Presenters
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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-Authors | Affiliation | Address | Country | Title | ||
| THR2.12d | |||||||||
| THR2.9d | |||||||||
| TUR2.9d | |||||||||
| THR2.3d | |||||||||
| FRR1.11d | |||||||||
| MOR2.5c | |||||||||
| MOR2.11d | |||||||||
| MOR2.10b | |||||||||
| TUR1.5d | |||||||||
| THR1.6c | |||||||||
| THR1.5d | |||||||||
| MOR2.12a | Joseph | Abdou | Hans Keiding | Universite Paris | Maison des Sciences Economiques Universite Paris 1106-112 boulevard de l'Hopital 75647 Paris Cedex 13 |
France | abdou@univ-paris1.fr | On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strong Solvability of Game Forms | |
| WEP | Iqbal | Adjali | D. Collings, A. Varley, M. H. Lyons | BT Laboratories | Business & Technology Analysis Unit Advanced Communications Engineering BT Laboratories Martlesham Heath, Ipswich IP5 3RE |
United Kingdom | iqbal.adjali@bt.com | Investigating Learning Schemes in Game Theory With an Application to a Model of Entry in a Regulated Market | |
| THS2.2 | Philippe | Aghion | M. Dewatripont, P. Rey | University College London | Department of Economics University Colllege London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT |
United Kingdom | p.aghion@ucl.ac.uk | Conceding Control Rights to Induce Cooperation: A Partial Contracting Approach | |
| FRR1.12b | Encarnacion | Algaba | J. M. Bilbao, N. Jimenez Jimenez, J. J. Lopez | Escuela Superior de Ingenieros | Matematica Aplicada II Escuela Superior de Ingenieros Camino de los Descubrimientos s/n 41092 Sevilla |
Spain | encarni@matini.us.es | Locally Convex (Concave) Games | |
| FRR1.3c | Ahmet | Alkan | alkan@boun.edu.tr | Cardinal Monotonic Choice Functions and the Lattice of Stable Matchings | |||||
| FRR2.2a | Raba | Amir | University of Copenhagen | Department of Economics University of Copenhagen 1455 Copenhagen K |
Denmark | Rabah.Amir@econ.ku.dk | Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance | ||
| TUP | Kazunori | Araki | Waseda University | School of Political Science & Econ
omics WasedaUniversity1-6-1 Nishiwaseda, Shinjuku-ku Tokyo |
Japan | kazaraki@mn.waseda.ac.jp | Training or Poaching? : An Evolutionary Model of General Training Provision | ||
| FRR1.5d | Miguel | Aramendia | C. Larrea y L. Ruiz | Universidad del Pais Vasco | Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV Universidad del Pais Vasco Av. L. Aguirre, 8348015 BILBAO |
Spain | elparrum@bs.ehu.es | Renegotiation in the Repeated Cournot Model | |
| WEP | Javier | Arin | J. Kuipers, D. Vermeulen | Basque Country University | Depart. Fundamentos del Analisis Economico Basque Country University 48015 Bilbao |
Spain | Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games | ||
| FRR2.3a | Olivier | Armantier | Jean-Pierre Florens, Jean Francois Richard | SUNY | Dept of Economics S621 SBS Building SUNY Stony Brook Stony Brook NY, 11794 |
USA | olivier.armantier@sunysb.edu | Nash Equilibrium Approximation in Games of Incomplete Information | |
| MOS2a | Kenneth | Arrow | Stanford University | Department of Economics Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | Inaugural Address | |||
| TUR1.1c | Geir B. | Asheim | University of Oslo | Department of Economics University of Oslo P.O. Box 1095 Blindern N-0317 Oslo |
Norway | g.b.asheim@econ.uio.no | On the Epistemic Foundation for Backward Induction | ||
| THS4 | Robert | Aumann | The Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Center for Rationality The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem |
Israel | raumann@math.huji.ac.il | Presidential Address | ||
| WES2.1 | David | Austen-Smith | Jeffrey S. Banks | Northwestern University | Department of Political Science Northwestern University 601 University Place Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | dasm@northwestern.edu | Social Choice Theory, Game Theory and Positive Political Theory | |
| MOR1.6a | Michael | Bacharach | University of Oxford | Department of Economics University of Oxford Manor Road Oxford OX1 3UQ |
United Kingdom | michael.bacharach@economics.oxford.ac.uk | Team Games and Personal Decisions | ||
| WES1.3 | Kyle | Bagwell | Columbia University | Department of Economics Columbia University 420 West 118th ST. New York, NY 10027 |
USA | kwb8@columbia.edu | The Theory of the WTO | ||
| TUR1.2b | Dieter | Balkenborg | Alistair Ulph | University of Exeter | Department of Economics School of Business and Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court Rennes Drive Exeter, Devon EX4 4PU |
United Kingdom | d.g.balkenborg@exeter.ac.uk | Extended Liability, Costly Monitoring and the Weighted Nash Bargaining Solution | |
| THP | M. A. | Ball | University of Liverpool | Department of Mathematical Sciences University of Liverpool P.O.Box 127 Liverpool, L69 3BX |
United Kingdom | ballm@liverpool.ac.uk | A new solution using coalitional theory for superadditive TU n-person games | ||
| TUP | Richard | Ball | Haverford College | Haverford College Haverford, PA 19041 |
USA | rball@haverford.edu | Violations Of Monotonicity In Evolutionary Models With Sample-Based Beliefs | ||
| MOS3.4 | Abhijit | Banerjee | M.I.T. | Department of Economics M.I.T. Cambridge, MA 02136 |
USA | banerjee@mit.edu | The Uses of Game Theory: Against a Purely Positive Interpretation of Game Theoretic Results | ||
| THR2.7b | Julius | Barbanel | Union College | Department of Mathematics Union College Schenectady, NY 12308 |
USA | barbanej@union.edu | On The Structure of Pareto Optimal Cake Partitions | ||
| WES3.2 | Salvador | Barbera | CODE and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | CODE Edifici B Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 08193 Bellaterra Barcelona |
Spain | salvador.barbera@uab.es | Strategic Aspects in Voting: Old and New | ||
| FRR1.8b | Marco | Battaglini | Northwestern University | Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road Evanston, Illinois 60208-2600 |
USA | m-battaglini@northwestern.edu | Multiple referrals and Multidimensional Cheap talk | ||
| TUR1.5a | Pierpaolo | Battigalli | Giovanni Maggi | European Univ. Inst. | Economics Department European University Institute Badia Fiesolana I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) |
Italy | battigal@iue.it | Imperfect Contracting | |
| TUR1.2c | Manel | Baucells | Steven A. Lippman | Universidad de Navarra | IESE Universidad de Navarra Navarra |
Spain | mbaucells@iese.edu | Bargaining with Search as an Outside Option: The Impact of the Buyer's Future Availability | |
| TUP | Doris | Behrens | Reinhard Neck | University of Klagenfurt | Department of Economics University of Klagenfurt Universitaetsstr. 65-67 A-9020 Klagenfurt |
Austria | doris.behrens@uni-klu.ac.at | OPTGAME 2.0: An Algorithm for Equilibrium Solutions of N-Person Discrete-Time (Non-)Linear Dynamic Games | |
| TUR2.1b | Ann Maria | Bell | W. A. Sethares, J. A. Bucklew | NASA Ames Research Center | NASA Ames Research Center Mail Stop 269-3 Moffett Field, CA 94035-1000 |
USA | abell@mail.arc.nasa.gov | Learning and Information Structure in Market Entry Games | |
| FRR2.10a | Elchanan | Ben-Porath | Tel Aviv University | School of Economics Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv |
Israel | benporat@post.tau.ac.il | Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information | ||
| FRR1.7d | Hassan | Benchekroun | Florida Atlantic University | Department of Economics Florida Atlantic University |
USA | benchekr@fau.edu | On the Effects of Unilateral Quotas on the Harvesting of a Renewable Resource | ||
| THR1.5a | Jean-Pierre | Benoit | New York University | Department of Economics New York University 44, West 4-th Street New York, NY 10012-1126 |
USA | Jeanpierre.benoit@nyu.edu | A Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Correspondences | ||
| TUR1.11a | Dolors | Berga | Gustavo Bergantińos, Jordi Massó, and Alejandro Neme | Universitat de Girona | Departament d'Economia Facultat de Ciencies Economiques i Empresarials Universitat de Girona Campus Montilivi 17071 Girona |
Spain | berga@econ.udg.es | Voting By Committees with Exit | |
| TUR2.5a | James | Bergin | Queen's University | Department of Economics Queen's University Kingston, Ontario K7L 3N6 |
Canada | berginj@qed.econ.queensu.ca | Virtual implementation without randomization | ||
| MOR1.7b | Ted | Bergstrom | University of California, Santa Barbara | Economics Dept University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara CA 93106 |
USA | tedb@econ.ucsb.edu | Evolution of Behavior in Family Games | ||
| FRR1.5b | Rajeev R. | Bhattacharya | The University of New South Wales | Australian Graduate School of Management The University of New South Wales & The University of Sydney Sydney 2052 |
Australia | RajeevB@agsm.edu.au | Short-run constraints and price wars | ||
| MOR2.2b | Sushil | Bikhchandani | Joseph Ostroy | Anderson School of Management at UCLA | Anderson School of Management at UCLA 110 Westwood Plaza Box 951481 Los Angeles, CA 90095 |
USA | sbikhcha@anderson.ucla.edu | Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions | |
| FRR1.12a | Jesus Mario | Bilbao | J. R. Fernandez, A. Jimenez Losada, E. Lebron | Escuela Superior de Ingenieros | Matematica Aplicada II Escuela Superior de Ingenieros Camino de los Descubrimientos s/n 41092 Sevilla |
Spain | mbilbao@matinc.us.es | Bicooperative Games | |
| THR2.5a | Matthias | Blonski | University of Mannheim | Department of Economics University of Mannheim Mannheim 68131 Mannheim |
Germany | blonski@rumms.uni-mannheim.de | How many veiled women do we expect in Cairo? Characterization of equilibria in large anonymous games | ||
| THR1.8d | Andreas | Blume | Ted Temzelides | University of Iowa | Department of Economics Tippie College University of Iowa Iowa City, IA 52242 |
USA | andreas-blume@uiowa.edu | On the Geography of Conventions | |
| FRR2.5b | Oliver | Board | Oxford University | Brasenose College and Department of Economics Oxford University London |
United Kingdom | oliver.board@economics.oxford.ac.uk | Deception and Unreliability: A Generalization of Extensive Form Games | ||
| MOP | Nicolas | Boccard | Xavier Wauthy | CORE | CORE 34 voie du roman pays 1348 LLN |
Belgium | Bertrand Competition and Cournot Outcomes: Further Results | ||
| MOR1.2c | Anna | Bogomolnaia | Herve Moulin | Southern Methodist University | Department of Economics Southern Methodist University Dallas, TX 75275-0496 |
USA | annab@mail.smu.edu | A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem | |
| TUR2.10b | Peter | Borm | Herbert Hamers, Maurice Koster, Marieke Quant | Tilburg University | CentER and Department of Econometrics Tilburg University PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | pemborm@kub.nl | Communication and cooperation in public network enterprises | |
| THR2.7a | Steven J. | Brams | Todd R. Kaplan, Jeffrey R. Lax | New York University | Department of Politics New York University 715 Broadway, 4th Fl. New York, NY 10003 |
USA | steven.brams@nyu.edu | Yankee Trading | |
| MOR2.4a | Steven J. | Brams | Michael Jones, D. Marc Kilgour | New York University | Dept. of Politics New York University 715 Broadway 4th Fl. New York, NY 10003 |
USA | steven.brams@nyu.edu | The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions | |
| MOR1.4a | Adam | Brandenburger | H. Jerome Keisler | Harvard Business School | Harvard Business School Boston, MA 02163 |
USA | abrandenburger@hbs.edu | An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games | |
| TUR2.11d | Mariana Rodica | Branzei | S. Tijs, J. Timmer | Alexandru Ioan Cuza University | Alexandru Ioan Cuza University IASI |
Romania | branzeir@infoiasi.ro | Information Collecting Games | |
| THR2.8b | Thomas | Brenner | Max Planck Institute | Max-Planck-Institute for Research into
Economic Systems Evolutionary Economics Unit Kahlaische Str. 10 D-07745 Jena |
Germany | brenner@mpiew-jena.mpg.de | Reinforcement Learning for 2-Armed Bandits and 2x2-Games: Studying the Stationary Probability Distribution | ||
| TUP | Michele | Breton | Georges Zaccour | michele.breton@hec.ca | Equilibria in an Asymmetric Duopoly Facing a Security Constraint | ||||
| WEP | Jeannette | Brosig | Joachim Weimann, Chun-Lei Yang | Otto-von-Guericke-University | Faculty of Economics and Management Otto-von-Guericke-University Postfach 4120 39106 Magdeburg |
Germany | Jeannette.brosig@ww.uni-magdeburg.de | Bargaining Power in Simple Sequential Games | |
| TUR2.6d | Lluis | Bru | Universidad de Malaga | Universidad de Malaga | Spain | lluis@uma.es | Incentives for Mergers in Vertical Structures | ||
| THR1.2c | Sandro | Brusco | G. Lopomo | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III de Madrid C/ Madrid 126. 28903 Getafe Madrid |
Spain | brusco@emp.uc3m.es | Collusion Via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities | |
| THR1.3c | Mauricio Soares | Bugarin | Universidade de Brasilia | Departamento de Economia Universidade de Brasilia ICC Norte, Asa Norte 70910-900, Brasilia, DF |
Brazil | bugarin@unb.br | Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: a unified model | ||
| THP | Mirta | Bugarin | Sataka Bugarin, Mauricio Soares Bugarin | Imoversodade de Brasilia | Departamento de Economia Universidade de Brasilia ICC Norte, Asa Norte CEP 70910-900 Brasilia DF |
Brazil | mirta@unb.br | Non-Pigouvian Tax Design with Fully Aware Agents | |
| TUR1.10d | Nadia | Burani | William Zwicker | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | Departament d'Economia i d'Historia Economica Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Edifici B 08193 Bellateraa, Baracelona |
Spain | nburani@idea.uab.es | Coalition Formation Games with Separable Preferences | |
| THP | Tom R. | Burns | Anna Gomolinska | Uppsala University | Uppsala Theory Circle Department of Sociology Uppsala University Box 821 75108 Uppsala |
Sweden | tom.burns@soc.uu.se | The Socially Imbedded Theory of Games: The Mathematics of Social Relationships, Rule Complexes, and Action Modalities | |
| THR2.12b | Lutz-Alexander | Busch | Ignatius J. Horstmann | University of Western Ontario | Department of Economics University of Western Ontario London ON N6A 5C2 |
Canada | lbusch@watserv1.uwaterloo.ca | The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements | |
| THR1.9b | Pedro | Calleja | Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn | University of Barcelona | Department of Economical, Financial and
Actuarial Mathematics University of Barcelona Av. Diagonal 690 08034 Barcelona |
Spain | calleja@eco.ub.es | On the Balancedness of a Multi Machine Sequencing Game | |
| THR2.1c | Emilio | Calvo | Hans Peters | University of Valencia | Departament d'Anŕlisi Econňmica Universitat de Valčncia Campus d'els Tarongers s/n Edificio Departamental Oriental 46022 Valencia |
Spain | emilio.calvo@uv.es | Cardinal-ordinal Invariant Solutions | |
| THP | Hector | Calvo | Salvatore Lanza | DELTA (CNRS-EHESS-ENS) | DELTA (CNRS-EHESS-ENS) | France | calvo@delta.ens.fr | Information in Auctions : Interest Groups | |
| TUR2.3d | Estelle | Cantillon | Yale University | Cowles Foundation Yale University Box 208281 New Haven, CT 06520-8281 |
USA | ecantill@kuznets.fas.harvard.edu | The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions | ||
| WEP | Daniel | Cardona-Coll | Universitat de les Illes Balears | Departament d'Economia i Empresa Universitat de les Illes Balears Carretera dc Valledemoosa km 7.5 07071 Palma de Mallorca |
Spain | d.cardona@uib.cs | Bargaining and Single-Peak Preferences | ||
| WEP | Andre | Casajus | Universität Hohenheim | Universität Hohenheim (420b) Institut für Agrarpolitik und Landwirtschaftliche Marktlehre D-70593 Stuttgart |
Germany | casajus@uni-hohenheim.de | Weak Isomorphisms of Extensive Games | ||
| MOP | Balbina | Casas-Mendez | University Santiago de Compestola | Department of Statistics and OR University Santiago de Compestola 15771 Santiago e Compostela |
Spain | eigradu3@usc.es | Negotiation in Cooperative Bargaining Games with Restricted Communication | ||
