|
TIME |
DETAILS (All Sessions are Parallel Sessions)
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|
Monday (July 24) |
|
9:45-10:30 |
Opening session with welcome by the President of the
Basque government |
MOS1 |
|
11:00-12:30 |
Inaugural Statement by Kenneth Arrow followed by
Reinhard Selten's Keynote Lecture: "How to Play Games--Lessons From
Strategy Experiments" |
MOS2 |
|
12:40-1:25
Session MOS3 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| MOS3.1 |
Alvin E. Roth |
Axel Ockenfels |
Harvard University |
Last Minute Bidding and the Rules
for Ending Second-price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural
Experiment on the Internet |
R. Rosenthal |
| MOS3.2 |
Roger Guesnerie |
G. Desgranges |
Delta, Paris |
The Transmission of Information
Through Prices: An Alternative Exploratory Assessment of Market
Performance |
G. Mailath |
| MOS3.3 |
Jonathan Schaeffer |
|
University of Alberta |
On Computers and Games |
J. Rosenmuller |
| MOS3.4 |
Abhijit Banerjee |
|
M.I.T. |
The Uses of Game Theory: Against
a Purely Positive Interepretation of Game Theoretic Results |
S.
Matthews | |
3:00-3:45
Poster Session
(MOP) |
|
|
|
| MOR1 Sessions and Topics |
|
MOR1.1 |
Imperfect Monitoring |
|
MOR1.2 |
Allocation and Assignments |
|
MOR1.3 |
First and Second Price Auctions |
|
MOR1.4 |
Interactive Epistemology |
|
MOR1.5 |
Cooperative Solutions with Small Players |
|
MOR1.6 |
Teams, Cartels and Bankuptcy |
|
MOR1.7 |
Evolution, Cooperation and Coordination |
|
MOR1.8 |
Networks and Coalition Formation |
|
MOR1.9 |
Voting |
|
MOR1.10 |
Principal-Agent and Delegation |
|
MOR1.11 |
Iterated Dominance and Equilibrium Computation |
|
MOR1.12 |
Evolutionary Selection | |
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|
| MOR2 Sessions and Topics |
|
MOR2.1 |
Bounded Repeated Games |
|
MOR2.2 |
Equilibrium and Auctions |
|
MOR2.3 |
Experiments with Reputation and Communication |
|
MOR2.4 |
Coalition Formation in Economics and Politics |
|
MOR2.5 |
Cooperation, Fairness and Public Goods |
|
MOR2.6. |
Extensions of Bargaining Solutions |
|
MOR2.7 |
Core and Consistency |
|
MOR2.8 |
Adaptive Behavior and Best Response Learning |
|
MOR2.9 |
Experts and Communication in Games |
|
MOR2.10 |
Incentive Issues in Markets |
|
MOR2.11 |
Strategic Interaction in Markets and Politics |
|
MOR2.12 |
The Structure of Equilibria | |
|
Tuesday (July 25) |
|
9:30-10:15
Session TUS1 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| TUS1.1 |
Howard Rosenthal |
|
Princeton University |
Recent Applications of Game
Theory in Political Science |
S. Brams |
| TUS1.2 |
Abraham Neyman |
|
Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
Games with Uncertain Duration |
Y. Kannai |
| TUS1.3 |
Aldo Rustichini |
Johannes Berg, Matteo Marsili, Riccardo Zecchina |
Boston University |
Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning
in Large Games |
A. Urbano |
| TUS1.4 |
Philip J. Reny |
Shmuel Zamir |
University of Chicago |
On the Existence of Pure Strategy
Equilibria in First-Price Auctions |
D.
Lehmann | |
|
10:30-11:15
Session TUS2 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| TUS2.1 |
Roger Myerson |
|
Northwestern University |
Comparison of Scoring Rules in
Poisson Voting Games |
S. Zamir |
| TUS2.2 |
Peyton Young |
|
Johns Hopkins University |
Possibility and Impossibility
Results in Learning |
J. Zarzuelo |
| TUS2.3 |
Joseph Y. Halpern |
|
Cornell Univeristy |
A Computer Scientist Looks at
Game Theory |
Y. Moses |
| TUS2.4 |
Mark Satterthwaite |
|
Northwestern University |
The Optimality of the Double
Auction Trading Mechanism |
M.
