GAMES 2000

Tuesday (TUR2) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
TUR2.1 LEARNING IN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
TUR2.1a Xavier Vila Frances Rocher Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona A Note on Agent Based Imperfect Competition
TUR2.1b Ann Maria Bell W. A. Sethares, J. A. Bucklew NASA Ames Research Center Learning and Information Structure in Market Entry Games
TUR2.1c Alexander Tieman Oddvar M. Kaarboe De Nederlandsche Bank Equilibrium Selection in Games with MacroeconomicComplementarities
TUR2.1d D. D. B. van Bragt E. H. Gerding, J. A. La Poutre Centre for Mathematics and Computer Science Equilibrium Selection in Alternating Offers Bargaining Models: The Evolutionary Computing Approach
TUR2.2 SPECIALIZED EQUILIBRIA IN MARKETS
TUR2.2a Yoram Moses Rann Smorodinsky Technion---Israel Equilibrium in An Asynchronous Model
TUR2.2b Hamid Sabourian   University of Cambridge Bargaining and Markets: Complexity and the Walrasian Outcome
TUR2.2c Ross Cressman Jean-Francois Wen Wilfrid Laurier University Playing the Field - An Evolutionary Approach to Information Transmission in Stock Markets
TUR2.2d Juan Delgado Urdanibia Diego Moreno Comisión del Mercado de las Telecomunicaciones Coalition-proof Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly
TUR2.3 OPTIMAL AUCTIONS
TUR2.3a Charles Zheng   Northwestern University Optimal Auction in a Multidimensional World
TUR2.3b Aner Sela B. Moldovanu Ben-Gurion University of the Negev The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests
TUR2.3c Giuseppe Lopomo V. Agrawal, S. Seshadri New York University Revenue maximizing selling mechanisms with multiple objects and one-unitdemands
TUR2.3d Estelle Cantillon   Yale University The Effect of Bidders' Asymmetries on Expected Revenue in Auctions
TUR2.4 INFORMATION ISSUES IN EQUILIBRIUM
TUR2.4a Marco Scarsini Bruno Bassan, Olivier Gossner, Shmuel Zamir Columbia University A Class of Games with Positive Value of Information
TUR2.4b Michael Schwarz   Harvard University Decision Making Under Extreme Uncertainty
TUR2.4c J. Jude Kline   The Australian National University Minimum memory for equivalence betweenex ante optimality and time consistency
TUR2.4d Jorn Rothe   London School of Economics Uncertainty, Rationality and Equilibrium in Games
TUR2.5 SOCIAL IMPLEMENTATION
TUR2.5a James Bergin   Queen's University Virtual implementation without randomization
TUR2.5b James Schummer Rakesh Vohra Northwestern University Strategy-proof Location on a Network
TUR2.5c Hannu Vartiainen   Univerity of Helsinki Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
TUR2.5d Kfir Eliaz   Tel Aviv University Fault Tolerant Implementation
TUR2.6 MARKET STRUCTURE
TUR2.6a Ramon Fauli-Oller Joel Sandonis University of Alicante To Merge or to License: Implications for Competition Policy
TUR2.6b Veronkia Grimm F. Riedel, Wolfstetter Humboldt University at Berlin Implementing Efficient Market Structure
TUR2.6c Peter Faynzilberg   Northwestern University Optimal Selection of a Regulated Monopoly
TUR2.6d Lluis Bru   Universidad de Malaga Incentives for Mergers in Vertical Structures
TUR2.7 ENTROPY AND COMPLEXITY IN DYNAMIC ENVIRONMENTS
TUR2.7a Nicolo Cesa-Bianchi Gabor Lugosi University of Milano Minimax Values and Metric Entropy Bounds for Portfolio Selection Problems
TUR2.7b Amparo Urbano Penelope Hernadez University of Valencia Pseudorandom processes: Entropy and Automata
TUR2.7c Amparo Urbano Penelope Hernadez, Jose Vila University of Valencia The complexity of a strategy
TUR2.7d Amparo Urbano I. Arribas University of Valencia Repeated games with probabilistic horizon
TUR2.8 STOCHASTIC GAMES AND EVOLUTION
TUR2.8a Jorgen W. Weibull Michel Benaim Stockholm School of Economics Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
TUR2.8b Jonathan Schaeffer Darse Billings, Aaron Davidson, Duane Szafron University of Alberta High-performance Computer Poker: When Game-theory Meets Practice
TUR2.8c Janos Flesch F. Thuijsman, O. J. Vrieze Maastricht University Stochastic games with non-observable actions
TUR2.8d Xavier Spinat   Laboratoire d'Econometrie de l'Ecole Polytechnique Approachability and Differential Invariance
TUR2.9 EXTENSIONS OF COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS
TUR2.9a Hans Peters Walter Bossert, Jean Derks, Stef Tijs University of Maastricht Effiency in Uncertain Cooperative Games
TUR2.9b Laurence Kranich Andres Perea, Hans Peters University of Albany Dynamic Cooperative Games
TUR2.9c William S. Zwicker Josep Freixas Union College The minimum PSA pseudoweighting representation of a linear game
TUR2.9d Manuel A. Pulido Cayuela Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano Miguel Hernandez University A Characterization of the Core with Restricted Cooperation
TUR2.10 COALITION FORMATION, THEORY AND EXPERIMENT
TUR2.10a Arno Riedl Akiro Okada CREED, Amsterdam Inefficiency and Social Exclusion in a Coalition formation Game: Experimental Evidence
TUR2.10b Peter Borm Herbert Hamers, Maurice Koster, Marieke Quant Tilburg University Communication and cooperation in public network enterprises
TUR2.10c Gael Giraud   Universite Louis Pasteur Nash and Strong Coalition-proof Implementation of the Walras Equilibria
TUR2.10d Szilvia Papai   Universidade Nova de Lisboa Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games
TUR2.11 SPECIAL CLASSES OF COOPERATIVE GAMES
TUR2.11a Daniel Granot Jeroen Kuipers, Sunil Chopra University of British Columbia Cost Allocation for a Tree Network with Heterogeneous Customers
TUR2.11b A. Lebret   Universite de Caen Fuzzy Cooperative Games and Political Models
TUR2.11c Maurice Koster   Tilburg University Cooperative production and transferable utility games
TUR2.11d Mariana Rodica Branzei S. Tijs, J. Timmer Alexandru Ioan Cuza University Information Collecting Games
TUR2.12 VALUE AND POWER INDICES
TUR2.12a David W. K. Yeung Leon Petrosyan Hong Kong Baptist University Shapley Value for Games with Uncertain Terminal Payoffs
TUR2.12b Henk Norde Hans Reijnierse Tilburg University A dual description of the class of games with a population monotonic allocation scheme
TUR2.12c Elena Yanovskaya   St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics The Family of Least Power Values for Transferable Utility Games and Their Limits
TUR2.12d Dennis Leech   University of Warwick An Empirical Comparison of the Performance of Classical Power Indices