| TUP | Eliane P. | Catilina | University of Virginia | Department of Economics University of Virginia 114 Rouss Hall Charlottesville, VA 20093 |
USA | epc6g@virginia.edu | Information Acquisition Games in Cournot Oligopolistic Markets: A Three Stage Approach | ||
| MOP | Alberto | Cavaliere | Pubblica Universita degli Studi di Pavia |
Dipartimento di Economia |
Italy | cavalier@unipv.it | Coordination and the Provision of a Discrete Public good by Correlated Equilibria | ||
| TUR2.7a | Nicolo | Cesa-Bianchi | Gabor Lugosi | University of Milano | Polo Didattico e di Ricerca University of Milano Via Bramante 6526013 Crema |
Italy | cesabian@dsi.unimi.it | Minimax Values and Metric Entropy Bounds for Portfolio Selection Problems | |
| FRR2.8a | Kalyan | Chatterjee | Pennsylvania State University | Departments of MSIS and Economics Pennsylvania State University University Park, PA 16802 |
USA | kchatterjee@psu.edu | N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity | ||
| FRR1.5c | Harrison | Cheng | University of Southern California | Department of Economics University of Southern California UniversityPark Los Angles CA 90089-0253 |
USA | hacheng@usc.edu | Optimal Collusion with Moral Hazards in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games | ||
| FRR1.4b | P. A. | Chiappori | Steve Levitt | University of Chicago | Department of Economics University of Chicago 1126 East 59th Street Chicago, IL 60637 |
U.S.A | pchiappo@nsit-popmail.uchicago.edu | Do soccer players randomize? | |
| TUP | A. A. | Chikrii | S. D. Eidelman | Cybernetics Institute | Cybernetics Institute 40 Glushkov Prsp. 03187 Kyiv |
Ukraine | chik@d165.icyb.kiev.ua | Quasilinear Fractal Games of Approach | |
| MOP | Greta Ts. | Chikrii | Cybernetics Institute | Cybernetics Institute 40 Glushkov Prsp. 03187 Kyiv |
Ukraine | chik@d165.icyb.kiev.ua | Solution of Game Problems Using Effect of Information Delays | ||
| FRR2.1b | Youngsub | Chun | Seoul National University | School of Economics Seoul National University Seoul 151-742 |
Korea | ychun@plaza.snu.ac.kr | The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining | ||
| THP | Thorsten | Clausing | University of Magdeburg | Faculty of Management and Economics University of Magdeburg Universitätsplatz 2 39108 Magdeburg |
Germany | thorsten.clausing@ww.uni-magdeburg.de | Cognitive Uncertainty in Games A Note on Limited Information Processing and Backward Induction | ||
| WEP | Sebastien | Cochinard | University of Picardy | University of Picardy | France | sebastien.cochinard@u-picardie.fr | Real algebraic properties of the core and stable sets | ||
| MOR1.9c | John | Conley | Ali Toossi, Myrna Wooders | University of Illinois | Department of Economics University of Illinois Champaign, IL 61821 |
USA | jpconley@uiuc.edu | Evolution and Voting: How Nature Makes Us Public Spirited | |
| THR2.2d | David | Cooper | John Kagel | Case Western Reserve University | Weatherhead School of Management Department of Economics Case Western Reserve University 10900 Euclid Avenue Cleveland, OH 44106-7206 |
USA | djc13@guinness.somcwru.edu | Transfer in Signaling Games | |
| FRS3.3 | Vincent | Crawford | Miguel Costa-Gomes, Bruno Broseta | University of California, San Diego | Department of Economics University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0508 |
USA | vcrawfor@weber.ucsd.edu | Cognition and Behavior in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study | |
| FRR2.4b | Vincent P. | Crawford | Ping-Sing Kuo | University of California, San Diego | Department of Economics University of California, San Diego 9500 Gilman Drive La Jolla, CA 92093-0508 |
USA | vcrawfor@weber.ucsd.edu | A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling | |
| TUR2.2c | Ross | Cressman | Jean-Francois Wen | Wilfrid Laurier University | Department of Mathematics Wilfrid Laurier University Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3C5 |
Canada | rcressma@wlu.ca | Playing the Field - An Evolutionary Approach to Information Transmission in Stock Markets | |
| THP | Antonio | D'Agata | University of Catania | Faculty of Political Sciences University of Catania Via Vittorio Emanuele 8 95131 Catania |
Italy | adagata@lex.unict.it | War For Land: A Division Game On Measurable Spaces | ||
| TUP | Rajarshi | Das | IBM Institute for Advanced Commerce | IBM Institute for Advanced Commerce Hawthorne, NY 10532 |
USA | rajarshi@us.ibm.com | Dynamic Pricing in Pricebots: Learning and Collective Behavior | ||
| MOR1.3d | M. Angeles | de Frutos | L. Pechlivanos | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III de Madrid C/ Madrid 126. 28903 GetafeMadrid |
Spain | frutos@eco.uc3m.es | Second-Price Common-Value Auctions under Multidimensional Uncertainty | |
| WEP | Andre Rossi | de Oliveira | Universidade de Brasília | Departamento de Economia Universidade de Brasília, Campus Darcy Ribeiro ICC Norte Departamento de Economia Brasília-D.F. 70910-900 |
Brazil | arossi@unb.br | Bilateral Trade with Different Distributions of Types | ||
| THP | Beatriz | de Otto Lopez | Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona | Departamento de Economía Cuantitativa Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona Facultad de Económicas Av. del Cristo, s/n33006 Oviedo |
Spain | bdeotto@econo.uniovi.es | Bidding in a Pool with Contract Market | ||
| TUP | Jim | Dearden | Dorothy Klotz | Lehigh University | Department of Economics Rauch Business Center Lehigh University Bethlehem, PA 18015 |
USA | jad8@lehigh.edu | Supervisors,Minimum Requirements, and Contracting | |
| MOP | Suresh | Deman | Young O. Kim | University of Greenwich | School of Business University of Greenwich London SE18 6PF |
United Kingdom | s_deman@yahoo.com | Corporate Spin-offs under Asymmtric Information | |
| MOR2.12c | Stefano | Demichelis | Fabrizio Germano | Universita' di Pavia | Department of Mathematics Universita' di Pavia |
Italy | stefano@dimat.unipv.it | On the Indices of Zeros of Nash Fields | |
| TUP | Gabriel | Desgranges | Universite de Cergy-Pontoise | Universite de Cergy-Pontoise 33, boulevard du port F-95011 CERGY Cedex |
France | Gabriel.Desgranges@eco.u-cergy.fr | Common Knowledge of Rationality in a Market Game with Asymmetric | ||
| WEP | Amrita | Dhillon | Ben Lockwood | University of Warwick | Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL |
UK | ecsbk@csv.warwick.ac.uk | When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable? | |
| WEP | Effrosyni | Diamantoudi | McGill University and University of Aarhus | Department of Economics University of Aarhus Building 350, Aarhus C. 8000 |
Denmark | faye@econ.au.dk | Binding Agreements | ||
| MOP | Nicola | Dimitri | Universitŕ degli Studi di Siena | Dipartimento di Economia Politica Facoltŕ di Economia Universitŕ degli Studi di Siena |
Italy | DIMITRI@unisi.it | Efficiency and Equilibrium in the Electronic Mail Game; The General Case | ||
| FRR1.10d | Victor | Domansky | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and
Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences Tchaikovskogo 1 St.Petersburg, 191187 |
Russia | victor@agd.stud.pu.ru | Solutions of stopping games for Markov chains | ||
| TUP | Antonino | Drago | Univ. Federico II | Dip. Scienze Fisiche Univ. Federico II Mostra d'Oltermare 19 Napoli |
Italy | adrago@na.infn.it | The Well-adequate Mathematics to Game Theory is H. Weyl's Elementary Mathematics | ||
| TUR1.7b | Theo. S. H. | Driessen | University of Twente | Faculty of Mathematical Sciences University of Twente P.O. Box 217 7500 AE ENSCHEDE |
The Netherlands | t.s.h.driessen@math.utwente.nl | Consistency and Potentials in Cooperative TU-Games: Sobolev's Reduced Game Revived | ||
| FRR1.7c | Marc | Dudey | Rice University | Department of Economics Rice University |
USA | dudey@rice.edu | Quantity Precommitment and Dynamic Price Competititon Can Yield the Bertrand Outcome | ||
| MOR1.11b | Martin | Dufwenberg | Mark Stegeman | Stockholm University | Department of Economics Stockholm University Stockholm |
Sweden | md@ne.su.se | Existence and uniqueness of maximally reduced games under iterated strict dominance | |
| TUR1.9c | Anastassia | Egorova | L.A. Petrosyan | St.-Petersburg State University | Faculty of Applied Math and Control Processes St.-Petersburg State University St. Petersburg |
Russia | spbuoasis7@peterlink.ru | Strong Nash Equilibrium in Repeated n-person Games | |
| WEP | Harri | Ehtamo | Raimo Hamalainen | Helsinki University of Technology | Systems Analysis Laboratory Helsinki University of Technology P.O. Box 1100 02015 HUT |
Finland | ehtamo@hut.fi | Searching for Joint Gains in Multi-Party Negotiations | |
| TUR1.1b | Jurgen | Eichberger | David Kelsey | Universitat des Saarlandes | Department of Economics (FB2) Universitat ds Saarlandes Postfach 15 11 50 D-66041 Saarbrucken |
Germany | j.eichberger@with.uni-sb.de | Uncertainty and Strategic Interaction in Economics | |
| MOR1.5c | Ezra | Einy | Diego Moreno, Benjamin Shitovitz | Ben Gurion University of the Negev | Department of Economics Ben-Gurion University of the Negev P.O. Box 659 Beer-Sheeva 84105 |
Israel | einy@bgumail.bgu.ac.il | On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information | |
| THP | Maria | Ekes | Warsaw School of Economics | Institute of Econometrics, Warsaw School
of Economics Al. Niepodleglosci 162 02-554 Warszawa |
Poland | mmroman@sgh.waw.pl | General Elections Modelled with Infinitely Many Voters | ||
| TUR2.5d | Kfir | Eliaz | Tel Aviv University | Eitan Berglas School of Economics Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv |
Israel | eliaz@post.tau.ac.il | Fault Tolerant Implementation | ||
| MOR1.1c | Jeffrey | Ely | Northwestern University | Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road Evanston IL 60208 |
USA | ely@northwestern.edu | Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring | ||
| MOR2.5b | Dirk | Engelmann | Martin Strobel | Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin | Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultaet Lehrstuhl fuer Wirtschaftspolitik Spandauer Str. 1 D- 10178 Berlin |
Germany | engelmann@wiwi.hu-berlin.de | An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt | |
| MOR1.11a | Christian | Ewerhart | University of Mannheim | Sonderforschungsbereich 504 University of Mannheim Mannheim |
Germany | christian_ewerhart@exchange.de | Chess-like Games are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps | ||
| TUR2.6a | Ramon | Fauli-Oller | Joel Sandonis | University of Alicante | Department of Economics University of Alicante Campus de Sant Vicent 03071 Alicante |
Spain | fauli@merlin.fae.ua.es | To Merge or to License: Implications for Competition Policy | |
| TUR2.6c | Peter | Faynzilberg | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Leverone Hall Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | PeterSFay@aol.com | Optimal Selection of a Regulated Monopoly | ||
| THR1.5c | Peter | Faynzilberg | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Leverone Hall Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | PeterSFay@aol.com | Participation Rights and Mechanism Design | ||
| MOR1.4b | Yossi | Feinberg | Stanford University | Graduate School of Business Stanford University 518 Memorial Way Stanford, CA 94305-5015 |
USA | feinberg_yossi@gsb.stanford.edu | Subjective Reasoning in Games | ||
| TUR1.7c | Barry | Feldman | Ibbotson Associates | Ibbotson Associates 225 N. Michigan Ave. Chicago, IL 60601 |
USA | bfeldman@ibbotson.com | The Proportional Value of a Cooperative Game | ||
| WES2.3 | Leonardo | Felli | Luca Anderlini | University of Southampton | Department of Economics Georgetown University 37th and "O" Sts. Washington, DC 20057 |
USA | la2@gunet.georgetown.edu | Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts | |
| MOP | Linda | Fernandez | University of California, Riverside | Dept. of Environmental Sciences and Economics University of California Riverside, CA 92521 |
USA | linda.fernandez@ucr.edu | Trade's Dynamic Solutions to Transboundary Pollution | ||
| MOR2.10a | Jose Luis | Ferreira | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III 28903 Geafe Madrid |
Spain | jlferr@eco.uc3m.es | Strategic Interaction Between Futures and Spot Markets | ||
| WEP | Helene | Ferrer | Universite de Caen | Department of Economics GEMMA, Universite de Caen 14032 Caen cedex |
France | ferrer@econ.unicaen.fr | Stable Syndicates of Factors Owners and Distribution of Social Output | ||
| FRR2.2b | Dragan | Filipovich | Colegio de Mexico | Colegio de Mexico | Mexico | dfilipovich@colmex.mx | Choosing One's Identity | ||
| THP | Dragan | Filipovich | Colego de Mexico | Colego de Mexico | Mexico | dfilipovich@colmex.mx | Choosing One´s Identity | ||
| WEP | Francesca | Flamini | University of Exeter | Department of Economics University of Exeter Streatham Court, Rennes Drive Exeter EX4 4PU |
United Kingdom | F.Flamini@exeter.ac.uk | Issue-by-issue Bargaining Models with Probability of Game Continuation | ||
| TUR2.8c | Janos | Flesch | F. Thuijsman, O. J. Vrieze | Maastricht University | Department of Mathematics Maastricht University |
The Netherlands | kuipers@math.unimaas.nl | Stochastic games with non-observable actions | |
| FRS2.2 | Francoise | Forges | Jean-Francois Mertens, Rajiv Vohra | Université de Cergy-Pontoise | THEMA, Université de Cergy-Pontoise 33, Boulevard du Port 95011 Cergy-Pontoise CEDEX |
France | Forges@u-cergy.fr | The Incentive Compatible Core of an Economy with Differential Information: The Quasi-Linear Case | |
| TUR1.3b | Alain | Fougeres | Salvador Barbera, L. A. Gerard-Varet | University of Perpignan | GREQAM Marseille and University of Perpignan | France | fougeres@univ-perp.fr | Minimal Core Generation | |
| WEP | Vito | Fragnelli | I.Garcia-Jurado, L.Mendez-Naya | Eastern Piedmont University | Department of Advanced Sciences and Technologies Eastern Piedmont University Corso Borsalino 54 15100 Alessandria |
Italy | fragnell@unipmn.it | Bus Games | |
| WEP | Maguerite | Frank | Rider University | Rider University Department of Decision and Management Sciences 2083 Larenceville Rd. Lawrenceville, NJ 08648-3099 |
USA | jnfrank@compuserve.com | Hierarchical Games | ||
| THP | Takako | Fujiwara-Greve | Keio University | Department of Economics Keio University 2-15-45 Mita Minatoku, Tokyo 108-8345 |
Japan | takakofg@econ.keio.ac.jp | Efficiency and a folk theorem with voluntary partnerships and no information flow | ||
| MOR2.7c | Yukihiko | Funaki | Waseda University | School of Political Science & Economics WASEDA University Nishi-Waseda 1-6-1 Shinjuku-ku, Tokyo 169-8050 |
Japan | funaki@mn.waseda.ac.jp | The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization | ||
| THR2.4d | David | Furth | University of Amsterdam | Oude Manhisport 1012 CN Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | furth@jur.uva.nl | The (Price) Core of a Bertrand--Edgeworth Economy | ||
| TUR1.7a | Gianfranco | Gambarelli | University of Bergamo | Department of Mathematics University of Bergamo Piazza Rosate 2 24129 Bergamo |
Italy | gambarex@ibguniv.unibg.it | Transforming Games from Characteristic into Normal Form | ||
| THP | A. J. | Ganesh | K. Laevens, R. Steinberg | Microsoft Research | Microsoft Research Cambridge |
United Kingdom | ajg@microsoft.com | Dynamics of a congestion pricing model | |
| MOR2.10d | Juan-Jose | Ganuza | Marco Celentani | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Department of Economics Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | juanjo.ganuza@econ.upf.es | Corruption and competition in procurement | |
| WEP | Nuno | Garoupa | Joao Gata | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Department d'Economia i Empresa Universitat Pompeu Fabra C/ Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | nuno.garoupa@econ.upf.es | A Game Theoretic Approach to Decolonization | |
| MOR2.4c | Rod | Garratt | Cheng-Zhong Qin | University of California, Santa Barbara | Department of Economics University of California, Santa Barbara Santa Barbara, CA 93106 |
USA | garratt@econ.ucsb.edu | Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation | |
| MOP | Joao E. | Gata | Samiran Banerjee | ISG & UECE/ISEG, Lisbon | Instituto Superior de Gestăo Rua Vitorino Nemésio 5 1750-306 Lisbon |
Portugal | joaogata@hotmail.com | Environmental Regulation, Technological Innovation with Spillovers: A Game Theoretical Approach | |
| THR1.5b | Arieh | Gavious | Aner Sela | Ben Gurion University | Ben Gurion University Faculty of Engineering Sciences IE P.O. Box 653 Beer-Sheva 84105 |
Israel | ariehg@bgumail.bgu.ac.il | Auctions With Bounds | |
| WEP | Nikolaos | Georgantzis | Gerardo S. Grande | Universitat Jaume I | Depto. de Economia Campus Riu Sec 12071 Universitat Jaume I Castellon |
Spain | georgant@eco.uji.es | Accounting for Risk Aversion in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Test | |
| MOR2.9b | Dino | Gerardi | Northwestern University | Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208-2600 |
USA | d-gerardi@northwestern.edu | Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information | ||
| THR2.8a | Sudeep | Ghosh | University of Iowa | Department of Economics University of Iowa W379 PBAB Iowa City, IA 52242 |
USA | sudeep-ghosh@uiowa.edu | Optimal Learning in Variable Universe Games | ||
| MOR1.11c | Mario | Gilli | Bocconi University/Bari University | Department of Economics Bocconi University Via Gobbi 5 20136 Milano |
Italy | mario.gilli@uni-bocconi.it | Iterated Admissibility as a Solution Concept in Game Theory | ||
| WEP | Natacha | Gilson | Catholic University of Mons | Facultés Universitaires Catholiques de
Mons Unité Arpčge (Atelier de Recherche sur la politique économique et la gestion des Entreprises) chaussée de Binche, 151 7000 Mons |
Belgium | gilson@fucam.ac.be | Debt Structure as a Signalling Device | ||
| TUR1.11c | Miguel | Gines-Vilar | Universitat Jaume I | Dpt dEcononia Universitat Jaume I 12071 Castelló |
Spain | mgines@eco.uji.es | A bargaining approach to the provision of public goods | ||
| TUR2.10c | Gael | Giraud | Universite Louis Pasteur | CNRS UR 7522 Bureau d'Economie Theorique
et Appliquee Universite Louis Pasteur 61, avenue de la Foret Noire 67000 Strasbourg |
France | NASH and STRONG COALITION-PROOF IMPLEMENTATION OF WALRAS EQUILIBRIA | |||
| FRR1.2b | Jacob K. | Goeree | University of Virginia | University of Virginia | USA | jg2n@virginia.edu | A Model of Noisy Introspection | ||
| MOR2.4d | Armando | Gomes | University of Pennsylvania | University of Pennsylvania 2300 Steinberg-Hall Dietrich-Hall Philadelphia, PA 19104 |
USA | gomes@wharton.upenn.edu | A Theory of Negotiations and Formation of Coalitions | ||
| MOR2.1b | Olivier | Gossner | Université Paris X - Nanterre | THEMA, UMR 7536 Université Paris X - Nanterre 200, Avenue de la République 92001 Nanterre CEDEX |
France | Games Played by Turing Machines | |||
| THS1.3 | Hari | Govindan | University of Western Ontario | Department of Economics University of Western Ontario London, Ontario N6A 5C2 |
Canada | sgovinda@julian.uwo.ca | The Structure of Nash Equilibria in Finite Games | ||
| TUR2.11a | Daniel | Granot | Jeroen Kuipers, Sunil Chopra | University of British Columbia | Faculty of Commerce University of British Columbia Vancouver, B.C. |
Canada | daniel.granot@commerce.ubc.ca | Cost Allocation for a Tree Network with Heterogeneous Customers | |
| THR2.3c | Amy | Greenwald | Brown University | Computer Science Department Brown University Box 1910 Providence, RI 02912 |
USA | amygreen@cs.brown.edu | On the Connection Between On-line Learning and Games | ||
| TUR2.6b | Veronkia | Grimm | F. Riedel, Wolfstetter | Humboldt University at Berlin | Humboldt University at Berlin Spandauer Str. 1 10178 Berlin |
Germany | grimm@wiwi.hu-berlin.de | Implementing Efficient Market Structure | |
| MOR2.3d | Brit | Grosskopf | Gary Charness | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Department of Economics Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon-Trias-Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | grosskop@upf.es | Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination | |
| FRR2.7a | Peter | Grunwald | Phil Dawid | Eurandom | Eurandom P.O. Box 513 5600 MB Eindhoven |
The Netherlands | pdg@cwi.nl | A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of the Maximum Entropy Method | |
| MOS3.2 | Roger | Guesnerie | G. Desgranges | Delta, Paris |
Delta |
France | rg@delta.ens.fr | The Transmission of Information Through Prices: An Alternative Exploratory Assessment of Market Performance | |
| MOR2.8b | Hans | Haller | Alexander Outkin | Virginia Polytechnic Institute | Department of Economics Virginia Polytechnic Institute Blacksburg, VA 24061-0316 |
USA | haller@vt.edu | Best Response Dynamics and Neural Networks | |
| TUS2.3 | Joseph Y. | Halpern | Cornell Univeristy | Department of Computer Science Cornell University Ithaca, NY 14853 |
USA | halpern@cs.cornell.edu | A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory | ||
| FRR1.10c | Hardy | Hanappi | E. Hanappi-Eggar, A. Mehlmann | University of Technology, Vienna | Institute of Economics University of Technology of Vienna Argentinierstr. 8/175 A-1040 Vienna |
Austria | hanappi@pop.tuwien.ac.at | Algorithmic Games: From a New form of Specification to a New Type of Results | |
| FRS2.1 | Sergiu | Hart | The Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Center for Rationality The Hebrew University of Jersusalem Givat-Ram, Feldman Bldg. 91904 Jerusalem |
Israel | hart@math.huji.ac.il | Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction | ||
| TUP | Esther | Hauk | Juan-Jose Ganuza | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Department of Economics and Business Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | esther.hauk@econ.upf.es | Economic Integration and Corruption: The Corrupt Soul of the European Union | |
| MOR2.8c | Dana | Heller | Rajiv Sarin | University of Chicago | Department of Economics University of Chicago 1126 East 59th Street Chicago, IL 60637 |
USA | dheller@midway.uchicago.edu | Parametric Adaptive Learning | |
| FRR1.3b | Dorothea | Herreiner | University of Bonn | Institute for Economic Theory III Department of Economics University of Bonn Adenauerallee 24-26 53173 Bonn |
Germany | herreine@econ3.uni-bonn.de | The Decision To Seek or To Be Sought | ||
| WES3.1 | Josef | Hofbauer | University of Vienna | Department of Mathematics University of Veinna Studlhofgasse 4 A-190 Wien |
Austria | Josef.Hofbauer@univie.ac.at | Evolutionary Methods of Equilibrium Selection | ||
| FRR1.2c | Charles A. | Holt | University of Virginia | University of Virginia | USA | cah2k@virginia.edu | The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies | ||
| THR2.4a | Ron | Holzman | Yevgenia Apartsin | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | Department of Mathematics Rm 2-336 Massachusetts Institute of Technology 77 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02139 |
USA | holzman@math.mit.edu | The Core and the Bargaining Set in Glove-Market Games | |
| THR2.3a | Ed | Hopkins | University of Pittsburgh | Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh 4S01 Forbes Quad Pittsburgh, PA 15260 |
USA | hopkinse+@pitt.edu | Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games | ||
| MOP | Chen-Ying | Huang | National Taiwan University | Department of Economics National Taiwan University 21 Hsu-Chow Road Taipei 10020 |
Taiwan | chenying@ccms.ntu.edu.tw | Mulilateral Bargaining: Conditional and Unconditional Offers | ||
| TUR1.8a | Sjaak | Hurkens | Esther Hauk | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Dept. of Economics Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | hurkens@upf.es | On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability | |
| MOR1.10a | Tatsuro | Ichiishi | Semih Koray | Ohio State | Department of Economics Ohio State University 1945 North High Street Columbus, OH 43210-1172 |
U.S.A. | ichiishi.1@osu.edu | Job Matching: A Multi-Principal, Multi-Agent Model | |
| THR2.1b | Haruo | Imai | Kyoto University | Kyoto Institute of Economic Research Kyoto University Kyoto 606-8501 |
Japan | imai@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp | Constrained n-person Bargaining Problems | ||
| WES1.2 | Matthew O. | Jackson | Caltech | California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CA 91125 |
USA | jacksonm@hss.caltech.edu | The Endogenous Choice of Mechanisms: Self-Stable Majority Voting Rules | ||
| MOP | Flavio | Jacome | Pontifica Universidad Javeriana | Facultad de Ciencias Economicas y Administrativas Pontificia Universidad Javeriana |
Spain | fjacome@javercol.javeriana.edu.co | Strategic Managerial Incentives in the Electricity Market | ||
| MOR1.7d | Julian | Jamison | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | j-jamison@northwestern.edu | Assigning and Trading Tasks | ||
| FRR2.5a | William | Janss | Mark Walker | University of Arizona | Department of Economics University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721-0108 |
USA | wpjanss@U.Arizona.EDU | Intertemporal Deployment of a Strategic Resource | |
| THR1.11d | Mogens | Jensen | Danish Competition Authority and Institute of Economics,University of Copenhagen | Danish Competition Authority Noerregade
49 DK-1165 Copenhagen K |
Denmark | mje@ks.dk | Repeated Signalling Games, Long-run Sender and Short-run Receivers | ||
| THR2.6a | Reinoud | Joosten | Thomas Brenner, Ulrich Witt | Max Planck Institute | Max-Planck-Institute for Research into
Economic Systems Evolutionary Economics Unit Kahlaische Strasse 10 D-07745 JENA |
Germany | joosten@mpiew-jena.mpg.de | On games with frequency-dependent payoffs | |
| TUP | Jens | Josephson | Alexander Matros | Stockholm School of Economics | Department of Economics Stockholm School of Economics |
Sweden | jens.josephson@hhs.se | Adaptive Learning by Imitation | |
| FRR1.11c | Vikas | Kakkar | Eric O'N Fisher | City University of Hong Kong | City University of Hong Kong Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon, Hong Kong |
China | efvikas@cityu.edu.hk | On the Evolution of Comparative Advantage | |
| TUR1.5c | Adam | Kalai | Ehud Kalai | Carnegie-Mellon University | Department of Computer Science Carnegie-Mellon University 5000 Forbes Ave. Pittsburgh, PA 15213 |
USA | akalai@cs.cmu.edu | Strategic Polarization | |
| WEP | Ehud | Kalai | Eilon Solan | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | kalai@kellogg.northwestern.edu | Randomization and Simplification | |
| THS3.3 | Ehud | Kalai | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Rd. Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | kalai@northwestern.edu | Information-proof Equilibria in Macro Bayesian Games | ||
| TUR1.2a | Yakar | Kannai | The Weizmann Institute ofScience | Department of Mathematics The Weizmann Institute of Science Rehovot |
Israel | kannai@wisdom.weizmann.ac.il | Costly negotiations leading to the Nash set | ||
| MOR1.3b | Todd R. | Kaplan | Shmuel Zamir | Israel | todd@bgumail.bgu.ac.il | The Strategic use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions | |||
| MOP | Vladislav | Karguine | Boston University | 11 Harold St. A apt.3 Somerville, MA 02143-3909 |
USA | slava@bu.edu | Prevention of Herding Among Experts | ||
| TUR1.11b | Ayca | Kaya | Semih Koray | Bilkent University | Bilkent University Department of Economics Bilkent, Ankara |
Turkey | kaya@bilkent.edu.tr | A Characterization of Solution Concepts Which Only Implement Monotonic Social Choice Rules | |
| TUP | Sabit T. | Khakimzhanov | Bilkent University | Department of Economics Bilkent University Bilkent, Ankara |
Turkey | sabit@bilkent.edu.tr | Debt Reduction or Tax Reform: Numerical Computation of a Markov Equilibrium in a Dynamic Game | ||
| WEP | Kensaku | Kikuta | Kobe University of Commerce | Kobe University of Commerce Department of Management Science |
Japan | kikuta@kobeuc.ac.jp | Strongly Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game | ||
| THR1.8a | Moez | Kilani | University of the Centre | University of the Centre Department of Quantitative Economics 4, rue des hortensias 2080 Ariana |
Tunisia | kilani@planet.tn | Evolution and the Complexity of Finite Automata | ||
| THP | Helena | Kim | K.U. Leuven | Department of Economics- K.U. Leuven Naamsestraat 69 3000 Leuven |
Belgium | Helena.Kim@econ.kuleuven.ac.be | Sequential Crisis Bargaining | ||
| MOR2.9c | Yong-Gwan | Kim | Sung Kyun Kwan University | School of Economics Sung Kyun Kwan University 53, 3-Ka, Myungryun-dong Chongro-Ku, Seoul 110-745 |
Korea | ygkim@yurim.skku.ac.kr | Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest | ||
| FRR1.4d | Alan | Kirman | Wolfgane Hardle | GREQAM | GREQAM 2 Rue de la Charite 13002 Marseille |
France | kirman@ehess.cnrs-mrs.fr | When to Accept and When to Refuse | |
| THR2.11a | Thomas | Kittsteiner | K. Fieseler, B. Moldovanu | University of Mannheim | Graduiertenkolleg "Finanz und Guetermaerkte" Universitaet Mannheim L13, 15 D-68161 Mannheim |
Germany | kittstei@pool.uni-mannheim.de | Partnerships, Lemons, and Efficient Trade | |
| TUR1.2d | Flip | Klijn | Jordi Masso | Tilburg University | CentER and Department of Econometrics Tilburg University Tilburg |
The Netherlands | fklijn@europe.com | Weak Stability and a Bargaining Set for the Marriage Model | |
| TUR2.4c | J. Jude | Kline | The Australian National University | Department of Economics Copland Bld. The Australian National University Canberra, ACT0200 |
Australia | Jeffrey.Kline@anu.edu.au | Minimum memory for equivalence betweenex ante optimality and time consistency | ||
| FRR1.7a | Vicki | Knoblauch | Steffen Huck, Wieland Mueller | University of London | Royal Holloway University of London Egham, Surrey TW20 OEX |
United Kingdom | v.knoblauch@rhbnc.ac.uk | On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games | |
| THP | Laszlo A. | Koczy | Katholieke Universiteit Leuven | Department of Economics Faculty of Economics and Applied Economics Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Naamsestraat 69 B-3000 Leuven |
Belgium | laszlo.koczy@econ.kuleuven.ac.be | Finding the best way to join in--A dynamic accession game | ||
| WEP | Frederic | Koessler | Universite Louis Pasteur | Bureau d'Economie Theorique et Appliquee (UMR 7522 - CNRS) PEGE - Universite Louis Pasteur 61, Avenue de la Foręt-Noire F-67085 Strasbourg Cedex |
France | koessler@cournot.u-strasbg.fr | Strategic Commuication in Games with Certifiable Information | ||
| WES3.3 | Daphne | Koller | Brian Milch | Stanford University | Computer Science Department Gates Buidling 1A Room 142 Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-9010 |
USA | koller@cs.stanford.edu | Structured Models of Complex Decision Problems | |
| TUR2.11c | Maurice | Koster | Tilburg University | CentER and Department of Econometrics Tilburg University PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | M.A.L.Koster@kub.nl | Cooperative production and transferable utility games | ||
| TUR2.9b | Laurence | Kranich | Andres Perea, Hans Peters | University of Albany |
Department of Economics, BA 110 |
USA | L.Kranich@albany.edu | Dynamic Cooperative Games | |
| THP | Andreas | Krause | University of Fribourg | Seminar fuer Nationaloekonomie University of Fribourg Misericorde CH-1700 Fribourg |
Switzerland | andreas.krause@unifr.ch | Patience and Collusion in Repeated Games | ||
| TUS4 | David M. | Kreps | Stanford University and Tel Aviv University | Graduate School of Business Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305-5015 |
USA | kreps@leland.stanford.edu | Game Theory and Management (A Tribute to Don Jacobs) | ||
| WEP | Victoria | Kreps | Victor Domansky | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | St. Petersburg Institute for Economics
and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences Tchaikovskogo 1 St.Petersburg, 191187 |
Russia | vita@agd.stud.pu.ru | Social equilibria for competitive resource allocation models | |
| TUS3.1 | Harold W. | Kuhn | Princeton University |
Department of Mathematics |
USA | kuhn@math.princeton.edu | Extensive Games Revisited | ||
| TUR1.7d | Jeroen | Kuipers | Ulirch Faigle, Walter Kern | University of Maastricht | Department of Economics Maastricht University P.O. Box 616 Tongersestraat 53 6200 MD Maastricht |