Wooders | |
|
11:45- 12:30
Session TUS3 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| TUS3.1 |
Harold W. Kuhn |
|
Princeton University |
Extensive Games Revisited |
G. Owen |
| TUS3.2 |
Eric Maskin |
|
Princeton University |
Efficiency in Auctions |
T. Ichiishi |
| TUS3.3 |
Richard D. McKelvey |
|
Caltech |
Effects of "Mistakes" in Game
Theoretic Models of Political Processes |
A. McLennan |
| TUS3.4 |
Ehud Lehrer |
|
Tel Aviv University |
Approachability and Its
Applications |
M.
Bacharach | |
|
12:40-1:30 |
David M. Kreps (Stanford University and Tel Aviv
University), The Donald P. Jacobs Lecture: "Game Theory and
Management" |
|
|
3:00-3:45
Tuesday poster session (TUP) |
|
|
|
| TUR1 Sessions and Topics |
|
TUR1.1 |
Knowledge and Uncertainty |
|
TUR1.2 |
Issues in Bargaining and Matching |
|
TUR1.3 |
Core Stability |
|
TUR1.4 |
Multi-Item Auctions |
|
TUR1.5 |
Contracts, Coordination and
Polarization |
|
TUR1.6. |
Alternative Notions of Equilibrium |
|
TUR1.7 |
Solutions of Cooperative Games |
|
TUR1.8 |
Equilibrium Selection and Computation |
|
TUR1.9 |
Topics in Repeated Games |
|
TUR1.10 |
Sequential Coalition Formation |
|
TUR1.11 |
Bargaining and Implementation |
|
TUR1.12 |
Information and Technology in
Markets | |
|
|
| TUR2 Sessions and Topics |
|
TUR2.1 |
Learning in Economic Environments |
|
TUR2.2 |
Specialized Equilibria in Markets |
|
TUR2.3 |
Optimal Auctions |
|
TUR2.4 |
Informational Issues in Equilibrium |
|
TUR2.5 |
Social Implementation |
|
TUR2.6 |
Market Structure |
|
TUR2.7 |
Entropy and Complexity in Dynamic Environments |
|
TUR2.8 |
Stochastic Games and Evolution |
|
TUR2.9 |
Extensions of Cooperative Solutions |
|
TUR2.10 |
Coalition Formation, Theory and Experiment |
|
TUR2.11 |
Special Classes of Cooperative Games |
|
TUR2.12 |
Value and Power Indices | |
|
Wednesday (July 26) |
|
9:30-10:15
Session WES1 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| WES1.1 |
Sylvain Sorin |
Abraham Neyman |
Ecole Polytechnique and U.
Paris |
Repeated Games with Incomplete
Information and Uncertain Duration |
T. E. S. Raghavan |
| WES1.2 |
Matthew O. Jackson |
|
Caltech |
The Endogenous Choice of
Mechanisms: Self-Stable Majority Voting Rules |
G. Gambarelli |
| WES1.3 |
Kyle Bagwell |
|
Columbia University |
The Theory of the WTO |
H. Peters |
| WES1.4 |
Dov Samet |
P. Jehiel |
Tel Aviv University |
Learning to Play by Node
Valuation |
G.
Asheim | |
|
10:30-11:15
Session WES2 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| WES2.1 |
David Austen-Smith |
Jeffrey S. Banks |
Northwestern University |
Social Choice Theory, Game Theory
and Positive Political Theory |
R. McLean |
| WES2.2 |
Robert Schapire |
|
AT&T Labs |
Modern Approaches to Machine
Learning and their Game-theoretic Context |
J. Swinkels |
| WES2.3 |
Leonardo Felli |
Luca Anderlini |
University of Southampton |
Bounded Rationality and
Incomplete Contracts |
F. Patrone |
| WES2.4 |
Michael Maschler |
Daniel Granot, Jonathan Shalev |
The Hebrew University |
Unanimity in Voting for Voters |
E.
