Mini-Courses

2019-2020

We periodically invite to campus distinguished scholars to give mini-courses on a topic of current interest. These mini-courses are open to all members of the Northwestern community as well as visitors from other Colleges and Universities.

Last updated: 2/13/20



Ignacio Esponda, Associate Professor and Walter J. Mead Chair of Economics at the University of California, Santa Barbara, will present a mini-course on "Learning and Equilibrium under Misspecification" during his visit to Northwestern the week of February 17th.

The mini-course will take place over three sessions (all in the Kellogg Global Hub Crown Family Boardroom, room 5101):
Monday, February 17th, 3:30-5:00pm
Tuesday, February 18th, 3:30-5:00pm
Thursday, February 20th, 3:30-5:00pm

The lecture will be divided into six chapters. For each chapter, references are included and the recommended readings are highlighetd with a (*).

Chapter 1. Fictitious play.
Reading:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapter 2.

Chapter 2. Stochastic fictitious play.
Readings:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapter 4. Fudenberg and Kreps (1993), “ Learning to play Bayesian games,” Games and Economic Behavior. Benaim and Hirsch (1999), “Mixed equilibria and dynamical systems arising from fictitious play in perturbed games,” Games and Economic Behavior. Borkar (2008), Stochastic approximation: A dynamical systems viewpoint.

Chapter 3. Self-confirming equilibrium.
Readings:
(*) Fudenberg and Levine (1998), The theory of learning in games, Chapters 6 & 7. Fudenberg and Levine (1993), “Self-confirming equilibrium,” Econometrica. Dekel, Fudenberg and Levine (2003), “Learning to Play Bayesian Games,” in Games and Economic Behavior. Esponda (2008), “Information Feedback in First-Price Auctions,” RAND Journal of Economics.

Chapter 4. Cursed and behavioral equilibrium.
(*) Esponda (2008), “Behavioral equilibrium in economies with adverse selection,” American Economic Review. Eyster and Rabin (2005), “Cursed equilibrium,” Econometrica. Jehiel (2005), “Analogy-based expectation equilibrium,” Journal of Economic Theory. Jehiel and Koessler (2008), “Revisiting games of incomplete information with analogy-based expectations,” Games and Economic Behavior. Spiegler (2011), Bounded rationality in industrial organization.

Chapter 5. Berk-Nash equilibrium.
(*) Esponda and Pouzo (2016), “Berk-Nash equilibrium: A framework for modeling agents with misspecified models,” Econometrica. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2018), “Unrealistic expectations and misguided learning,” Econometrica. Spiegler (2016) “Bayesian networks and boundedly rational expectations,” Quarterly Journal of Economics. Esponda and Pouzo (2019), “Equilibrium in misspecified Markov decision processes,” working paper.

Chapter 6. Dynamics.
(*) Esponda, Pouzo, and Yamamoto (2019), “Asymptotic behavior of Bayesian learners with misspecified models,” working paper. Heidhues, Koszegi, and Strack (2019), "Convergence in misspecified learning models with endogenous actions,” working paper. Frick, Iijima, and Ishii (2019), “Stability and robustness in misspecified learning models,” working paper.

For information on past mini-courses,