The Netherlands | kuipers@math.unimaas.nl | An Efficient Algorithm for Nucleolus and Prekernel Computation in Some Classes of TU-games | |
| FRR2.6a | Nikolai | Kukushkin | Russian Academy of Sciences | Russian Academy of Sciences Computing Center 40 Vavilova, Moscow 117967 |
Russia | ququ@ccas.ru | Perfect Information and Potential | ||
| MOP | Klaus | Kultti | Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration | Department of Economics Helsinki School of Economics and Business Administration P.O. Box 1210 00101 Helsinki |
Finland | kultti@hkkk.fi | Price posting and auctions with a finite number of traders | ||
| THR1.2b | Anthony M. | Kwasnica | Penn State University | Penn State University Dept. of MSIS 339 Beam BAB University Park, PA 16802 |
USA | kwasnica@psu.edu | Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments | ||
| TUP | Hrachya | Kyureghian | Sudipta Sarangi | American University of Armenia | Dept. of Industrial Engineering and Systems
Management American University of Armenia Yerevan 375087 |
Armenia | hkyuregh@aua.am | Transport Cost Sharing and Spatial Competition | |
| THR1.12c | Pierfrancesco | La Mura | Stanford University | Dept. of Computer Science Gates Hall, room 134 Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USAS | piero@robotics.stanford.edu | Game Networks | ||
| FRR1.6c | Gilbert | Laffond | Jean Laine | Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers | Laboratoire d'Econometrie Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers 2 rue Conte 75003 Paris |
France | laffond@vcnam.cnam.fr | Strategic Differentiation in Political Competition Games | |
| THR1.7d | Rida | Laraki | Modal'X, University-Paris-10 & Laboratoire D'Econometrie-Ecole Polytechnique | Laboratoire d'Econometrie 1, rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | laraki@poly.polytechnique.fr | Variational inequalities, system of functional equations and incomplete information repeated games | ||
| MOP | Moussa | Larbani | Fariza Krim | University of Tizi-Ouzou | Department of Mathematics University of Tizi-Ouzou 15000 Tizi-Ouzou |
Algeria | m_larbani@yahoo.fr | About Berge Equilibria | |
| FRR2.8b | Kate | Larson | Tuomas Sandholm | Washington University | Dept. of Computer Science Washington University One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 |
USA | Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems | ||
| THR1.1a | Annick | Laruelle | Federico Valenciano | Universidad de Alicante | Departamento de Fundamentos de Analisis
Economico Universidad de Alicante Campus de San Vicente 03071 ALICANTE |
Spain | laruelle@merlin.fae.ua.es | The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited: A transparent axiomatization | |
| MOR2.8a | Jean-Francois | Laslier | R. Topol, B. Walliser | Ecole Polytechnique | Laboratoire d'Econometrie Ecole Polytechnique 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | laslier@poly.polytechnique.fr | A Behavioral Learning Process in Games | |
| TUR1.4b | Ron | Lavi | Noam Nisan | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Institute of Computer Science Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem |
Israel | tron@cs.huji.ac.il | Competitive Analysis of On-Line Auctions | |
| TUR2.11b | A. | Lebret | Universite de Caen | GEMMA-CREME Universita de Caen 14000 Caen |
France | 91002629@etu.unicaen.fr | Fuzzy Cooperative Games and Political Models | ||
| MOR1.3c | Bernard | Lebrun | Universite Laval | Departement d'economique Univerite Laval Quebec, QC, G1K 7P4 |
Canada | bleb@ecn.ulaval.ca | First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model | ||
| MOR2.6c | Seung-Hoon | Lee | Seoul National University | School of Economics Seoul National University Seoul |
Korea | shoonlee@plaza.snu.ac.kr | Extended Nash Bargaining Solution with Open Outside Opportunities and its Application to Market Allocation and Team Production | ||
| TUR2.12d | Dennis | Leech | University of Warwick | Department of Economics University of Warwick Coventry CV4 7AL |
United Kingdom | D.Leech@warwick.ac.uk | An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices | ||
| FRR1.1a | Daniel | Lehmann | Lehmann, Nisan | Hebrew University | School of Engineering and Computer Science The Hebrew University Jerusalem 91904 |
Israel | lehmann@cs.huji.ac.il | Sub-modular Combinatorial Auctions | |
| TUS3.4 | Ehud | Lehrer | Tel Aviv University | School of Mathematical Sciences Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv 69978 |
Israel | lehrer@math.tau.ac.il | Approachability and Its Applications | ||
| FRR1.9b | Rene | Levinsky | Rene van den Brink, Karel Soukenik | Charles University | CERGE Politickych veznu 7 111 21 Praha |
Czech Republic | rene.levinsky@cerge.cuni.cz | Balanced Solutions for TU-games | |
| FRR1.6a | Gilat | Levy | London School of Economics | Department of Economics London School of Economics Houghton st. London WC2A 2AE |
United Kingdom | g.levy1@lse.ac.uk | Formation of Parties in Multi-Dimensional Policy Space | ||
| THR1.2d | Kevin | Leyton-Brown | Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz | Stanford University | Department of Computer Science Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | kevinlb@robotics.stanford.edu | Bidding Clubs: Institutionalized Collusion in Auctions | |
| TUR1.4c | Kevin | Leyton-Brown | Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz | Stanford University | Department of Computer Science Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | kevinlb@robotics.stanford.edu | An Algorithm for Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions | |
| MOP | Elena | Lezhnina | V. V. Zakharov | St. Petersburg State University | Faculty of Applied Mathematics - Control
Processes St. Petersburg State University St. Petersburg |
Russia | elena.lezhnina@paloma.spbu.ru | Cooperative Solutions and Natural Gas Market | |
| FRR1.8a | Hao | Li | Sherwin Rosen, Wing Suen | University of Toronto | 150 St. George St. Toronto M5S 3G7 Ontario |
Canada | haoli@acsu.buffalo.edu | Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees | |
| TUP | Wei Shi | Lim | National University of Singapore | National University of Singapore 15 Law Link S 117591 Singapore |
The Phillipines | fbalimws@nus.edu.sg | A Search Game By The Name of You've Got Mail | ||
| THR1.3d | Alessandro | Lizzeri | Nicola Persico | Princeton University | Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 |
USA | lizzeri@princeton.edu | The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition | |
| THR1.9c | Natividad | Llorca-Pascual | Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano, Stef Tijs, Judith Timmer | Miguel Hernandez University | Operations Research Center Miguel Hernandez University La Galia Bldg. Avda. del Ferrocarril s/n 03202 Elche |
Spain | nllorca@umh.es | Infinite Continuous Transportation Games | |
| TUR2.3c | Giuseppe | Lopomo | V. Agrawal, S. Seshadri | New York University | Stern School of Business Department of Economics New York University 44, West 4-th Street New York, NY 10012-1126 |
USA | glopomo@stern.nyu.edu | Revenue maximizing selling mechanisms with multiple objects and one-unitdemands | |
| THR2.11b | Shunlong | Luo | Academia Sinica, Beijing | Institute of Applied Mathematics Academia Sinica Beijing, 100080 |
P.R. China | luosl@amath4.amt.ac.cn | The Value of Information in Insider Trading | ||
| TUR1.6c | Xiao | Luo | McGill University | Department of Economics McGill University 855 Sherbrooke St. W. Montreal, Quebec H3A 2T7 |
Canada | xluo1@po-box.mcgill.ca | General Systems and and phi-stable Sets | ||
| THP | Emiel | Maasland | Tilburg University | CentER for Economic Research Tilburg University P.O. Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | e.maasland@kub.nl | Procuring Universal Telecommunications Services | ||
| MOR2.4b | Ines | Macho-Stadler | Maria Paz Espinosa | Universitat Autňnoma de Barcelona | CODE and Department of Economics Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Edifici B E-08193 Bellaterra |
Spain | Ines.Macho@uab.es | Endogenous Formation of Partnerships with Moral Hazard | |
| MOR1.1b | George J. | Mailath | Stephen Morris | University of Pennsylvania | Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104 |
USA | gmailath@econ.sas.upenn.edu | Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring | |
| THP | Marcin | Malawski | Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN | Instytut Podstaw Informatyki PAN Ordona 21 01-237 Warszawa |
Poland | malawski@ipipan.waw.pl | POWER INDICES IN SIMPLE GAMES: TRANSFER PROPERTIES AND MONOTONICITY | ||
| TUP | Xavier Mas | Manez | European University Institute | Economics Department European University Institute Via dei Roccettini 9 50016 San Domenico di Fiesole |
Italy | mas@datacomm.iue.it | Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model | ||
| MOR2.2d | Vlad | Mares | Rutgers University | Dept. of Economics Rutgers University 75 Hamilton New Brunswick, NJ 08901 |
USA | mares@economics.rutgers.edu | Mergers in Common Value Auctions | ||
| TUR1.3d | Massimo | Marinacci | Larry Epstein | Universita de Bologna | Departimento di Scienze Economiche Univerita di Bologna P. Scaravilli 240126 Bologna |
Italy | marinacc@economia.unibo.it | The Core of Large Differentiable TU Games | |
| WEP | Marco | Marini | Sergio Curranrini | University of Urbino | Istituo di Scienze Economiche University of Urbino 61029 Urbino |
Italy | marinmarco@tiscalinet.it | Simultaneous and Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function in Games with Externalities | |
| TUP | Paolo | Marino | France | Paolo.Marino@univ-tlse1.fr | Fictitious play and weak dominance in two player finite games | ||||
| MOR1.12c | Tosh | Maruta | Osaka Prefecture University | College of Economics Osaka Prefecture University 1-1 Gakuencho, Sakai Osaka, 599-8531 |
Japan | tosh@eco.osakafu-u.ac.jp | Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice | ||
| WES2.4 | Michael | Maschler | Daniel Granot, Jonathan Shalev | The Hebrew University | Center for Rationality and Interactive
Decision Theory The Hebrew University Jerusalem 91904 |
Israel | maschler@vms.huji.ac.il | Unanimity in Voting for Voters | |
| TUS3.2 | Eric | Maskin | Princeton University | School of Social Science Institute for Advanced Study Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08540 |
USA | emaskin@mit.edu | Efficiency in Auctions | ||
| FRR1.3d | Jordi | Masso | Ruth Martinez, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | Departament d'Economia i d'Historia Economica Edifici B Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 08193, Bellaterra (Barcelona) |
Spain | jordi.masso@uab.es | An algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings | |
| MOR2.9d | Takashi | Matsuhisa | Ibaraki National College of Technology | Department of Liberal Arts and Sciences Ibaraki National College of Technology 866 Nakane, Hitachinaka-Sh Ibaraki-Ken 312-8508 |
Japan | mathisa@cc.ibaraki-ct.ac.jp | Communication leading to Nash equilibrium | ||
| THP | Tomoni | Matsui | University of Tokyo | Department of Mathematical Engineering
and Information Physics Graduate School of Engineering University of Tokyo Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo 113 |
Japan | tomomi@misojiro.t.u-tokyo.ac.jp | A Minimum Taxrate Core Allocation of Bin Packing Game | ||
| TUP | Yasuko | Matsui | Tokai University | Department of Mathematical Sciences Faculty of Science Tokai University Hiratsuka, Kanagawa 259-129 |
Japan | yasuko@ss.u-tokai.ac.jp | A Dynamic Programming Technique for Calculating the Deegan Packel Power Indices | ||
| MOR1.1a | Steven A. | Matthews | George J. Mailath, Tadashi Sekiguchi | University of Pennsylvania | Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia, PA 19104-6297 |
USA | stevenma@ssc.upenn.edu | Private Strategies in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring | |
| TUS3.3 | Richard D. | McKelvey | Caltech | California Institute of Technology Mail Code 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125 |
USA | rdm@hss.caltech.edu | Effects of "Mistakes" in Game Theoretic Models of Political Processes | ||
| WEP | Robert | McKelvey | Leif Sandal, Stein Steinshamn | University of Montana | 1740 Madeline Ave. Missoula, MT 59801 |
USA | MA_RWM@selway.umit.edu | Fish-Wars on the High Seas: Erecting Economic Barriers to Entry | |
| MOR1.5a | Richard P. | McLean | Andrew Postlewaite | Rutgers University | Department of Economics Rutgers University New Brunswick, NJ 08901-1248 |
USA | rpmclean@rci.rutgers.edu | Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information | |
| MOR1.2b | Andrew | McLennan | University of Minnesota | Department of Economics University of Minnesota 1035 Mngmt & Econ 271 19th Ave. S. Minneapolis, MN 55455 |
USA | mclennan@atlas.socsci.umn.edu | Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem | ||
| FRR1.12d | Holger | Meinhardt | University of Karlsruhe | Department of Economics University of Karlsruhe P.O. Box 6980 Zirkel 2 D-76128 Karlsruhe |
Germany | hme@vw13.wiwi.karlsruhe.de | Convexity and k-convexity in Cooperative Common Pool Games | ||
| FRR1.6b | Adam | Meirowitz | Stanford University | Graduate School of Business Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | ameirow@leland.stanford.edu | Polling Games and Information Revelation in the Downsian Framework | ||
| THP | Flavio | Menezes | Paulo Monteiro, Akram Temimi | Australian National University | Department of Economics (Building # 26) Faculty of Economics and Commerce Australian National University Canberra, ACT 0200 |
Australia | Flavio.Menezes@anu.edu.au | Discrete Public Goods with Incomplete Information | |
| THR1.1c | Vincent | Merlin | Annick Laruelle | Universite de Caen | MRSH, bureau 230 Universite de Caen 14032 Caen Cedex |
France | merlin@econ.unicaen.fr | Different Least Square Values, Different Rankings | |
| MOR2.12d | Jean-Francois | Mertens | Francesco De Sinopoli (author) | CORE (original author) | CORE-UCL 34 Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
Belgium | desinopoli@core.ucl.ac.be | On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games | |
| THS3.4 | Jean-Francois | Mertens | Isabel Grilo | CORE | Catholic Univeristy of Louvain 34, Voie du Roman Pays B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve |
Belgium | jrm@core.ucl.ac.be | Cournot Equilibrium | |
| TUR1.9d | Mathias | Messner | Mattias Polborn | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Dept. of Economics Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | matthias.messner@econ.upf.es | Cooperation in Stochastic OLG Games | |
| THS3.2 | Margaret | Meyer | Christopher Avery | Nuffield College | Nuffield College Oxford OX1 1NF |
United Kingdom | margaret.meyer@nuffield.oxford.ac.uk | Choosing Procedures for Eliciting Advice from Biased Advisors | |
| TUR1.6b | Claudio | Mezzetti | James W. Friedman | Department of Economics University of North Carolina Chapel Hill, NC 27599-3305 |
USA | mezzetti@email.unc.edu | Random Belief Equilibrium: Theory and Applications to Experimental Games | ||
| THP | J. | Miekisz | Michael Ramsza (author) | Warsaw School of Economics | Institute of Econometrics Warsaw School of Economics Aleje Niepodleglosci 162 02 - 554, Warsaw |
Poland | mramsz@sgh.waw.pl | Certainly Worse Strategies and Sampling Dynamics | |
| THR1.8b | Jacek | Miekisz | University of Warsaw | Institute of Applied Mathematics and Mechanics University of Warsaw 02-097 Warsaw |
Poland | miekisz@mimuw.edu.pl | Statistical Mechanics of Simple Spatial Games | ||
| THP | Fausto | Mignanego | S. Mulinacci | Univerita Cattolica Sacro Cuore | Universite Cattolica Sacro Cuore Milan |
Italy | fmignane@ml.unicatt.it | Noncooperative Stockastic Stackelberg Games | |
| MOR1.7a | Igal | Milchtaich | Bar-Ilan University | Department of Economics Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan 52900 |
Israel | milchti@mail.biu.ac.il | How Does Selfishness Affect Well-Being? | ||
| THR2.10a | Salvatore | Modica | University of Palermo | Facolta' di Economia University of Palermo 90128 Palermo |
