GAMES 2000

Wednesday Poster Sessions

Listed Alphabetically--All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title
WEP Iqbal Adjali D. Collings, A. Varley, M. H. Lyons BT Laboratories Investigating Learning Schemes in Game Theory With an Application to a Model of Entry in a Regulated Market
WEP Javier Arin J. Kuipers, D. Vermeulen Basque Country University Some characterizations of egalitarian solutions on classes of TU-games
WEP Jeannette Brosig Joachim Weimann, Chun-Lei Yang Otto-von-Guericke-University Bargaining Power in Simple Sequential Games
WEP Daniel Cardona-Coll   Universitat de les Illes Balears Bargaining and Single-Peak Preferences
WEP Andre Casajus   Universität Hohenheim Weak Isomorphisms of Extensive Games
WEP Sebastien Cochinard   University of Picardy Real algebraic properties of the core and stable sets
WEP Andre Rossi de Oliveira   Universidade de Brasília Bilateral Trade with Different Distributions of Types
WEP Amrita Dhillon Ben Lockwood University of Warwick When are Plurality Rule Voting Games Dominance-Solvable?
WEP Effrosyni Diamantoudi   McGill University and University of Aarhus Binding Agreements
WEP Harri Ehtamo Raimo Hamalainen Helsinki University of Technology Searching for Joint Gains in Multi-Party Negotiations
WEP Helene Ferrer   Universite de Caen Stable Syndicates of Factors Owners and Distribution of Social Output
WEP Francesca Flamini   University of Exeter Issue-by-issue Bargaining Models with Probability of Game Continuation
WEP Vito Fragnelli I.Garcia-Jurado, L.Mendez-Naya Eastern Piedmont University Bus Games
WEP Maguerite Frank   Rider University Hierarchical Games
WEP Nuno Garoupa Joao Gata Universitat Pompeu Fabra A Game Theoretic Approach to Decolonization
WEP Nikolaos Georgantzis Gerardo S. Grande Universitat Jaume I Accounting for Risk Aversion in Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma Games: An Experimental Test
WEP Natacha Gilson   Catholic University of Mons Debt Structure as a Signalling Device
WEP Ehud Kalai Eilon Solan Northwestern University Randomization and Simplification
WEP Kensaku Kikuta   Kobe University of Commerce Strongly Reasonable Outcomes in a Cooperative Game
WEP Frederic Koessler   Universite Louis Pasteur Strategic Communication in Games with Certifiable Information
WEP Victoria Kreps Victor Domansky St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics Social equilibria for competitive resource allocation models
WEP Marco Marini Sergio Curranrini University of Urbino Simultaneous and Sequential Approach to the Characteristic Function in Games with Externalities
WEP Robert McKelvey Leif Sandal, Stein Steinshamn University of Montana Fish-Wars on the High Seas: Erecting Economic Barriers to Entry
WEP Ed Nosal   University of Waterloo Information Gathering by an Informed Principal
WEP Maite Pastor-Gosalbez Ramon Fauli CEU/San Pablo Merger Policy in R&D Intensive Industries
WEP Francisco S. Ramos Silvinha P. Vasconcelos Federal University of Pernambuco-Brazil The regulation of anti-competitive actions under asymmetric information when reputation doesn't matter
WEP Michael J. Ryan   The University of Hull Conditional and Strategic Equivalence and Frame Restricted choice with Applications to Regulatory Risk and Uncertainty
WEP Kalpana Scholtes-Dash   Institute for Advanced Studies Can There be Informationally Efficient Fianncial Market with Asymmetric Information Between Market Mkers?
WEP Daniel Sgroi   University of Oxford The Optimal Structure of the Herd: Guinea Pigs and Aggregate Welfare
WEP Vasiliki Skreta   University of Pittsburgh Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms
WEP Ted Turocy Richard McKelvey and Andrew McLennan Northwestern University Game Theory Computer Software: Hands on Demonstration
WEP Karine van der Straeten Jean-Francoise Laslier Universite de Clergy-Pointoise Electoral Competition with a Strategic Electorate
WEP Thierry Vignolo   Universite Montpellier I Learning, Matching Rule, and Equilibrium Selection in Coordination Games
WEP Federico Weinschelbaum Mariano Tomassi Universidad de San Andrés The threat of insurance. A note on the robustness of principal-agent models
WEP Marcus Winter   University of Ulm Issue Linkage in International Environmental Dilemmas: A Finitely Repeated Games Approach