Inarra | |
|
11:45-12:30
Session WES3 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| WES3.1 |
Josef Hofbauer |
|
University of Vienna |
Evolutionary Methods of
Equilibrium Selection |
A. Robson |
| WES3.2 |
Salvador Barbera |
|
CODE and Universitat Autonoma de
Barcelona |
Strategic Aspects in Voting: Old
and New |
J. Abdou |
| WES3.3 |
Daphne Koller |
Brian Milch |
Stanford University |
Structured Models of Complex
Decision Problems |
B. von Stengel |
| WES3.4 |
Herve Moulin |
|
Rice University |
Distributing Beans According to
Claims: Proportional, Fair Queuing, and Other Methods |
S.
Muto | |
|
12:40-1:30 |
Yoav Shoham (Stanford University): "Interesting
Problems at the Interface of Computer Science and Game Theory" |
WES4 |
|
3:00-3:45
Wednesday poster session
(WEP) |
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|
Thursday (July 27) |
|
9:30-10:15
Session THS1 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| THS1.1 |
Scott Shenker |
|
International Computer Science
Institute |
Game Theory and Computer
Networks |
T. Sandholm |
| THS1.2 |
Joel Watson |
Alan Schwartz |
University of California, San
Diego |
Contract, Legal Institutions, and
Game Theory, with an Application to Costly Recontracting |
A. Okada |
| THS1.3 |
Hari Govindan |
|
University of Western Ontario |
The Structure of Nash Equilibria
in Finite Games |
L.
Zhou | |
|
10:30-11:15
Session THS2 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| THS2.1 |
Joel Sobel |
|
UCSD |
Social Preferences and
Reciprocity |
D. Furth |
| THS2.2 |
Philippe Aghion |
M. Dewatripont, P. Rey |
University College London |
Conceding Control Rights to
Induce Cooperation: A Partial Contracting Approach |
S. Weber |
| THS2.3 |
Nicolas Vielle |
|
Laboratoire d'Econometrie, Ecole
Polytechnique, Paris and Grape, Universite Montesquieu-Bordeaux 4 |
Recent Developments in Stochastic
Games |
H.
Imai | |
|
11:45-12:30
Session THS3 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| THS3.1 |
Moshe Tennenholtz |
|
Technion and Stanford
University |
Mechanism Design for
Computational Settings |
A. Brandenburger |
| THS3.2 |
Margaret Meyer |
Christopher Avery |
Nuffield College |
Choosing Procedures for Eliciting
Advice from Biased Advisors |
J.-F. Ponssard |
| THS3.3 |
Ehud Kalai |
|
Northwestern University |
Information-proof Equilibria in
Macro Bayesian Games |
M. Stinchcombe |
| THS3.4 |
Jean-Francois Mertens |
Isabel Grilo |
CORE |
Cournot Equilibrium |
J.-P.
Benoit | |
|
12:40-1:30 |
Gerard Debreu's Introduction followed by Robert
J. Aumann's "Presidential Address" |
THS4 |
|
3:00-3:45
Thursday poster session
(THP) |
|
|
|
| THR1 Sessions and Topics |
|
THR1.1 |
Value and Power Indices |
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THR1.2 |
Collusions in Auctions |
|
THR1.3 |
Voting Through Parties |
|
THR1.4 |
Learning: Theory and Experiments |
|
THR1.5 |
Mechanisms and Implementation |
|
THR1.6 |
Contests, Entry and R&D |
|
THR1.7 |
Repeated Games with and without Complete Information |
|
THR1.8 |
Evolution with Local Interaction |
|
THR1.9 |
Special Classes of Coalitional Games |
|
THR1.10 |
Foundations of Bargaining and Cooperative Solutions |
|
THR1.11 |
Signaling and Information Transmission |
|
THR1.12 |
Equilibria of Extensive Games | |
|
|
| THR2 Sessions and Topics |
|
THR2.1 |
Special Classes of Bargaining Solutions |
|
THR2.2 |
Experiments Regarding Economic Issues |
|
THR2.3 |
Comparisons of Learning Models |
|
THR2.4 |
Coalitional Games in Economic Environments |
|
THR2.5 |
Games with Infinitely Many Strategies and Players |
|
THR2.6 |
Solutions to Stochastic Games |
|
THR2.7 |
Fair Division and Allocation |
|
THR2.8 |
Rational Learning |
|
THR2.9 |
The Stability of Governance Structures |
|
THR2.10 |
Rationalizability, Awareness and Beliefs |
|
THR2.11 |
Quality Issues in Trade |
|
THR2.12 |
Timing in Strategic
Interaction | |
|
Friday (July 28) |
|
9:30-10:15
Session FRS1 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's
Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| FRS1.1 |
William Thomson |
|
University of Rochester |
An Axiomatic Theory of
Bargaining: An Update |
J.-M. Bilbao |
| FRS1.2 |
Eric Van Damme |
Jorgen W. Weibull |
Tilburg University |
Evolution and Refinement with
Endogenous Mistake Probabilities |
C. Holt |
| FRS1.3 |
David Schmeidler |
Ithzak Gilboa |
Tel Aviv and Ohio State
Universities |
Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic
Approach |
S.
