GAMES 2000

Thursday (THR2) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
THR2.1 SPECIAL CLASSES OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
THR2.1a William Thomson Toru Hokari University of Rochester Bankruptcy Rules, Anonymity, and Consistency
THR2.1b Haruo Imai Kyoto University Constrained n-person Bargaining Problems
THR2.1c Emilio Calvo Hans Peters University of Valencia Cardinal-ordinal Invariant Solutions
THR2.1d Antonio Nicolo Andres Perea Universitat Autonoma deBarcelona A Non-Welfarist Approach to Bargaining Situations
THR2.2 EXPERIMENTS REGARDING ECONOMIC ISSUES
THR2.2a Abdolkarim Sadrieh Klaus Abbink, Ron Darziv, Zohar Gilula, Harel Goren, Bernd Irlenbusch, Arnon Keren, Bettina Rockenbach, Reinhard Selten, and Shmuel Zamir Tilburg University The Competitive Ultimatum Game: When Competition Matters, Although It Should Not, and Backward Induction Appears Through the Backdoor
THR2.2b Tridib Sharma Tim Cason ITAM, CIE--Mexico City Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics and Uncertainty: Theory andExperiments
THR2.2c Randolph Sloof Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek University of Amsterdam On the relation between asset ownership and specific investments
THR2.2d David Cooper John Kagel Case Western Reserve University Transfer in Signaling Games
THR2.3 COMPARISONS OF LEARNING MODELS
THR2.3a Ed Hopkins University of Pittsburgh Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games
THR2.3b Roberto Weber Carnegie-Mellon University Learning with No Feedback: A Test or Reinforcement Models Using the Competitive Guessing Game
THR2.3c Amy Greenwald Brown University On the Connection Between On-line Learning and Games
THR2.3d          
THR2.4 COALITIONAL GAMES IN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS
THR2.4a Ron Holzman Yevgenia Apartsin Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Core and the Bargaining Set in Glove-Market Games
THR2.4b Mark Voorneveld Tilburg University Voluntary contribution to multiple public goods
THR2.4c Lutz Veldman University of Bielefeld Representations of Multi-level Games
THR2.4d David Furth University of Amsterdam The (Price) Core of a Bertrand--Edgeworth Economy
THR2.5 GAMES WITH INFINITELY MANY STRATEGIES AND PLAYERS
THR2.5a Matthias Blonski University of Mannheim How many veiled women do we expect in Cairo? Characterization of equilibria in large anonymous games
THR2.5b Maxwell B. Stinchcombe Christopher Harris, William Zame University of Texas at Austin The Finitistic Theory of Infinite Games
THR2.5c Maxwell B. Stinchcombe   University of Texas at Austin The Integration of Non-Measurable Functions in Game Theory
THR2.5d Marianna S. Troeva Oleg A. Malafeyev Saint Petersburg University A weak solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation for n-person differential games
THR2.6 SOLUTIONS TO STOCHASTIC GAMES
THR2.6a Reinoud Joosten Thomas Brenner, Ulrich Witt Max Planck Institute On games with frequency-dependent payoffs
THR2.6b T.E.S. Raghavan Zamir Syed University of Illinois A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of Perfect Information
THR2.6c T.E.S. Raghavan Zamir Syed University of Illinois Using Lemke's Algorithm to Solve Two-person Single-controller Stochastic Games
THR2.6d T.E.S. Raghavan Zamir Syed University of Illinois A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of a Special Class
THR2.7 FAIR DIVISION AND ALLOCATION
THR2.7a Steven J. Brams Todd R. Kaplan, Jeffrey R. Lax New York University Yankee Trading
THR2.7b Julius Barbanel Union College On The Structure of Pareto Optimal Cake Partitions
THR2.7c Francis Edward Su Forest Simmons Harvey Mudd College and Cornell University Sperner, Tucker, and Combinatorial Topology for Fair Division Problems
THR2.7d Matthias Raith Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su University of Bielefeld Bidding for Envy-freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems
THR2.8 RATIONAL LEARNING
THR2.8a Sudeep Ghosh University of Iowa Optimal Learning in Variable Universe Games
THR2.8b Thomas Brenner Max Planck Institute Reinforcement Learning for 2-Armed Bandits and 2x2-Games: Studying the Stationary Probability Distribution
THR2.8c Mari Rege Statistics Norway Networking Strategy: People Cooperate Today in Order to Meet More Cooperators Tomorrow
THR2.8d Kichool Park University of California Two Player Continuous Time Bandit Problem
THR2.9 THE STABILITY OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES
THR2.9a Shlomo Weber Michel Le Breton Southern Methodist University The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession?
THR2.9b Katri Sieberg College of William and Mary Contract Enforcement in Post-Soviet Russia
THR2.9c Stefano Vannucci Universita di Siena Effectivity Functions and Stable Governance Structures
THR2.9d          
THR2.10 RATIONALIZABILITY, AWARENESS AND BELIEFS
THR2.10a Salvatore Modica University of Palermo Unawareness, priors and posteriors
THR2.10b Arnis Vilks Thorsten Clausing Leipzig Graduate School of Management Backwards Induction in General Belief Structures with and without Strategies
THR2.10c Licun Xue University of Aarhus Consistent Rationalizability
THR2.10d Leeat Yariv Muriel Niederle Harvard University Seeing is Not Believing: A Simple Model of Confirmatory Bias and Cognitive Dissonance
THR2.11 QUALITY ISSUES IN TRADE
THR2.11a Thomas Kittsteiner K. Fieseler, B. Moldovanu University of Mannheim Partnerships, Lemons, and Efficient Trade
THR2.11b Shunlong Luo Academia Sinica, Beijing The Value of Information in Insider Trading
THR2.11c Muriel Niederle Rudolf Kerschbamer, Josef Perktold Harvard University Quality Enforcement as a Public Good
THR2.11d Eric Van Tassel University of Queensland Product Quality Under Confidential Pricing
THR2.12 TIMING IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION
THR2.12a Thomas Noe Tulane University Fooling all of the people some of the time:A theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations
THR2.12b Lutz-Alexander Busch Ignatius J. Horstmann University of Western Ontario The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements
THR2.12c Nicolas Sahuguet Johannes Horner University of Pennsylvania The timing of bids in all-pay auctions
THR2.12d