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| Session | Presenter's Name | Co-author(s) | Presenter's Affiliation | Paper Title | |
| WEP | Iqbal | Adjali | D. Collings, A. Varley, M. H. Lyons | BT Laboratories | Investigating Learning Schemes in Game Theory With an Application to a Model of Entry in a Regulated Market |
| WEP | Javier | Arin | J. Kuipers, D. Vermeulen | Basque Country University | Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games |
| WEP | Jeannette | Brosig | Joachim Weimann, Chun-Lei Yang | Otto-von-Guericke-University | Bargaining Power in Simple Sequential Games |
| WEP | Daniel | Cardona-Coll | Universitat de les Illes Balears | Bargaining and Single-Peak Preferences | |
| WEP | Andre | Casajus | Universität Hohenheim | Weak Isomorphisms of Extensive Games | |
| WEP | Sebastien | Cochinard | University of Picardy | Real algebraic properties of the core and stable sets | |
| WEP | Andre Rossi | de Oliveira | Universidade de Brasília | Bilateral Trade with Different Distributions of Types | |
| WEP | Amrita | Dhillon | Ben Lockwood | University of Warwick | When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable? |
| WEP | Effrosyni | Diamantoudi | McGill University and University of Aarhus | Binding Agreements | |
| WEP | Harri | Ehtamo | Raimo Hamalainen | Helsinki University of Technology | Searching for Joint Gains in Multi-Party Negotiations |
| WEP | Helene | Ferrer | Universite de Caen | Stable Syndicates of Factors Owners and Distribution of Social Output | |
| WEP | Francesca | Flamini | University of Exeter | Issue-by-issue Bargaining Models with Probability of Game Continuation | |
| WEP | Vito | Fragnelli | I.Garcia-Jurado, L.Mendez-Naya | Eastern Piedmont University | Bus Games |
| WEP | Maguerite | Frank | Rider University | Hierarchical Games | |
| WEP | Nuno | Garoupa | Joao Gata | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | A Game Theoretic Approach to Decolonization |
| WEP | Nikolaos | Georgantzis | Gerardo S. Grande | Universitat Jaume I | Accounting for Risk Aversion in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Test |
| WEP | Natacha | Gilson | Catholic University of Mons | Debt Structure as a Signalling Device | |
| WEP | Ehud | Kalai | Eilon Solan | Northwestern University | Randomization and Simplification |
| WEP | Kensaku | Kikuta | Kobe University of Commerce | Strongly Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game | |
| WEP | Frederic | Koessler | Universite Louis Pasteur | Strategic Communication in Games with Certifiable Information | |
| WEP | Victoria | Kreps | Victor Domansky | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | Social equilibria for competitive resource allocation models |
| WEP | Marco | Marini | Sergio Curranrini | University of Urbino | Simultaneous and Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function in Games with Externalities |
| WEP | Robert | McKelvey | Leif Sandal, Stein Steinshamn | University of Montana | Fish-Wars on the High Seas: Erecting Economic Barriers to Entry |
| WEP | Ed | Nosal | University of Waterloo | Information Gathering by an Informed Principal | |
| WEP | Maite | Pastor-Gosalbez | Ramon Fauli | CEU/San Pablo | Merger Policy in R&D Intensive Industries |
| WEP | Francisco S. | Ramos | Silvinha P. Vasconcelos | Federal University of Pernambuco-Brazil | The regulation of anti-competitive actions under asymmetric information when reputation doesn't matter |
| WEP | Michael J. | Ryan | The University of Hull | Conditional and Strategic Equivalence and Frame Restricted choice with Applications to Regulatory Risk and Uncertainty | |
| WEP | Kalpana | Scholtes-Dash | Institute for Advanced Studies | Can There be Informationally Efficient Fianncial Market with Asymmetric Information Between Market Mkers? | |
| WEP | Daniel | Sgroi | University of Oxford | The Optimal Structure of the Herd: Guinea Pigs and Aggregate Welfare | |
| WEP | Vasiliki | Skreta | University of Pittsburgh | Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms | |
| WEP | Ted | Turocy | Richard McKelvey and Andrew McLennan | Northwestern University | Game Theory Computer Software: Hands on Demonstration |
| WEP | Karine | van der Straeten | Jean-Francoise Laslier | Universite de Clergy-Pointoise | Electoral Competition with a Strategic Electorate |
| WEP | Thierry | Vignolo | Universite Montpellier I | Learning, Matching Rule, and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games | |
| WEP | Federico | Weinschelbaum | Mariano Tomassi | Universidad de San Andrés | The threat of insurance. A note on the robustness of principal-agent models |
| WEP | Marcus | Winter | University of Ulm | Issue Linkage in International Environmental Dilemmas: A Finitely Repeated Games Approach | |