GAMES 2000

Tuesday Poster Sessions

Listed Alphabetically--All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title
TUP Kazunori Araki   Waseda University Training or Poaching? : An Evolutionary Model of General Training Provision
TUP Richard Ball   Haverford College Violations Of Monotonicity In Evolutionary Models With Sample-Based Beliefs
TUP Doris Behrens Reinhard Neck University of Klagenfurt OPTGAME 2.0: An Algorithm for Equilibrium Solutions of N-Person Discrete-Time (Non-)Linear Dynamic Games
TUP Michele Breton Georges Zaccour   Equilibria in an Asymmetric Duopoly Facing a Security Constraint
TUP Eliane P. Catilina   University of Virginia Information Acquisition Games in Cournot Oligopolistic Markets: A Three Stage Approach
TUP A. A. Chikrii S. D. Eidelman Cybernetics Institute Quasilinear Fractal Games of Approach
TUP Rajarshi Das   IBM Institute for Advanced Commerce Dynamic Pricing in Pricebots: Learning and Collective Behavior
TUP Jim Dearden Dorothy Klotz Lehigh University Supervisors,Minimum Requirements, and Contracting
TUP Gabriel Desgranges   Universite de Cergy-Pontoise Common Knowledge of Rationality in a Market Game with Asymmetric
TUP Antonino Drago   Univ. Federico II The Well-adequate Mathematics to Game Theory is H. Weyl's Elementary Mathematics
TUP Esther Hauk Juan-Jose Ganuza Universitat Pompeu Fabra Economic Integration and Corruption: The Corrupt Soul of the European Union
TUP Jens Josephson Alexander Matros Stockholm School of Economics Adaptive Learning by Imitation
TUP Sabit T. Khakimzhanov   Bilkent University Debt Reduction or Tax Reform: Numerical Computation of a Markov Equilibrium in a Dynamic Game
TUP Hrachya Kyureghian Sudipta Sarangi American University of Armenia Transport Cost Sharing and Spatial Competition
TUP Wei Shi Lim   National University of Singapore A Search Game By The Name of You've Got Mail
TUP Xavier Mas Manez   European University Institute Leader-Follower Equilibria in a Two-Stage Model
TUP Paolo Marino     Fictitious play and weak dominance in two player finite games
TUP Yasuko Matsui   Tokai University A Dynamic Programming Technique for Calculating the Deegan Packel Power Indices
TUP S. A. Nemnyugin O. A. Malafeev, A. V. Krutova Sankt-Petersburg State University The Conflict Model Of The Option Prices Dynamic On Security Market
TUP Ichiro Obara Michihiro Kandori University of Pennsylvania Private Strategy and Efficiency: Repeated Partnership Games Revisited
TUP Ivan Pastine Tuvana Pastine   Coordination in Markets with Consumption Externalities: The Role of Advertising and Product Quality
TUP Anders Poulsen   University of Essex Commitment and Information in Ultimatum Bargaining: An Evolutionary Analysis
TUP Ewa Roszkowska Anna Gomolinska, Tom Burns University of Bialystok Rule complexes for the social game theory
TUP Amedeo Spadaro   Universitat de les Illes Balears Evolving Network in a Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma Game
TUP Mabel Tidball A. Jean-Marie, N. Querou INRA Conjectural Variation Equilibrium, Reaction functions and Indifference Curves
TUP Felix Vardy   Princeton University Incentives for Information Acquisition in Common Value Auctions with Large Underlying Uncertainty
TUP Filippo Vergara Caffarelli   European University Institute Privatization and Bookbuilding