GAMES 2000 Program By Session

 

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TIME
DETAILS (All Sessions are Parallel Sessions)
Monday (July 24) 
9:45-10:30
Opening session with welcome by the President of the Basque government
MOS1
11:00-12:30
Inaugural Statement by Kenneth Arrow followed by Reinhard Selten's Keynote Lecture: "How to Play Games--Lessons From Strategy Experiments"
MOS2
12:40-1:25
Session MOS3
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
MOS3.1 Alvin E. Roth Axel Ockenfels Harvard University Last Minute Bidding and the Rules for Ending Second-price Auctions: Theory and Evidence from a Natural Experiment on the Internet R. Rosenthal
MOS3.2 Roger Guesnerie G. Desgranges Delta, Paris The Transmission of Information Through Prices: An Alternative Exploratory Assessment of Market Performance G. Mailath
MOS3.3 Jonathan Schaeffer   University of Alberta

On Computers and Games

J. Rosenmuller
MOS3.4 Abhijit Banerjee   M.I.T. The Uses of Game Theory: Against a Purely Positive Interepretation of Game Theoretic Results S. Matthews

3:00-3:45
Poster Session
(MOP)

3:45-5:15
Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of MOR1 Presenters

MOR1 Sessions and Topics

MOR1.1

Imperfect Monitoring

MOR1.2

Allocation and Assignments

MOR1.3

First and Second Price Auctions

MOR1.4

Interactive Epistemology

MOR1.5

Cooperative Solutions with Small Players

MOR1.6

Teams, Cartels and Bankuptcy

MOR1.7

Evolution, Cooperation and Coordination

MOR1.8

Networks and Coalition Formation

MOR1.9

Voting

MOR1.10

Principal-Agent and Delegation

MOR1.11

Iterated Dominance and Equilibrium Computation

MOR1.12

Evolutionary Selection

5:45-7:15
Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of MOR2 Presenters

MOR2 Sessions and Topics

MOR2.1

Bounded Repeated Games

MOR2.2

Equilibrium and Auctions

MOR2.3

Experiments with Reputation and Communication

MOR2.4

Coalition Formation in Economics and Politics

MOR2.5

Cooperation, Fairness and Public Goods

MOR2.6.

Extensions of Bargaining Solutions

MOR2.7

Core and Consistency

MOR2.8

Adaptive Behavior and Best Response Learning

MOR2.9

Experts and Communication in Games

MOR2.10

Incentive Issues in Markets

MOR2.11

Strategic Interaction in Markets and Politics

MOR2.12

The Structure of Equilibria

Tuesday (July 25)
9:30-10:15
Session TUS1
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
TUS1.1 Howard Rosenthal   Princeton University Recent Applications of Game Theory in Political Science S. Brams
TUS1.2 Abraham Neyman   Hebrew University of Jerusalem Games with Uncertain Duration Y. Kannai
TUS1.3 Aldo Rustichini Johannes Berg, Matteo Marsili, Riccardo Zecchina Boston University Equilibrium and Adaptive Learning in Large Games A. Urbano
TUS1.4 Philip J. Reny Shmuel Zamir University of Chicago On the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in First-Price Auctions D. Lehmann
10:30-11:15
Session TUS2
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
TUS2.1 Roger Myerson   Northwestern University Comparison of Scoring Rules in Poisson Voting Games S. Zamir
TUS2.2 Peyton Young   Johns Hopkins University Possibility and Impossibility Results in Learning J. Zarzuelo
TUS2.3 Joseph Y. Halpern   Cornell Univeristy A Computer Scientist Looks at Game Theory Y. Moses
TUS2.4 Mark Satterthwaite   Northwestern University The Optimality of the Double Auction Trading Mechanism M. Wooders
11:45- 12:30
Session TUS3
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
TUS3.1 Harold W. Kuhn   Princeton University Extensive Games Revisited G. Owen
TUS3.2 Eric Maskin   Princeton University Efficiency in Auctions T. Ichiishi
TUS3.3 Richard D. McKelvey   Caltech Effects of "Mistakes" in Game Theoretic Models of Political Processes A. McLennan
TUS3.4 Ehud Lehrer   Tel Aviv University Approachability and Its Applications M. Bacharach
12:40-1:30
David M. Kreps (Stanford University and Tel Aviv University), The Donald P. Jacobs Lecture: "Game Theory and Management"
3:00-3:45
Tuesday poster session (TUP)
3:45-5:15
Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of TUR1 Presenters

TUR1 Sessions and Topics

TUR1.1

Knowledge and Uncertainty

TUR1.2

Issues in Bargaining and Matching

TUR1.3

Core Stability

TUR1.4

Multi-Item Auctions

TUR1.5

Contracts, Coordination and Polarization

TUR1.6.

