Strength and weakness in four coalition situations

This study tested four models of coalition behavior in decision making on systems at the group level, in four different games, each of which was played by five individuals. Each game established a different distribution of power among the players. Data for coalition frequencies and for the payoffs of the players when they were included in a particular coalition supported Komorita & Chertkoff s (1973) bargaining theory over Komorita's (1974) weighted probability model and Gamson's (1961) minimum resource theory. When the overall payoffs received by each of the players in each game were used as a measure of the player's success in bargaining, the predictions of the Roth-Shipley and the weighted probability models received mixed support. Finally, the results suggested when the strength is weakness phenomenon might be expected to occur. Players with equal Shapley values but different resources within a particular game supported strength is weakness. Players with different Shapley values supported a strength is strength conclusion. Reports of the players provided a possible explanation of the underlying causes of this phenomenon.