Italy | modica@unipa.it | Unawareness, priors and posteriors | ||
| MOP | Bernando | Moreno | Universidad de Malaga | Departamento de Teoria e Historia Economica Universidad de Malaga Campus El Ejido s/n 29013 Malaga |
Spain | bernardo@uma.es | |||
| TUR1.12b | Diego | Moreno | Ezra Einy, Benyamin Shitovitz | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Departamento de Economia Universidad Carlos III de Madrid 28903 Geafe |
Spain | dmoreno@eco.uc3m.es | Information Advantage in Cournot Oligopoly | |
| TUR1.3a | Jacqueline | Morgan | Universita di Napoli "Federico II" | Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni Universita di Napoli "Federico II" Via Cinthia 80126, Naples |
Italy | morgan@matna2.dma.unina.it | Stability of the Core for Cooperative Games Without Transferable Untility Under Perturbations | ||
| MOR2.9a | John | Morgan | Vijay Krishna | Princeton University | Woodrow Wilson School Princeton University Princeton, NJ |
USA | rjmorgan@princeton.edu | Communicating with Experts | |
| TUR2.2a | Yoram | Moses | Rann Smorodinsky | Technion---Israel | Faculty of Electrical Engineering Technion Israel Institute of Technology Haifa 32000 |
Israel | moses@ee.technion.ac.il | Equilibrium in An Asynchronous Model | |
| WES3.4 | Herve | Moulin | Rice University |
Department of Economics |
USA | moulin@rice.edu | Distributing Beans According to Claims: Proportional, Fair Queuing, and Other Methods | ||
| TUR1.4a | Rudolf | Muller | Maastricht University | Department of Quantitative Economics Maastricht University P.O. Box 616 Tongersestraat 53 6200 MD Maastricht |
The Netherlands | r.muller@ke.unimaas.nl | On the Computational Complexity of winner determination in Combinatorial Auctions | ||
| TUR1.6a | Shigeo | Muto | Akihiro Suzuki | Tokyo Institute of Technology | Department of Value and Decision Science Graduate School of Decision Science and Technology Tokyo Institute of Technology 2-12-1 Oh-Okayama, Meguro-ku Tokyo 152-8552 |
Japan | muto@valdes.titech.ac.jp | Farsighted Stability in n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma | |
| TUS2.1 | Roger | Myerson | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Leverone Hall Northestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | myerson@northwestern.edu | Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games | ||
| FRR1.2d | Rosemarie | Nagel | Antoni Bosch-Domenech, Albert Satorra, Jose Garcia-Montalvo | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Department of Economics Universitat Pompeu Fabra Ramon Trias Fargas, 24 08005 Barcelona |
Spain | nagel@upf.es | One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments | |
| MOR2.1d | Mikio | Nakayama | Keio University | Department of Economics Keio University 2-15-45 Mita Tokyo 108-8345 |
Japan | nakayama@econ.keio.ac.jp | Kinship-Recognition and Self-Sacrifice in Prisoners' Dilemma | ||
| FRR1.9d | Stefan | Napel | Mika Widgren | University of Karlsruhe | Institute for Economics and Operations
Research Universitat Karlsruhe Kollegium am Schloss IV 76128 Karlsruhe |
Germany | napel@wior.uni-karlsruhe.de | Inferior Players in Simple Games | |
| FRS5 | John F. | Nash, Jr. | Princeton University | USA | PANEL: On Future Applications of Game Theory | ||||
| TUP | S. A. | Nemnyugin | O. A. Malafeev, A. V. Krutova | Sankt-Petersburg State University | Sankt-Petersburg State University Physics Faculty Sankt-Petersburg, 198904, ul.Ulyanovskaya 1 |
Russia | nemnugin@mph.phys.spbu.ru | The Conflict Model Of The Option Prices Dynamic On Security Market | |
| THP | Bernhard | Neumaerker | Ruhr University | Ruhr-University Bochum Department of Economics D-44780 Bochum |
Germany | Bernhard.K.Neumaerker@ruhr-uni-bochum.de | The power of providing public goods privately (or publicly): A game-theoretic analysis | ||
| MOR2.1a | Abraham | Neyman | Daijiro Okada | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Center for Rationality Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem |
Israel | aneyman@sunset.huji.ac.il | Strategy Space Restriction in Repeated Games | |
| TUS1.2 | Abraham | Neyman | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Center for Rationality Hebrew University of Jerusalem Jerusalem |
Israel | aneyman@sunset.huji.ac.il | Games with Uncertain Duration | ||
| THR2.1d | Antonio | Nicolo | Andres Perea | Universitat Autonoma deBarcelona | Dipartimento di Scienze and Economiche Universitŕ degli studi di Padovavia del Santo 3335123 Padova |
Italy | A Non-Welfarist Approach to Bargaining Situations | ||
| THR2.11c | Muriel | Niederle | Rudolf Kerschbamer, Josef Perktold | Harvard University | Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 |
USA | niederle@kuznets.fas.harvard.edu | Quality Enforcement as a Public Good | |
| THR2.12a | Thomas | Noe | Tulane University | A. B. Freeman School of Business 601 Goldring/Woldenberg Hall Tulane University New Orleans, LA 70118-5669 |
U.S.A | tnoe@mailhost.tcs.tulane.edu | Fooling all of the people some of the time:A theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations | ||
| TUR2.12b | Henk | Norde | Hans Reijnierse | Tilburg University | CentER for Economic Research Tilburg University P.O. Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | h.norde@kub.nl | A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme | |
| WEP | Ed | Nosal | University of Waterloo | Department of Economics University of Waterloo Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G1 |
Canada | ednosal@watarts.uwaterloo.ca | Information Gathering by an Informed Principal | ||
| MOP | Natalia M. | Novikova | Moscow State University | Computing Center Russian Academy of Scienses Moscow State University Moscow |
Russia | nnovik@ccas.ru | Games with forbidden outcomes | ||
| FRS3.1 | Barry | O'Neill | Stanford University | CISAC Encina Hall Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | barry.oneill@stanford.edu | The Treatment of Emotions in Game Theory | ||
| THR1.7c | Ichiro | Obara | V. Bhaskar | University of Pennsylvania |
Department of Economics |
USA | obara@ssc.upenn.edu | The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring | |
| TUP | Ichiro | Obara | Michihiro Kandori | University of Pennsylvania |
Department of Economics |
USA | obara@ssc.upenn.edu | Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited | |
| MOR1.12a | Joerg | Oechssler | Frank Riedel | University of Bonn | Department of Economics University of Bonn Adenauerallee 24 53113 Bonn |
Germany | oechssler@uni-bonn.de | The Insufficiency of Static Evolutionary Stability Conditions | |
| THR1.7a | Akira | Okada | Kyoto University | Institute of Economic Research Kyoto University Sakyo, Kyoto 606-8501 |
Japan | okada@kier.kyoto-u.ac.jp | Social Development Promoted by Cooperation: A Simple Game Model | ||
| TUR1.10a | Norma | Olaizola | E. Inarra, J. Kuipers | Basque Country University | Depart. Fundamentos del Analisis Economico Basque Country University 48015 Bilbao |
Spain | etpolorn@bs.ehu.es | Absorbing Sets in Coalition Formation Systems | |
| THP | Sander | Onderstal | Tilburg University | Tilburg University; CentER Room B805 Postbus 90153 5000LE Tilburg |
Netherlands | A.M.Onderstal@kub.nl | The Tennis Racket Auction | ||
| MOP | Erwin | Ooghe | CES | CES Naamsestraat, 69 B3000 Leuven |
Belgium | erwin.ooghe@econ.kuleuven.ac.be | Reasonable Agreement and Distributive Justice: Generalized Leximin | ||
| MOR1.5d | Joseph | Ostroy | Louis Makowski | UCLA | Department of Economics Box 951477 UCLA Los Angeles, CA 90095-1477 |
USA | ostroy@econ.ucla.edu | Linear Programming and General Equilibrium Theory | |
| MOR1.6d | Ursula F. | Ott | Loughborough University | Loughborough University Ashy Road Loughborough Leicestershire LE11 3TU | United Kingdom | u.f.ott@lboro.ac.uk | International Joint Ventures: A Common Agency Game | ||
| TUR1.12c | Marco | Ottaviani | Andrea Prat | University College London | Department of Economics University College London Gower Street London WC1E 6BT |
United Kingdom | m.ottaviani@ucl.ac.uk | The Value of Public Information in Monopoly | |
| THR1.3a | Guillermo | Owen | Bernard Grofman | Naval Postgraduate School | Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA |
USA | GOwen@nps.navy.mil | Two stage electoral competition | |
| MOR1.10c | Frank H. | Page | University of Alabama | Department of Finance University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL 35487 |
USA | fpage@cba.ua.edu | Competitive Selling Mechanisms: The Delegation Principle and Farsighted Stability | ||
| FRR1.4c | Ignacio | Palacios-Huerta | Brown University | Department of Economics Brown University Box B Providence, RI 02912 |
USA | ipalacios@brown.edu | Game Theory in the Grass | ||
| FRR2.1a | Jorge R. | Palamara | Lloyd Shapley | University of California | Department of Economics University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90074 |
USA | jpala@ucla.edu | Simple Games and Authority Structures | |
| FRR1.6d | Thomas | Palfrey | Enriqueta Aragones | California Institute of Technology | California Institute of Technology 228-77 Pasadena, CA 91125 |
USA | trp@hss.caltech.edu | Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate | |
| FRR1.2a | Tomas R. | Palfrey | Caltech |
California Institute of Technology |
USA | trp@hss.caltech.edu | Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions | ||
| TUR2.10d | Szilvia | Papai | Universidade Nova de Lisboa | Faculdade de Economia Universidade Nova de Lisboa Travessa Estevao Pinto 1099-032 Lisboa |
Portugal | spapai@fe.unl.pt | Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games | ||
| THR2.8d | Kichool | Park | University of California | Department of Economics University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90024 |
U.S.A. | kichool@ucla.edu | Two Player Continuous Time Bandit Problem | ||
| TUP | Ivan | Pastine | Tuvana Pastine | pastine@bilkent.edu.tr | Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: The Role of Advertising and Product Quality | ||||
| WEP | Maite | Pastor-Gosalbez | Ramon Fauli | CEU/San Pablo | CEU/San Pabloc/Comissari 1 03220 Elx Alicante |
Spain | ceuade@ctv.es | Merger Policy in R&D Intensive Industries | |
| TUR1.9a | Fioravante | Patrone | L. Mendez-Naya, I. Garcia-Jurado | Univ. of Genoa | University of Genoa Genoa |
Italy | patrone@dima.unige.it | Unilateral Commitments and Finitely Repeated Games | |
| FRR1.9a | Sergei | Pechersky | Elena Yanovskaya | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | St. Petersburg Institute for Economics
and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences 1 Tchaikovsky str1 91187 St. Petersburg |
Russia | specher@eu.spb.ru | Transfer Values for Games with Non Transferable Utilities | |
| MOP | Ronald | Peeters | Jean-Jacques Herings | University of Maastricht | Department of Economics University of Maastricht P.O. Box 626 6200 MD Maastricht |
The Netherlands | R.Peeters@algec.unimaas.nl | A Globally Convergent Algorithm to Computer Stationary Equilibria in Stochastic Games | |
| FRR2.11b | Bezalel | Peleg | Hans Keiding | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Feldman Bldg. Givat Ram 91904 Jerusalem |
Israel | pelegba@math.huji.ac.il | Correlated Equilibria of Games with Many Players | |
| MOP | Pedro | Pereira | Cristina Mazon | Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Campus de Somosaguas | Departamento de Fundamentos del Analisis
Economico II Universidad Complutense de Madrid Campus de Somosaguas 28223 Madrid |
Spain | eccuax7@sis.ucm.es | E-commerce and the Retail Industry | |
| THR1.10b | David | Perez-Castrillo | David Wettstein | Universitat Autňnoma de Barcelona | Universitat Autňnoma de Barcelona Dep. Economia e Historia Economica and CODE Edifici BE 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) |
Spain | David.Perez@uab.es | Bidding for the surplus: A non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value | |
| FRR1.8c | Nicola | Persico | University of Pennsylvania | Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania room 445, McNeil building 3718 Locust Walk Philadelphia PA 19104-6297 |
USA | persico@econ.sas.upenn.edu | Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design withEndogenous Information | ||
| TUR2.9a | Hans | Peters | Walter Bossert, Jean Derks, Stef Tijs | University of Maastricht | Department of Quantitative Economics University of Maastricht P.O.Box 616 6200 MD Maastricht |
The Netherlands | H.Peters@ke.unimaas.nl | EFFICIENCY IN UNCERTAIN COOPERATIVE GAMES | |
| THR1.12a | Avi | Pfeffer | Daphne Koller, Ken T. Takusagawa | Harvard University | Harvard University Cambridge, MA 02138 |
USA | avi@eecs.harvard.edu | State-space Approximations for Extensive Form Games | |
| TUR1.12d | Kim Hang | Pham Do | Stef Tijs, Henk Norde | Tilburg University | Department of Economics/Econometrics CentER, Tilburg University Warandelaan 2 P.O.Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | K.H.Phamdo@kub.nl | Oligopoly Games with and Without Transferable Technologies | |
| FRR2.4a | Clara | Ponsati | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | Departament d'Economia i d'Historia Economica Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Edifici B 08193 Bellaterra (Barcelona) |
Spain | clara.ponsati@uab.es | Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets | ||
| THR1.6a | Jean Pierre | Ponssard | Eric Louvert | Ecole Polytechnique, Paris | Directeur de recherche au CNRS Laboratoire d'Econometrie 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | ponssard@poly.polytechnique.fr | A strategic model of hit and run | |
| MOP | Giovanni | Ponti | Anita Gantner, Robert Montgomery | Universidad de Alicante | Departamento de Fundamentos del Analisis
Economico Universidad de Alicante 03071 Alicante |
Spain | giuba@merlin.fae.ua.es | Solomon's Dilemma: an Experimental Study on Dynamic Implementation | |
| FRS3.2 | Andrew | Postlewaite | Richard McLean | University of Pennsylvania | Department of Economics University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104 |
USA | apostlew@econ.sas.upenn.edu | Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Multidimensional Signals | |
| TUP | Anders | Poulsen | University of Essex | Department of Economics University of Essex Wivenhoe Park Colchester CO4 3SQ |
United Kingdom | aupoul@essex.ac.uk | Commitment and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Evolutionary Analysis | ||
| THR1.4c | Rimawan | Pradiptyo | York University | Department of Economics and Related Studies York University |
United Kingdom | rp104@york.ac.uk, Rimawan@usa.net | Loss Aversion Fictitious Play | ||
| MOR2.11a | Andrea | Prat | A. Rustichini | London School of Economics | London School of Economics Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE |
United Kingdom | A.Prat@lse.ac.uk | Games Played Through Agents | |
| FRR1.10b | Ernst L. | Presman | CEMI RAS | Central Economics and Mathematical Institute Russian Academy of Sciences 47 Nakhimovsky Prospect Moscow 117418 |
Russia | presman@cemi.rssi.ru | Nash Equiliubrium Points in an m player Game of "Black Jack" | ||
| THR1.7b | Daniel | Probst | Matthias Blonski | Mannheim University | Department of Economic Theory Mannheim University |
Germany | dprobst@pool.uni-mannheim.de | The Emergence of Trust | |
| MOP | Julia G. | Pzareva | e-mail sender: V. N. Saprunov | Taganrog State University of Radioengineering Faculty of Economics, Management and Jurisprudence Taganrog, Russia |
Russia | otdel15@techno.infotecstt.ru | Theory games application to solution of public conveyance problems | ||
| MOR2.10c | Cheng-Zhong | Qin | Hong Kong University of Science and Technology | Department of Economics Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Clear Water Bay Kowloon, Hong Kong |
China | Credible Commitment: Ex Ante Deterrence and Ex Post Compensation | |||
| TUR1.6d | Ant | Quesada | Spain | estinnobis@retemail.es | Weakness of Perfect, Proper and Persistent Equilibria | ||||
| FRR2.3b | Antonio | Quesada | P.O. Box 2046 08907 L'Hospitalet de Llobregat |
