no systematic evidence
of persistence in the performance of mutual funds. But the
three note that buy-side results might not extend to the sell-side,
given "institutional differences between the two groups,"
including performance goals and compensation, and tighter
buy-side regulation.
But
the question remains: Will investors accrue large financial
gains by heeding market cues provided by the best performing
sell-side analysts? Walther found the market tends to react
more strongly to the recommendations of top performers than
those of poor performers. When she and her colleagues analyzed
a trading strategy that allowed three days to implement top-performing
analysts' recommendations, they found investors would not
earn excess returns after adjusting for risk and trading fees.
The margin became slightly better if investors were able to
react immediately to the new information. Holding periods
examined were three, 20 and 60 trading days.
Walther
notes, though, that for those planning on making an investment
anyway, it does make sense to pay attention to cues from top-performing
analysts. The amount of information available to investors
has exploded over the years, she says, helping "individuals
narrow down the field of who to pay attention to."
Since
documenting these differences in stock-picking ability, the
researchers, along with Xin Wang of the Fuqua School of Business,
have turned their attention to uncovering the reasons why.
Preliminary
results show that better-performing analysts tend to have
more resources (many worked at larger brokerage firms), issue
their reports in a more timely fashion and concentrate their
efforts more in a given industry.
Initial
findings also suggest that the best sell-side analysts are
more adept at using publicly available accounting information
to predict a company's future. "It isn't just that you
have better resources. It's that you are better able to take
publicly available information and analyze it," Walther
says.
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