Tijs | |
|
10:30-11:15
Session FRS2 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| FRS2.1 |
Sergiu Hart |
|
The Hebrew University of
Jerusalem |
Evolutionary Dynamics and
Backward Induction |
T. Palfrey |
| FRS2.2 |
Francoise Forges |
Jean-Francois Mertens, Rajiv
Vohra |
Université de Cergy-Pontoise |
The Incentive Compatible Core of
an Economy with Differential Information: The Quasi-Linear Case |
E. Ben-Porath |
| FRS2.3 |
Brian Skyrms |
|
University of California |
Co-evolution of Norms: A Case
Study |
M.
Sotomayor | |
|
11:45-12:30
Session FRS3 |
| Session |
Presenter's Name |
Co-author(s) |
Presenter's Affiliation |
Paper Title |
Chair |
| FRS3.1 |
Barry O'Neill |
|
Stanford University |
The Treatment of Emotions in Game
Theory |
X. Vives |
| FRS3.2 |
Andrew Postlewaite |
Richard McLean |
University of Pennsylvania |
Efficient Auction Mechanisms with
Multidimensional Signals |
A. Kirman |
| FRS3.3 |
Vincent Crawford |
Miguel Costa-Gomes, Bruno
Broseta |
University of California, San
Diego |
Cognition and Behavior in
Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study |
A.
Alkan | |
|
12:40-1:30 |
Lloyd Shapley (University of California), The Oskar
Morgenstern Lecture: "Ethics and Clusters" |
FRS4 |
|
|
| FRR1 Sessions and Topics |
|
FRR1.1 |
Combinatorial Auctions |
|
FRR1.2 |
Quantal Response and Experiments |
|
FRR1.3 |
Matching |
|
FRR1.4 |
Empirical Studies in Sports and Markets |
|
FRR1.5 |
Dynamic Duopoloy and Oligopoly |
|
FRR1.6 |
Spatial Voting |
|
FRR1.7 |
Games in Markets |
|
FRR1.8 |
Strategic Aggregation of Information |
|
FRR1.9 |
Alternative Solutions to Cooperative Games |
|
FRR1.10 |
Stochastic and Extensive Games |
|
FRR1.11 |
Evolutionary Phenomena |
|
FRR1.12 |
Convexity in Coalitional
Games | |
|
|
| FRR2 Sessions and Topics |
| FRR2.1 |
Authority Structure and Bargaining |
| FRR2.2 |
Equilibrium in Markets |
| FRR2.3 |
Knowledge and Uncertainty |
| FRR2.4 |
Bargaining and Auctions in Markets |
| FRR2.5 |
Extensive Form Games |
| FRR2.6 |
Strategic Potential Games |
| FRR2.7 |
Min-Max Strategies |
| FRR2.8 |
Complexity in Bargaining |
| FRR2.9 |
Lessons from History and Testable Theory |
| FRR2.10 |
Cheap Talk |
| FRR2.11 |
Correlated Equilibria and
Sunspots | |
|
6:00-7:15 |
John F. Nash s Future Applications panel: Arrow,
Kuhn, Mas-Colell, Shapley, and van Damme |
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