Spain | fullsail@navegalia.com | When common knowledge of rationality is common knowledge of backward induction | |||
| FRR1.9c | Tadeusz | Radzik | Technical University of Wroclaw | Institute of Mathematics Technical University of Wroclaw 50-370 Wroclaw Wybrzeze Wyspianskiego 27 |
Poland | tradzik@jegorek.pwr.jgora.pl | A General Approach to TU-weighted Games | ||
| THR2.6d | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | Department of Mathematics University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL |
USA | ter@uic.edu | A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of a Special Class | |
| THR2.6b | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | Department of Mathematics University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL |
USA | ter@uic.edu | A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of Perfect Information | |
| THR2.6c | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | Department of Mathematics University of Illinois at Chicago Chicago, IL |
USA | ter@uic.edu | Using Lemke's Algorithm to Solve Two-person Single-controller Stochastic Games | |
| THR2.7d | Matthias | Raith | Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su | University of Bielefeld | Institute of Mathematical Economics Universitaet Bielefeld Postfach 100131 33501 Bielefeld |
Germany | Bidding for Envy-freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems | ||
| WEP | Francisco S. | Ramos | Silvinha P. Vasconcelos | Federal University of Pernambuco-Brazil | Department of Economics PIMES/PPGEP Federal University of Pernambuco |
Brazil | fsr@npd.ufpe.br | The regulation of anti-competitive actions under asymmetric information when reputation doesn't matter | |
| THP | Francisco S. | Ramos | Roberto A. Perrelli | Federal Univ. of Pernambuco | Department of Economics PIMS F ederal University of Pernambuco |
Brazil | fsr@npd.ufpe.br | PRUDENTIAL REGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING OF THE BRAZILIAN FINANCIAL MARKET | |
| FRR2.11a | Ray | University of York | Department of Economics University of York Heslington, York YO10 5DD |
United Kingdom | ir2@york.ac.uk | Correlation and Coordination: Sunspots May Not Be Replaced by A Mediator | |||
| MOR1.9d | Ronny | Razin | Princeton University | Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton, NJ |
USA | rrazin@princeton.edu | Two Candidates with Heterogeneous Voters | ||
| THR2.8c | Mari | Rege | Statistics Norway | Statistics Norway Research Department P.b. 8131 Dep. N-0033 Oslo |
Norway | mari.rege@econ.upf.es | Networking Strategy: People Cooperate Today in Order to Meet More Cooperators Tomorrow | ||
| THR1.11b | Jerome | Renault | Université PARIS IX DAUPHINE | CEREMADE, Université PARIS IX DAUPHINE Place du Marechal de Lattre de Tassigny 75775 PARIS Cedex 16 |
France | renault@ceremade.dauphine.fr | Information transmission in a way robust to unilateral deviations: A characterization | ||
| TUS1.4 | Philip J. | Reny | Shmuel Zamir | University of Chicago | Department of Economics University of Chicago 1126 E. 59th St. Chicago, IL 60637 |
USA | p-reny@uchicago.edu | On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions | |
| TUR2.10a | Arno | Riedl | Akiro Okada | CREED, Amsterdam | CREED, Dept. of Economics Roetersstraat 11 NL-1018 WB Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | riedl@fee.uva.nl | Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition formation Game: Experimental Evidence | |
| THR1.11a | Klaus | Ritzberger | Helmut Bester | Institute for Advanced Studies | Institute for Advanced Studies Dept. of Economics and Finance Stumpergasse 56A 1060 Vienna |
Austria | ritzbe@ihs.ac.at | Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Costly Information Acquisition | |
| MOR1.7c | Arthur | Robson | Philippe Gregoire | University of Western Ontario | Department of Economics University of Western Ontario London, Ontario N6A 5C2 |
Canada | arobson@julian.uwo.ca | IMITATION, GROUP SELECTION AND COOPERATION | |
| FRR1.1d | Amir | Ronen | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Institute of Computer Science Hebrew University of Jerusalem Givat Ram, Jerusalem 91904 |
Israel | amiry@cs.huji.ac.il | Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms | ||
| FRR1.10a | Dinah | Rosenberg | Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille | Universite Paris | Maison des Sciences Economiques Universite Paris 1106-112 boulevard de l'Hopital 75647 Paris Cedex 13 |
France | dinah@zeus.math.univ-paris13.fr | Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies | |
| MOR1.6c | Joachim | Rosenmuller | University of Bielefeld | IMW University of Bielefeld Postfach 10 01 31 33501 Bielefeld |
Germany | imw@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de | Cartels and Linear Production Games | ||
| TUS1.1 | Howard | Rosenthal | Princeton University | Department of Politics 031 Corwin Hall Princeton University Princeton NJ 08544 |
USA | rosentha@princeton.edu | Recent Applications of Game Theory in Political Science | ||
| MOR2.5a | Howard | Rosenthal | Wojciech Olszewskia | Princeton University | Department of Politics Princeton University Princeton NJ 08544 |
USA | rosentha@princeton.edu | Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods | |
| MOR2.3a | Robert W. | Rosenthal | Donald J. Dale, John Morgan | Boston University | Department of Economics Boston University 270 Bay State Rd. Boston, MA 02215 |
USA | rosentha@bu.edu | Coordination Through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment | |
| THR1.10d | Giovanni | Rossi |
University |
Department of Political Economics University of Siena |
Italy | rossi@geomin.unibo.it | Axiomatizations of Value Functions for Communication Situations | ||
| TUP | Ewa | Roszkowska | Anna Gomolinska, Tom Burns | University of Bialystok |
University of Bialystok |
Poland | erosz@weko.uwb.edu.pl | Rule complexes for the social game theory | |
| MOS3.1 | Alvin E. | Roth | Axel Ockenfels | Harvard University | GSB Harvard University Soldiers Field Road Baker Library 188 Boston, MA 02163 |
USA | aroth@hbs.edu | Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet | |
| TUR2.4d | Jorn | Rothe | London School of Economics | Interdisciplinary Institute of Management London School of Economics Houghton Street London WC2A 2AE |
United Kingdom | J.D.Rothe@lse.ac.uk | Uncertainty, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games | ||
| THP | Agnieszka | Rusinowska | Honorata Sosnowska (author) | Warsaw School of Economics | Institute of Econometrics Warsaw School of Economics 02-554 Warsaw, Niepodleglosci 162 |
Poland | arusin@sgh.waw.pl | More Fairly or the Same? Game Theoretical Analysis of Projects of Changes in Polish Electoral Law | |
| THP | Agnieszka | Rusinowska | Warsaw School of Economics | Warsaw School of Economics Institute of Econometrics Al. Niepodleglosci 162 02-554 Warsaw |
Poland | arusin@sgh.waw.pl | Bargaining Model with Preferences Described by Sequences of Discount Rates and Sequences of Bargaining Costs | ||
| TUS1.3 | Aldo | Rustichini | Johannes Berg, Matteo Marsili, Riccardo Zecchina | Boston University | Department of Economics Boston University 270 Bay State Road Boston, MA 02215 |
USA | raldo@bu.edu | Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning in Large Games | |
| WEP | Michael J. | Ryan | The University of Hull | School of Economic Studies The University of Hull Hull HU6 7RX |
United Kingdom | econ@hull.ac.uk | Conditional and Strategic Equivalence and Frame Restricted choice with Applications to Regulatory Risk and Uncertainty | ||
| TUR2.2b | Hamid | Sabourian | University of Cambridge | King's College University of Cambridg Cambridge CB2 1ST |
United Kingdom | hs102@econ.cam.ac.uk | Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome | ||
| THR1.8c | Martha | Saboya | Axel Ostmann | Universidad Autonoma de Madrid | Departamento de Analísis Económico Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales Universidad Autonoma de Madrid 28049 Cantoblanco (Madrid) |
Spain | martha.saboya@uam.es | Symmetric homogeneous local interaction | |
| THR2.2a | Abdolkarim | Sadrieh | Klaus Abbink, Ron Darziv, Zohar Gilula, Harel Goren, Bernd Irlenbusch, Arnon Keren, Bettina Rockenbach, Reinhard Selten, and Shmuel Zamir | Tilburg University | Department of Economics
and CentER for Economic Research Tilburg University PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | sadrieh@kub.nl | The Competitive Ultimatum Game: When Competition Matters, Although It Should Not, and Backward Induction Appears Through the Backdoor | |
| MOR2.6a | Zvika | Safra | Eran Hanany | Tel Aviv University | Faculty of Management Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv, Israel |
Israel | safraz@post.tau.ac.il | Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes | |
| THR2.12c | Nicolas | Sahuguet | Johannes Horner | University of Pennsylvania | Department of Economics Mc Neil Building University of Pennsylvania Philadelphia, PA 19104 |
USA | nicolas2@ssc.upenn.edu | The timing of bids in all-pay auctions | |
| MOR1.4d | Hannu | Salonen | University of Turku | Department of Economics University of Turku 20014, Turku |
Finland | hansal@utu.fi | Beliefs, Filters and Measurability | ||
| WES1.4 | Dov | Samet | P. Jehiel | Tel Aviv University | Faculty of Management Tel Aviv University Tel Aviv |
Israel | DovS@tauex.tau.ac.il | Learning to Play by Node Valuation | |
| FRR1.1c | Tuomas | Sandholm | Subhash Suri | Washington University | Washington University Department of Computer Science St. Louis, MO 63130-4899 |
USA | sandholm@cs.wustl.edu | Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations | |
| FRR1.11a | William H. | Sandholm | University of Wisconsin | Department of Economics University of Wisconsin 1180 Observatory Drive Madison, WI 53706 |
USA | whs@ssc.wisc.edu | Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing | ||
| THP | Karel-Jan | Sandker | Maastricht University | Maastricht University Department Algemene Economie FEWPost-box 616 6200 MD, Maastricht |
The Netherlands | K.Sandker@Algec.Unimaas.Nl | A Welfare Enhancing Piecemeal Policy | ||
| MOR1.9a | Alvaro | Sandroni | Tim Feddersen | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Leverone Hall Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
U.S.A. | sandroni@northwestern.edu | A theory of citizen duty and voting turnout | |
| MOR2.8d | Rajiv | Sarin | Dana Heller | Texas A&M University | Texas A&M University College Station, TX 77843-4228 |
USA | rsarin@econ.tamu.edu | Adaptively learning mixed equilibrium | |
| TUS2.4 | Mark | Satterthwaite | Northwestern University | KGMS/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | m-satterthwaite@northwestern.edu | The Optimality of the Double Auction Trading Mechanism | ||
| TUR2.4a | Marco | Scarsini | Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Shmuel Zamir | Columbia University | The Italian Academy Mail Code 1401 Columbia University 1161 Amsterdam Avenue New York, NY 10027 |
USA | scarsini@stat.columbia.edu | A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information | |
| TUR2.8b | Jonathan | Schaeffer | Darse Billings, Aaron Davidson, Duane Szafron | University of Alberta | Department of Computing Science University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H1 |
Canada | jonathan@cs.ualberta.ca | High-performance Computer Poker: When Game-theory Meets Practice | |
| MOS3.3 | Jonathan | Schaeffer | University of Alberta | Department of Computing Science University of Alberta Edmonton, Alberta T6G 2H1 |
Canada | jonathan@cs.ualberta.ca |
On Computers and Games |
||
| WES2.2 | Robert | Schapire | AT&T Labs | AT&T Labs, Research Shannon Laboratory 180 Park Ave. Room A203 Florham Park, NJ 07932-0971 |
USA | schapire@research.att.com | Modern Approaches to Machine Learning and their Game-theoretic Context | ||
| TUR1.12a | Karl H. | Schlag | European University Institute | Department of Economics European University Institute Via dei Roccettini 950016 San Domenico di Fiesole |
Italy | The Impact of Selling Information on Competition | |||
| TUR1.1a | David | Schmeidler | Itzhak Gilboa | Tel Aviv University |
Tel Aviv University |
Israel | schmeid@post.tau.ac.il | Cognitive Foundations of Probability | |
| FRS1.3 | David | Schmeidler | Ithzak Gilboa | Tel Aviv and Ohio State Universities |
Tel Aviv University |
Israel | schmeid@post.tau.ac.il | Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach | |
| FRR2.9b | Christian | Schmidt | Université Paris-Dauphine | LESOD Université Paris-Dauphine Paris |
France | christian.schmidt@dauphine.fr | What can game theory learn from its history? | ||
| WEP | Kalpana | Scholtes-Dash | Institute for Advanced Studies | Institute for Advanced studies Department of Economics and Finance Strumpergasse 56A-1060 Vienna |
Austria | scholtes@ihs.ac.at | Can There be Informationally Efficient Fianncial Market with Asymmetric Information Between Market Mkers? | ||
| TUR2.5b | James | Schummer | Rakesh Vohra | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University Leverone Hall 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | schummer@northwestern.edu | Strategy-proof Location on a Network | |
| TUR2.4b | Michael | Schwarz | Harvard University | Department of Economics Harvard University Boston, MA 02138 |
USA | mschwarz@arrow.fas.harvard.edu | Decision Making Under Extreme Uncertainty | ||
| MOR2.3c | Martin | Sefton | Tony Burton | University of Newcastle | Department of Economics University of Newcastle Newcastle-upon-Tyne NE1 7RU |
United Kingdom | martin.sefton@ncl.ac.uk | Communication and Equilibrium | |
| TUR2.3b | Aner | Sela | B. Moldovanu | Ben-Gurion University of the Negev | Monaster Center for Economic Research Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheeva 84105 |
Israel | anersela@bgumail.bgu.ac.il | The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests | |
| MOR2.2c | Aner | Sela | E. Einy, R. Orzach | Ben-Gurion University of the Negev | Monaster Center for Economic Research Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Beer-Sheeva 84105 |
Israel | anersela@bgumail.bgu.ac.il | Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information | |
| MOS2b | Reinhard | Selten | University of Bonn | Department of Economics University of Bonn Adenauerallee 24-26 53173 Bonn |
Germany | n/a | How to PlayGames--Lessons from Strategy Experiments | ||
| MOR1.5b | Roberto | Serrano | Rajiv Vohra, Oscar Volij | Brown University | Department of Economics Box B Brown University Providence, RI 02912 |
U.S.A. | roberto_serrano@brown.edu | On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies of Asymmetric Information | |
| WEP | Daniel | Sgroi | University of Oxford | Nuffield College University of Oxford Oxford, OX1 1NF |
United Kingdom | daniel.sgroi@nuf.ox.ac.uk | The Optimal Structure of the Herd: Guinea Pigs and Aggregate Welfare | ||
| FRS4 | Lloyd | Shapley | University of California | Department of Mathematics and Economcis University of California, Los Angeles Los Angeles, CA 90024 |
USA | shapley@econ.ucla.edu | The Oskar Morgenstern Lecture: "Ethics and Clusters" | ||
| THR2.2b | Tridib | Sharma | Tim Cason | ITAM, CIE--Mexico City |
ITAM, CIE |
Mexico | sharma@master.ster.itam.mx | Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics and Uncertainty: Theory andExperiments | |
| THP | Tridib | Sharma | ITAM, CIE--Mexico City | ITAM, CIE Santa Teresa 930 Mexico City 10700 |
Mexico | sharma@master.ster.itam.mx | Equity and Anonymous markets as Commitment Devices | ||
| THS1.1 | Scott | Shenker | International Computer Science Institute | International Computer Science Institute Suite 600 1947 Center Ave. Berkeley, CA 94704-1198 |
USA | shenker@icsi.berkeley.edu | Game Theory and Computer Networks | ||
| MOR1.2a | Scott | Shenker | Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitrio | International Computer Science Institute | International Computer Science Institute Suite 600 1947 Center Ave. Berkeley, CA 94704-1198 |
USA | shenker@icsi.berkeley.edu | Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions | |
| WES4 | Yoav | Shoham | Stanford University | Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | shoham@cs.stanford.edu | Interesting Problems at the Interface of Computer Science and Game Theory | ||
| FRR1.1b | Yoav | Shoham | Moshe Tennenholtz | Stanford University | Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | shoham@cs.stanford.edu | On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity | |
| THR1.4d | Mikhael | Shor | Eric J. Friedman, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher | Rutgers University | Department of Economics Rutgers University Rutgers, NJ |
USA | shor@econ.rutgers.edu | Learning in Limited Information Environments | |
| MOR1.9b | Ken | Shotts | Northwestern University | Department of Political Science Northwestern University 601 University Pl. Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | k-shotts@northwestern.edu | A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections | ||
| THR2.9b | Katri | Sieberg | College of William and Mary | P.O. Box 8795 Department of Government College of William and Mary Williamsburg, VA 23187-8795 |
USA | kksieb@wm.edu | Contract Enforcement in Post-Soviet Russia | ||
| MOR1.3a | Marciano | Siniscalchi | Pierpaolo Battigalli | Princeton University | Department of Economics 309 Fisher Hall Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544-1021 |
USA | marciano@princeton.edu | RATIONALIZABLE BIDDING IN FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS | |
| WEP | Vasiliki | Skreta | University of Pittsburgh | Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh 4S00 Posvar Hall Pittsburgh, PA 15260 |
USA | vasst10+@pitt.edu | Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms | ||
| THR1.2a | Andrzej | Skrzypacz | Hugo Hopenhayn | University of Rochester | Department of Economics University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 |
USA | skrz@troi.cc.rochester.edu | Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions | |
| FRS2.3 | Brian | Skyrms | University of California | Logic and Philosophy of Science School of Social Sciences 3151 Social Science Plaza University of California, Irvine Irvine, CA 92697-5100 |
USA | bskyrms@uci.edu | Co-evolution of Norms: A Case Study | ||
| THR1.10c | Marco | Slikker | Henk Norde | Eindhoven University of Technology | Department of Accounting, Finance, and
Marketing Eindhoven University of Technology PO Box 513 5600 MB Eindhoven |
The Netherlands | m.slikker@tm.tue.nl | Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games | |
| THR2.2c | Randolph | Sloof | Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek | University of Amsterdam | NWO priority programme Scholar University of Amsterdam Roetersstraat 11 1018 WB Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | sloof@fee.uva.nl | On the relation between asset ownership and specific investments | |
| MOR2.1c | Justin | Smith | St. Peters' College | Department of Economics St. Peters' College Oxford OX1 2DL |
United Kingdom | justin.smith@economics.ox.ac.uk | Complexity and the Difficulty of Remembering Strategies | ||
| THR1.10a | Lones | Smith | Ennio Stacchetti | University of Michigan | Economics Dept Univ. of Michigan Ann Arbor MI 48109-1220 |
USA | lones@umich.edu | Aspirational Bargaining | |
| THS2.1 | Joel | Sobel | UCSD | Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral
Sciences 75 Alta Road Stanford, CA 94305-8090 |
USA | jsobel@weber.ucsd.edu | Social Preferences and Reciprocity | ||
| THR1.9d | Tamas | Solymosi | T. E. S. Raghavan, Stef Tijs | Budapest University of Economic Sciences | Department of Operations Research Budapest University of Economic Sciences 1828 Budapest, Pf. 489 |
Hungary | tamas.solymosi@opkut.bke.hu | The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus of permutation games | |
| MOR1.10d | Silvia | Sonderegger | Imran Rasul | London School of Economics | London School of Economics Room Q242, STICERD, LSE Houghton St. London WC2A 2AE |
United Kingdom | s.sonderegger@lse.ac.uk | Countervailing Contracts | |
| MOP | Constantin | Sonin | Russian-European Center for Economic Policy | Russian-European Center for Economic Policy Potapovsky per. 5 Bldg. 4 Moscow 10100 |
Russia | ksonin@nes.cemi.resi.ru | Corruption in Public Auctions with Multi-criterial Choice | ||
| THR1.6b | Isaac | Sonin | University of North Carolina | Department of Mathematics University of North Carolina Charlotte, NC 28223 |
USA | imsonin@email.uncc.edu | The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m -player Game: Shoot Later, Shoot First! | ||
| MOR1.2d | Tayfun | Sonmez | Atila Abdulkadiroglu | Koc University | tsonmez@ku.edu.tr | Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments | |||
| MOR2.3b | Barry | Sopher | Andrew Schotter | Rutgers University | Department of Economics Rutgers University 75 Hamilton St. New Brunswich, NJ |
USA | Sopher@economics.rutgers.edu | Creating Culture in the Laboratory: Equilibrium Conventions in an Intergenerational Ultimatum Game | |
| THR1.4a | Barry | Sopher | A. Schotter | Rutgers University |
Department of Economics |
USA | sopher@economics.Rutgers.edu | Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-generational Games: An Experimental Study in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics | |
| FRR2.10b | Peter | Sorensen | Marco Ottaviani | University of Copenhagen | Institute of Economics University of Copenhagen Studiestraede 6 DK-1455 Copenhagen K |
Denmark | peter.sorensen@econ.ku.dk | Reputational Cheap Talk | |
| WES1.1 | Sylvain | Sorin | Abraham Neyman | Ecole Polytechnique and U. Paris | Laboratoire d'Econometrie Ecole Polytechnique 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | sorin@poly.polytechnique.fr | Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration | |
| FRR1.3a | Marilda | Sotomayor | Universidade de Sao Paulo | Universidade de Sao Paulo Departamento de Economia Av. Prof. Luciano Gualberto, 908 Cidade Universitária 05508-900 Sao Paulo, SP |
Brazil | marildas@usp.br | The Strategy Structure Of The College Admissions Stable Mechanisms | ||
| TUP | Amedeo | Spadaro | Universitat de les Illes Balears | Departament d'Economia i Empresa Universitat de les Illes Balears Carretera dc Valledemoosa km 7.5 07071 Palma de Mallorca |
Spain | amedeo.spadaro@uib.es | Evolving Network in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game | ||
| FRR1.7b | Willy | Spanjers | David Kelsey | Universiy of Birmingham | Department of Economics University of Birmingham Edgbaston Birmingham B30 5TT |
United Kingdom | w.spanjers.1@bham.ac.uk | Uncertainty in Partnerships | |
| THR1.12d | Rani | Spiegler | Nuffield College | Nuffield College Oxford OX1 1NF |
United Kingdom | rani@post.tau.ac.il | Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Reason-Based Choice | ||
| TUR2.8d | Xavier | Spinat | Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique | Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | spinat@poly.polytechnique.fr | Approachability and Differential Invariance | ||
| MOR2.6b | Frans | Spinnewyn | Katholieke Universiteit LEUVEN | Department of Economics Katholieke Universiteit LEUVEN |
Belgium | frans.spinnewyn@econ.kuleuven.ac.be | The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution and Related Solution Concepts in Repeated Bargaining Games | ||
| FRR2.7b | Anton | Stefanescu | Bucharest University | Department of Probability Theory, Statistics
and OR Bucharest University 14, Academiei St. Bucharest 70109 |
Romania | anton@pro.math.unibuc.ro | The Minimax Theorm and the Convexity of Preferences | ||
| TUR1.8d | Mark | Stegeman | Paul Rhode | VPI and SU | Department of Economics 0316 VPI&SU Blacksburg, VA 24060 |
USA | stegeman@vt.edu | Stochastic Darwinian Equilibria in Finite and Large Populations | |
| THR2.5c | Maxwell B. | Stinchcombe | University of Texas at Austin | Department of Economics University of Texas at Austin Austin TX 78712-1173 |
USA | maxwell@mundo.eco.utexas.edu | The Integration of Non-Measurable Functions in Game Theory | ||
| THR2.5b | Maxwell B. | Stinchcombe | Christopher Harris, William Zame | University of Texas at Austin | Department of Economics University of Texas at Austin Austin TX 78712-1173 |
USA | maxwell@mundo.eco.utexas.edu | The Finitistic Theory of Infinite Games | |
| THR2.7c | Francis Edward | Su | Forest Simmons | Harvey Mudd College and Cornell University | School of Operations Research Cornell University 206 Rhodes Hall Ithaca, NY 14853 |
USAQ | su@orie.cornell.edu | Sperner, Tucker, and Combinatorial Topology for Fair Division Problems | |
| MOR2.7b | Peter | Sudholter | Y.-A. Hwang | University of Bielefeld | IMW University of Bielefeld Postfach 10 01 31 33501 Bielefeld |
Germany | PSudhoelter@Wiwi.Uni-Bielefeld.De | An Axiomatization of the Core | |
| MOR2.11b | Yutaka | Suzuki | Hosei University | Faculty of Economics Hosei University 4342 Aihara Machida-City Tokyo 194-0298 |
Japan | yutaka@mt.tama.hosei.ac.jp | Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Organizations | ||
| MOR2.2a | Jeroen | Swinkels | Matthew Jackson | Washington University | Olin School of Business Washington University Campus Box 1133 One Brookings Drive St. Louis, MO 63130 |
USA | SWINKELS@olin.wustl.edu | Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions and Discontinuous Bayesian Games: Endogenous and Incentive Compatible Sharing Rules | |
| MOP | Balazs | Szentes | Hsueh-Ling Huynh | Boston University | Department of Economics Boston University 270 Bay State Road 3/F Boston MA 02215 |
USA | szentes@bu.edu | Believing the Unbelievable: the Dilemma of Self-Belief | |
| MOR1.11d | Hidetoshi | Tashiro | Hitotsubashi University | Graduate School of Economics Hitotsubashi University Kunitachi, Tokyo, 186-0004 |
Japan | gem5104@srv.cc.hit-u.ac.jp | Compuability and Computational Enumerability of Nash Equilibria and Backward Induction Solutions of a Game with Computable Payoff Functions | ||
| THR1.11c | Bart | Taub | University of Illinois | Department of Economics 330 Commerce West University of Illinois Champaign, IL 61820 |
USA | b-taub@uiuc.edu | Dynamic Strategic Information Control | ||
| THS3.1 | Moshe | Tennenholtz | Technion and Stanford University | Computer Science Department Stanford University Stanford, CA 94305 |
USA | moshe@robotics.stanford.edu | Mechanism Design for Computational Settings | ||
| MOR1.4c | Elias | Thijsse | Jan Jaspars, Wiebe van der Hoek | Tilburg University | Computational Linguistics & AI Group Tilburg University P.O. Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | thysse@kub.nl | Characterizing Knowledge States | |
| FRS1.1 | William | Thomson | University of Rochester | Department of Economics University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 |
USA | wth2@troi.cc.rochester.edu | An Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining: An Update | ||
| THR2.1a | William | Thomson | Toru Hokari | University of Rochester | Department of Economics University of Rochester Rochester, NY 14627 |
USA | wth2@troi.cc.rochester.edu | Bankruptcy Rules, Anonymity, and Consistency | |
| TUR1.10b | Sylvie | Thoron | GREQAM | GREQAM, Centre de la vieille Charité 2, rue de la Charité 13002, Marseille |
France | thoron@ehess.cnrs-mrs.fr | Strategic Reactions of a Frustrated Coalition | ||
| TUP | Mabel | Tidball | A. Jean-Marie, N. Querou | INRA | Dept. Economie et Sociologie Rurales INRA, 2 Place VIALA 34060 MONTPELLIER |
France | tidball@ensam.inra.fr | Conjectural Variation Equilibrium, Reaction functions and Indifference Curves | |
| TUR2.1c | Alexander | Tieman | Oddvar M. Kaarboe | De Nederlandsche Bank | De Nederlandsche Bank Econometric Research and Special Studies Department P.O. Box 98 1000 AB Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | a.f.tieman@dnb.nl | Equilibrium Selection in Games with MacroeconomicComplementarities | |
| THR1.9a | Stef | Tijs | Ana Meca Martinez, Marco Antonio Lopez Cerda | The Netherlands | s.h.tijs@kub.nl | Holding games are strong big boss games | |||
| FRR1.12c | Judith | Timmer | P. Borm, S. Tijs | Tilburg University | CentER and Department of Econometrics Tilburg University Tilburg |
The Netherlands | j.b.timmer@kub.nl | Convexity and Solution Concepts in Stochastic Cooperative Situations | |
| THR1.3b | Michael | Ting | James Snyder | University of North Carolina | Department of Political Science University of North Carolina Chapel Hill NC 27599-3265 |
USA | mmting@unc.edu | Parties as Informative "Brands" | |
| MOR1.1d | Tristan | Tomala | Jerome Renault | Universite Paris Dauphine | Ceremade Universite Paris Dauphine Place de lattre de Tassigny 75016 Paris |
France | tomala@ceremade.dauphine.fr | A Characterization of Communication Equilibrium Payoffs in RepeatedGames with Imperfect Monitoring | |
| TUR1.11d | Walter | Trockel | Universitaet Bielefeld | IMW, Universitaet Bielefeld Postfach 100131 D 33501 Bielefeld |
Germany | wtrockel@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de | Implementations of the Nash Solution | ||
| FRR1.11b | Thomas | Troeger | ELSE, University College London | ELSE University College London Gower Street London WC1E6BT |
United Kingdom | t.troger@ucl.ac.uk | Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach | ||
| THR2.5d | Marianna S. | Troeva | Oleg A. Malafeyev | Saint Petersburg University | Saint Petersburg University Department of Applied Mathematics--Processes of Control Botanicheskaya 64/3 flat 79 St. Petergof St.Petersburg 198904 |
Russia | Troeva@desse.phys.spbu.ru | A weak solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation for n-person differential games | |
| WEP | Ted | Turocy | Richard McKelvey and Andrew McLennan | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | arbiter@kellogg.northwestern.edu | Game Theory Computer Software: Hands on Demonstration | |
| TUR1.8c | Ted | Turocy | Richard McKelvey and Andrew McLennan | Northwestern University | KGSM/MEDS Northwestern University 2001 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208 |
USA | arbiter@kellogg.northwestern.edu | Game Theory Computer Software: Hands on Demonstration | |
| MOR2.11c | Shyh-Fang | Ueng | Academia Sinica | Institute of Economics Academia Sinica Taipei |
Taiwan | us21@gate.sinica.edu.tw | A Non-stationary Finite-period Interactive Markov Race | ||
| FRR2.6b | Takashi | Ui | University of Tsukuba | Institute of Policy and Planning Sciences University of Tsukuba Tsukuba, Ibaraki 305-8573 |
Japan | oui@shako.sk.tsukuba.ac.jp | Robust Equilibria of Potential Games | ||
| TUR2.7b | Amparo | Urbano | Penelope Hernadez | University of Valencia | University of Valencia Departamento de Analisis Economico Campus dels Tarongers, Edif. Depart. Oriental 46022, Valencia |
Spain | amparo.urbano@uv.es | Pseudorandom processes: Entropy and Automata | |
| TUR2.7c | Amparo | Urbano | Penelope Hernadez, Jose Vila | University of Valencia | University of Valencia Departamento de Analisis Economico Campus dels Tarongers, Edif. Depart. Oriental 46022, Valencia |
Spain | amparo.urbano@uv.es | The complexity of a strategy | |
| TUR2.7d | Amparo | Urbano | I. Arribas | University of Valencia | University of Valencia Departamento de Analisis Economico Campus dels Tarongers, Edif. Depart. Oriental 46022, Valencia |
Spain | amparo.urbano@uv.es | Repeated games with probabilistic horizon | |
| TUR2.2d | Juan Delgado | Urdanibia | Diego Moreno | Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones | Dirección de Mercados Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones C/ Alcalá 37, E-28014 Madrid |
Spain | jdelgado@cmt.es | Coalition-proof Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly | |
| THR1.4b | Jose Ramon | Uriarte | Alfonso Barriuso | Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea | Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko
Unibertsitatea Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico Avenida del Lehendakari Aguirre, 83 448003 Bilbao |
Spain | jepurayj@ mail.bs.ehu.es | Perception Dynamics | |
| THR1.1b | Federico | Valenciano | Annick Laruelle | Universidad del Pais Vasco | Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV Universidad del Pais Vasco Av. L. Aguirre 83 48015 BILBAO |