Alternative Notions of Equilibrium

TUR1.7

Solutions of Cooperative Games

TUR1.8

Equilibrium Selection and Computation

TUR1.9

Topics in Repeated Games

TUR1.10

Sequential Coalition Formation

TUR1.11

Bargaining and Implementation

TUR1.12

Information and Technology in Markets

5:45-7:15
Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of TUR2 Presenters

TUR2 Sessions and Topics

TUR2.1

Learning in Economic Environments

TUR2.2

Specialized Equilibria in Markets

TUR2.3

Optimal Auctions

TUR2.4

Informational Issues in Equilibrium

TUR2.5

Social Implementation

TUR2.6

Market Structure

TUR2.7

Entropy and Complexity in Dynamic Environments

TUR2.8

Stochastic Games and Evolution

TUR2.9

Extensions of Cooperative Solutions

TUR2.10

Coalition Formation, Theory and Experiment

TUR2.11

Special Classes of Cooperative Games

TUR2.12

Value and Power Indices

Wednesday (July 26) 
9:30-10:15
Session WES1
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
WES1.1 Sylvain Sorin Abraham Neyman Ecole Polytechnique and U. Paris Repeated Games with Incomplete Information and Uncertain Duration T. E. S. Raghavan
WES1.2 Matthew O. Jackson   Caltech The Endogenous Choice of Mechanisms: Self-Stable Majority Voting Rules G. Gambarelli
WES1.3 Kyle Bagwell   Columbia University The Theory of the WTO H. Peters
WES1.4 Dov Samet P. Jehiel Tel Aviv University Learning to Play by Node Valuation G. Asheim
10:30-11:15
Session WES2
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
WES2.1 David Austen-Smith Jeffrey S. Banks Northwestern University Social Choice Theory, Game Theory and Positive Political Theory R. McLean
WES2.2 Robert Schapire   AT&T Labs Modern Approaches to Machine Learning and their Game-theoretic Context J. Swinkels
WES2.3 Leonardo Felli Luca Anderlini University of Southampton Bounded Rationality and Incomplete Contracts F. Patrone
WES2.4 Michael Maschler Daniel Granot, Jonathan Shalev The Hebrew University Unanimity in Voting for Voters E. Inarra
11:45-12:30
Session WES3
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
WES3.1 Josef Hofbauer   University of Vienna Evolutionary Methods of Equilibrium Selection A. Robson
WES3.2 Salvador Barbera   CODE and Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Strategic Aspects in Voting: Old and New J. Abdou
WES3.3 Daphne Koller Brian Milch Stanford University Structured Models of Complex Decision Problems B. von Stengel
WES3.4 Herve Moulin   Rice University Distributing Beans According to Claims: Proportional, Fair Queuing, and Other Methods S. Muto
12:40-1:30
Yoav Shoham (Stanford University): "Interesting Problems at the Interface of Computer Science and Game Theory"
WES4
3:00-3:45
Wednesday poster session (WEP)
Thursday (July 27)
9:30-10:15
Session THS1
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
THS1.1 Scott Shenker   International Computer Science Institute Game Theory and Computer Networks T. Sandholm
THS1.2 Joel Watson Alan Schwartz University of California, San Diego Contract, Legal Institutions, and Game Theory, with an Application to Costly Recontracting A. Okada
THS1.3 Hari Govindan   University of Western Ontario The Structure of Nash Equilibria in Finite Games L. Zhou
10:30-11:15
Session THS2
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
THS2.1 Joel Sobel   UCSD Social Preferences and Reciprocity D. Furth
THS2.2 Philippe Aghion M. Dewatripont, P. Rey University College London Conceding Control Rights to Induce Cooperation: A Partial Contracting Approach S. Weber
THS2.3 Nicolas Vielle   Laboratoire d'Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique, Paris and Grape, Universite Montesquieu-Bordeaux 4 Recent Developments in Stochastic Games H. Imai
11:45-12:30
Session THS3
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
THS3.1 Moshe Tennenholtz   Technion and Stanford University Mechanism Design for Computational Settings A. Brandenburger
THS3.2 Margaret Meyer Christopher Avery Nuffield College Choosing Procedures for Eliciting Advice from Biased Advisors J.-F. Ponssard
THS3.3 Ehud Kalai   Northwestern University Information-proof Equilibria in Macro Bayesian Games M. Stinchcombe
THS3.4 Jean-Francois Mertens Isabel Grilo CORE Cournot Equilibrium J.-P. Benoit
12:40-1:30
Gerard Debreu's Introduction followed by Robert J. Aumann's "Presidential Address"
THS4
3:00-3:45
Thursday poster session (THP)
3:45-5:15

Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of THR1 Presenters

THR1 Sessions and Topics

THR1.1

Value and Power Indices

THR1.2

Collusions in Auctions

THR1.3

Voting Through Parties

THR1.4

Learning: Theory and Experiments

THR1.5

Mechanisms and Implementation

THR1.6

Contests, Entry and R&D

THR1.7

Repeated Games with and without Complete Information

THR1.8

Evolution with Local Interaction

THR1.9

Special Classes of Coalitional Games

THR1.10

Foundations of Bargaining and Cooperative Solutions

THR1.11

Signaling and Information Transmission

THR1.12

Equilibria of Extensive Games

5:45-7:15

Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of THR2 Presenters

THR2 Sessions and Topics

THR2.1

Special Classes of Bargaining Solutions

THR2.2

Experiments Regarding Economic Issues

THR2.3

Comparisons of Learning Models

THR2.4

Coalitional Games in Economic Environments

THR2.5

Games with Infinitely Many Strategies and Players

THR2.6

Solutions to Stochastic Games

THR2.7

Fair Division and Allocation

THR2.8

Rational Learning

THR2.9

The Stability of Governance Structures

THR2.10

Rationalizability, Awareness and Beliefs

THR2.11

Quality Issues in Trade

THR2.12

Timing in Strategic Interaction

Friday (July 28) 
9:30-10:15
Session FRS1
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
FRS1.1 William Thomson   University of Rochester An Axiomatic Theory of Bargaining: An Update J.-M. Bilbao
FRS1.2 Eric Van Damme Jorgen W. Weibull Tilburg University Evolution and Refinement with Endogenous Mistake Probabilities C. Holt
FRS1.3 David Schmeidler Ithzak Gilboa Tel Aviv and Ohio State Universities Inductive Inference: An Axiomatic Approach S. Tijs
10:30-11:15
Session FRS2
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
FRS2.1 Sergiu Hart   The Hebrew University of Jerusalem Evolutionary Dynamics and Backward Induction T. Palfrey
FRS2.2 Francoise Forges Jean-Francois Mertens, Rajiv Vohra Université de Cergy-Pontoise The Incentive Compatible Core of an Economy with Differential Information: The Quasi-Linear Case E. Ben-Porath
FRS2.3 Brian Skyrms   University of California Co-evolution of Norms: A Case Study M. Sotomayor
11:45-12:30
Session FRS3
Session Presenter's Name Co-author(s) Presenter's Affiliation Paper Title Chair
FRS3.1 Barry O'Neill   Stanford University The Treatment of Emotions in Game Theory X. Vives
FRS3.2 Andrew Postlewaite Richard McLean University of Pennsylvania Efficient Auction Mechanisms with Multidimensional Signals A. Kirman
FRS3.3 Vincent Crawford Miguel Costa-Gomes, Bruno Broseta University of California, San Diego Cognition and Behavior in Normal-form Games: An Experimental Study A. Alkan
12:40-1:30
Lloyd Shapley (University of California), The Oskar Morgenstern Lecture: "Ethics and Clusters"
FRS4
3:00-4:30

Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of FRR1 Presenters

FRR1 Sessions and Topics

FRR1.1

Combinatorial Auctions

FRR1.2

Quantal Response and Experiments

FRR1.3

Matching

FRR1.4

Empirical Studies in Sports and Markets

FRR1.5

Dynamic Duopoloy and Oligopoly

FRR1.6

Spatial Voting

FRR1.7

Games in Markets

FRR1.8

Strategic Aggregation of Information

FRR1.9

Alternative Solutions to Cooperative Games

FRR1.10

Stochastic and Extensive Games

FRR1.11

Evolutionary Phenomena

FRR1.12

Convexity in Coalitional Games

4:45-5:30

Contributed Papers

Click here for a table of FRR2 Presenters

FRR2 Sessions and Topics
FRR2.1

Authority Structure and Bargaining

FRR2.2

Equilibrium in Markets

FRR2.3

Knowledge and Uncertainty

FRR2.4

Bargaining and Auctions in Markets

FRR2.5

Extensive Form Games

FRR2.6

Strategic Potential Games

FRR2.7

Min-Max Strategies

FRR2.8

Complexity in Bargaining

FRR2.9

Lessons from History and Testable Theory

FRR2.10

Cheap Talk

FRR2.11 Correlated Equilibria and Sunspots
6:00-7:15
John F. Nash s Future Applications panel: Arrow, Kuhn, Mas-Colell, Shapley, and van Damme