Spain | elpvallf@bs.ehu.es | Power indices and the veil of ignorance | |
| TUR2.1d | D. D. B. | van Bragt | E. H. Gerding, J. A. La Poutre | Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science | Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science
(CWI) Kruislaan 413, room M335 P.O. Box 94079 1090 GB Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | bragt@cwi.nl | Equilibrium Selection in Alternating Offers Bargaining Models: The Evolutionary Computing Approach | |
| FRS1.2 | Eric | Van Damme | Jorgen W. Weibull | Tilburg University | CentER and Department of Econometrics Tilburg University PO Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | eric.vandamme@kub.nl | Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities | |
| THR1.1d | Rene | van den Brink | Tilburg University | Department of Econometrics and CentER Tilburg University P.O. Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | jbrink@kub.nl | An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value using a Fairness Property | ||
| MOR1.8c | Anne | van den Nouweland | Marco Slikker | University of Oregon | Dept. of Economics 435 PLC 1285 University of Oregon Eugene, OR 97403-1285 |
USA | annev@oregon.uoregon.edu | Network Formation Models with Costs for Establishing Links | |
| MOR1.8d | Gerhard | van der Laan | P. Jean-Jacques Herings, A. J. J. Talman | Free University | Free University Department of Econometrics De Boelelaan 1105 1081 HV Amsterdam |
The Netherlands | glaan@econ.vu.nl | Cooperative Games in Graph Structure | |
| WEP | Karine | van der Straeten | Jean-Francoise Laslier | Universite de Clergy-Pointoise | THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pointoise 33 Bd. du Port 95011 Cergy-Pointoise |
France | straeten@u-cergy.fr | Electoral Competition with a Strategic Electorate | |
| THR2.11d | Eric | Van Tassel | University of Queensland | Department of Economics University of Queensland Brisbane, Qld 4072 |
Australia | e.vantassel@economics.uq.edu.au | Product Quality Under Confidential Pricing | ||
| TUR1.10c | Vincent | Vannetelbosch | J. J. Herings, A. Mauleon | University of Cergy Pontoise | THEMA, University of Cergy Pontoise Boulevard du Port 33 95011 Cergy Pontoise Cedex |
France | eepvaxxv@bs.ehu.es | Social Rationalizability | |
| THR2.9c | Stefano | Vannucci | Universita di Siena | Dipartimento di Economia Politica Universita di SienaPiazza S.Francesco 7 53100 Siena |
Italy | vannucci@unisi.it | Effectivity Functions and Stable Governance Structures | ||
| TUP | Felix | Vardy | Princeton University | Department of Economics Princeton University Princeton, NJ 08544 |
USA | fjjvardy@princeton.edu | Incentives for Information Acquisition in Common Value Auctions with Large Underlying Uncertainty | ||
| TUR2.5c | Hannu | Vartiainen | Univerity of Helsinki | Department of Economics, RUESG P.O. Box 10 (Snellmaninkatu 12 B) 00014 University of Helsinki |
Finland | hannu.vartiainen@helsinki.fi | Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization | ||
| MOR1.12b | Richard | Vaughan | University College London | Centre for Economic Learning and Social
Evolution (ELSE) University College London Gower Street LONDON WC1E 6BT |
United Kingdom | uctpb27@ucl.ac.uk | Evolutive Equilibrium Selection II: Quantal Response Mechanisms | ||
| MOR1.8b | Fernando | Vega-Redondo | Sanjeev Goyal | Universidad de Alicante | Facultad de Economicas Universidad de Alicante 03071 Alicante |
Spain | vega@merlin.fae.ua.es | Learning, Network Formation and Coordination | |
| THR2.4c | Lutz | Veldman | University of Bielefeld | Lutz VeldmanInstitute of Mathematical Economics
(IMW) University of Bielefeld P.O. Box 100 131 D - 33501 Bielefeld |
Germany | lveldman@wiwi.uni-bielefeld.de | Representations of Multi-level Games | ||
| TUP | Filippo | Vergara Caffarelli | European University Institute | Department of Economics European University Institute Badia Fiesolana Via dei Roccettin 9 I-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole(FI) |
Italy | vergara@iue.it | Privatization and Bookbuilding | ||
| MOR2.12b | Dries | Vermeulen | M. J. M. Jansen | Maastricht University | Dept. of Economics Maastricht University |
The Netherlands | d.vermeulen@algec.unimaas.nl | On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria | |
| THR1.6d | Reinhilde | Veugelers | Bruno Cassiman, David Perez-Castrillo | Katholique University, Leuven | K.U.Leuven and CEPR Naamsestraat 69 B-3000 Leuven |
Belgium | reinhilde.veugelers@econ.kuleuven.ac.be | Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments | |
| THS2.3 | Nicolas | Vielle | Laboratoire d'Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris and Grape, Universite Montesquieu-Bordeaux 4 | Laboratoire d'Econometrie Ecole Polytechnique 1 rue Descartes 75005 Paris |
France | vielle@poly.polytechnique.fr | Recent Developments in Stochastic Games | ||
| WEP | Thierry | Vignolo | Universite Montpellier I | Faculte des Sciences Economiques Universite Montpellier I B.P. 9606 Cedex 1 |
France | vignolo@lameta.univ-montp.fr | Learning, Matching Rule, and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games | ||
| TUR2.1a | Xavier | Vila | Frances Rocher | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | Dept. Economia i Ha. Econňmica Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 08193-Bellaterra (Barcelona) |
Spain | xvila@fawlty.uab.es | A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition | |
| TUR1.3c | Cori | Vilella-Bach | Carles Rafels | Universitat Rovira i Virgili | Facultat de Ciencies Economiques i Empresarials Universitat Rovira i Virgili Av. Universitat 1 43204 Reus |
Spain | mvb@fcee.urv.es | Average Monotonic Games with Non Transferable Utility | |
| THR2.10b | Arnis | Vilks | Thorsten Clausing | Leipzig Graduate School of Management | Leipzig Graduate School of Management Jahnallee 59 04109 Leipzig |
Germany | vilks@microec.hhl.de | Backwards Induction in General Belief Structures with and without Strategies | |
| MOP | Paul | Viminitz | University of Lethbridge | University of Lethbridge | Artificial Prudence and Extra-Logicality | ||||
| FRR1.5a | Xavier | Vives | Byoung H. Jun | Institut d'Anŕlisi Econňmica, CSIC | Institut d'Anŕlisi Econňmica, CSIC Campus UAB 08193 Bellaterra, Barcelona |
Spain | vives@cc.uab.es | Strategic Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly | |
| THP | Pierre | von Mouche | Wageningen University | Department of Social Sciences Wegeningen University Hollandseweg 16706 KN Wageningen |
The Netherlands | Pierre.van.mouche@alg.shhk.wag-ur.nl | Formal Transfrontier Pollution Games | ||
| THR1.12b | Bernhard | von Stengel | London School of Economics | Mathematics Department London School of Economics Houghton St, Room B408 London WC2A 2AE |
United Kingdom | stengel@maths.lse.ac.uk | Improved equilibrium computation for extensive two-person games | ||
| MOP | Jo R. | Voola (Ms.) | Curtin University of Technology | School of Economics and Finance Curtin University of Technology GPO Box U1987 Perth 6845 |
Australia | VOOLAJ@CBS.CURTIN.EDU.AU | Game Theory and Reality: An Explanation of the Structure of the Petroleum Industry | ||
| THR2.4b | Mark | Voorneveld | Tilburg University | Department of Econometrics Tilburg University P.O.Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | Voluntary contribution to multiple public goods | |||
| TUR1.4d | Nir | Vulkan | Bristol University | Department of Economics Bristol University 8 Woodland Road Bristol BS8 1TN |
United Kingdom | N.Vulkan@bristol.ac.uk | The game-theory of electronic markets, and automated negotiations | ||
| MOP | Jana | Vyrastekova | Tilburg University | Department of Econometrics and CentER Tilburg University Warandelaan 2 P.O.Box 90153 5000 LE Tilburg |
The Netherlands | Interdependent preferences in games with complementarities | |||
| MOP | Randall E. | Waldron | University of South Dakota | University of South Dakota School of Business Vermillion, SD 57069 |
USA | rwaldron@usd.edu | Marriage and Other Prisoner's Dilemmas | ||
| TUR1.9b | Mark | Walker | John Wooders | University of Arizona | Department of Economics University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721-0108 |
USA | mwalker@arizona.edu | Binary Markov Games | |
| TUR1.8b | Chris | Wallace | David P. Myatt | Nuffield College | Nuffield College Oxford OX1 1NF |
United Kingdom | christopher.wallace@nuf.ox.ac.uk | Dominated Strategies and Equilibrium Selection | |
| THP | Jin | Wang | Emory University | Law and Economics Program Department of Economics Emory University Atlanta, GA 30322 |
USA | jwang01@emory.edu | Trap Theory and Its Applications: Solutions to EliminateCorruption and Other Cooperative Crimes | ||
| TUR1.5b | Joel | Watson | Jesse Bull | University of California, San Diego | Department of Economics, 0508 University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92093-0508 |
USA | jwatson@weber.ucsd.edu | Evidence Disclosure and Verifiability | |
| THS1.2 | Joel | Watson | Alan Schwartz | University of California, San Diego | Department of Economics, 0508 University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92093-0508 |
USA | jwatson@weber.ucsd.edu | Contract, Legal Institutions, and Game Theory, with an Application to Costly Recontracting | |
| MOR1.8a | Alison | Watts | Matthew O. Jackson | Vanderbilt University | Department of Economics Vanderbilt University Nashville, TN 37235 |
USA | alison.watts@vanderbilt.edu | On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games | |
| THR2.3b | Roberto | Weber | Carnegie-Mellon University | Social and Decision Sciences Carnegie-Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 |
USA | rweber@andrew.cmu.edu | Learning with No Feedback: A Test or Reinforcement Models Using the Competitive Guessing Game | ||
| THR2.9a | Shlomo | Weber | Michel Le Breton | Southern Methodist University | Department of Economics Southern Methodist Univrsity Dallas, TX 75275-0496 |
USA | sweber@mail.smu.edu | The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession? | |
| TUR2.8a | Jorgen W. | Weibull | Michel Benaim | Stockholm School of Economics | Department of Economics Stockholm School of Economics P.O. Box 6501 113 83 Stockholm |
Sweden | jorgen.weibull@hhs.se | Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games | |
| WEP | Federico | Weinschelbaum | Mariano Tomassi | Universidad de San Andrés | Vito Dumas 284 1644-Victoria Provincia de Buenos Aires |
Argentina | fweinsch@udesa.edu.ar | The threat of insurance. A note on the robustness of principal-agent models | |
| THP | Marco | Wiering | University Utrecht | University Utrecht Department of Informatics Postbus: 80 089 3508 TB Utrecht |
The Netherlands | marco@cs.uu.nl | Learning to Control Traffic Lights with Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning | ||
| WEP | Marcus | Winter | University of Ulm | University of UlmFaculty of Mathematics
and Economics Department of Economics Helmholtzstr. 18 D-89069 Ulm |
Germany | winter@mathematik.uni-ulm.de | Issue Linkage in International Environmental Dilemmas: A Finitely Repeated Games Approach | ||
| FRR1.4a | John | Wooders | Mark Walker | University of Arizona | Department of Economics McClelland Hall University of Arizona Tucson, AZ 85721 |
USA | jwooders@bpa.arizona.edu | Minimax Play at Wimbledon | |
| MOR1.12d | Myrna | Wooders | University of Warwick | Department of Economics University of Warwick CovDepartmenentry CV4 7AL |
UK | mwooders@chass.utoronto.ca | Female Competition, Near-Monogamy and Sexual Dimorphism; An Evolutionary and Game-Theoretic Approach | ||
| THR2.10c | Licun | Xue | University of Aarhus | Department of Economics University of Aarhus Building 350 DK-8000 Aarhus C |
Denmark | LXue@econ.au.dk | Consistent Rationalizability | ||
| MOR1.10b | Varda | Yaari | Joshua Ronen | Ben-Gurion University | Department of Business Administration School of Management Ben-Gurion University Beer-Sheva |
Israel | alexgum21@hotmail.com | Renegotiation-proof Contracts with Unobservable Outcome | |
| MOR2.7d | Takehiko | Yamato | Yukihiko Funaki | Tokyo Metropolitan University | Faculty of Economics Tokyo Metropolitan University Hachioji, 192-0397 |
Japan | yamato-takehiko@c.metro-u.ac.jp | The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core by Means of Consistency | |
| MOP | Yi-Nung | Yang | Terrence F. Glover | Chung Yuan University | Department of International Trade Chung Yuan University Chungli, Taiwan 320 |
Republic of China | yinyang@ms17.hinet.net | Upgrades, Commitment, Monopoly Profit, and Network Effects | |
| TUR2.12c | Elena | Yanovskaya | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | St. Petersburg Institute for Economics
and Mathematics Russian Academy of Sciences Tchaikovsky St. 1 191187 St. Petersburg |
Russia | eyanov@iatp20.spb.org | The Family of Least Power Values for Transferable Utility Games and Their Limits | ||
| THR2.10d | Leeat | Yariv | Muriel Niederle | Harvard University | Department of Economics Harvard University Littauer 200 Cambridge, MA 02138 |
USA | yariv@fas.harvard.edu | Seeing is Not Believing: A Simple Model of Confirmatory Bias and Cognitive Dissonance | |
| FRR1.8d | Leeat | Yariv | Harvard University | Department of Economics Harvard University Littauer 200 Cambridge, MA 02138 |
USA | yariv@fas.harvard.edu | When Majority Rule Yields Majority Ruin | ||
| TUR2.12a | David W. K. | Yeung | Leon Petrosyan | Hong Kong Baptist University | Department of Finance and Decision Sciences Hong Kong Baptist University Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong |
China | wkyeung@hkbu.edu.hk | Shapley Value for Games with Uncertain Terminal Payoffs | |
| MOR2.6d | Naoki | Yoshihara | Hitotsubashi University | The Institute of Economic Research Hitotsubashi University Naka 2-1 Kunitachi, Tokyo 186-0004 |
Japan | yosihara@ier.hit-u.ac.jp | Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions In Production Economies without Welfarism | ||
| TUS2.2 | Peyton | Young | Johns Hopkins University | Department of Economics Johns Hopkins University Baltimore, MD |
USA | pyoung@jhu.edu | Possibility and Impossibility Results in Learning | ||
| MOP | Georges | Zaccour | Michele Breton, Fabien Chauny | GERAD & HEC | GERAD & HEC Montreal H3T 2A7 |
Canada | georges.zaccour@hec.ca | Numerical Analysis of a Lanchester Duopoly with Leader-Follower Information Structure | |
| MOR2.7a | Victor | Zakharov | Arina Akimova | St.Petersburg State University | St.Petersburg State University St. Petersburg |
Russia | victor@leontief.ru | Properties of the Subcore | |
| TUR1.1d | Eduardo | Zambrano | University of Notre Dame | Department of Finance and Business Economics University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, IN 46556 |
USA | Zambrano.1@nd.edu | Epistemic Conditions for Rationalizability | ||
| MOR2.5d | Shmuel | Zamir | Klaus Abbink, Abdolkarim Sadrieh | Crest--LEI/ENPC | Crest--LEI/ENPC 28 rue des Saints Peres 75007 Paris |
France | zamir@ensae.fr | Fairness and Public Good Aspects of Punishment Behavior | |
| MOR1.6b | Jose M. | Zarzuelo | Gooni Orshan, Federico Valenciano | Universidad del Pais Vasco | Departamento de Economia Aplicada IV Universidad del Pais Vasco Av. L. Aguirre 83 48015 BILBAO |
Spain | elpzazaj@bs.ehu.es | The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, The Core and NTU Bankruptcy Games | |
| TUR2.3a | Charles | Zheng | Northwestern University | Department of Economics Northwestern University 2003 Sheridan Road Evanston, IL 60208-2600 |
USA | czheng@northwestern.edu | Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World | ||
| FRR2.9a | Lin | Zhou | City University of Hong Kong | Department of Economics and Finance City University of Hong Kong Tat Chee Avenue Kowloon, Hong Kong |
China | efzhou@cityu.edu.hk | Testable implications of the theory of Nash equilbrium | ||
| TUR2.9c | William S. | Zwicker | Josep Freixas | Union College | Department of Mathematics Union College Schenectady, NY 12308 |
USA | zwickerw@union.edu | The minimum PSA pseudoweighting representation of a linear game |