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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| THR2.1 | SPECIAL CLASSES OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS | ||||
| THR2.1a | William | Thomson | Toru Hokari | University of Rochester | Bankruptcy Rules, Anonymity, and Consistency |
| THR2.1b | Haruo | Imai | Kyoto University | Constrained n-person Bargaining Problems | |
| THR2.1c | Emilio | Calvo | Hans Peters | University of Valencia | Cardinal-ordinal Invariant Solutions |
| THR2.1d | Antonio | Nicolo | Andres Perea | Universitat Autonoma deBarcelona | A Non-Welfarist Approach to Bargaining Situations |
| THR2.2 | EXPERIMENTS REGARDING ECONOMIC ISSUES | ||||
| THR2.2a | Abdolkarim | Sadrieh | Klaus Abbink, Ron Darziv, Zohar Gilula, Harel Goren, Bernd Irlenbusch, Arnon Keren, Bettina Rockenbach, Reinhard Selten, and Shmuel Zamir | Tilburg University | The Competitive Ultimatum Game: When Competition Matters, Although It Should Not, and Backward Induction Appears Through the Backdoor |
| THR2.2b | Tridib | Sharma | Tim Cason | ITAM, CIE--Mexico City | Durable Goods, Coasian Dynamics and Uncertainty: Theory andExperiments |
| THR2.2c | Randolph | Sloof | Joep Sonnemans, Hessel Oosterbeek | University of Amsterdam | On the relation between asset ownership and specific investments |
| THR2.2d | David | Cooper | John Kagel | Case Western Reserve University | Transfer in Signaling Games |
| THR2.3 | COMPARISONS OF LEARNING MODELS | ||||
| THR2.3a | Ed | Hopkins | University of Pittsburgh | Two Competing Models of How People Learn in Games | |
| THR2.3b | Roberto | Weber | Carnegie-Mellon University | Learning with No Feedback: A Test or Reinforcement Models Using the Competitive Guessing Game | |
| THR2.3c | Amy | Greenwald | Brown University | On the Connection Between On-line Learning and Games | |
| THR2.3d | |||||
| THR2.4 | COALITIONAL GAMES IN ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS | ||||
| THR2.4a | Ron | Holzman | Yevgenia Apartsin | Massachusetts Institute of Technology | The Core and the Bargaining Set in Glove-Market Games |
| THR2.4b | Mark | Voorneveld | Tilburg University | Voluntary contribution to multiple public goods | |
| THR2.4c | Lutz | Veldman | University of Bielefeld | Representations of Multi-level Games | |
| THR2.4d | David | Furth | University of Amsterdam | The (Price) Core of a Bertrand--Edgeworth Economy | |
| THR2.5 | GAMES WITH INFINITELY MANY STRATEGIES AND PLAYERS | ||||
| THR2.5a | Matthias | Blonski | University of Mannheim | How many veiled women do we expect in Cairo? Characterization of equilibria in large anonymous games | |
| THR2.5b | Maxwell B. | Stinchcombe | Christopher Harris, William Zame | University of Texas at Austin | The Finitistic Theory of Infinite Games |
| THR2.5c | Maxwell B. | Stinchcombe | University of Texas at Austin | The Integration of Non-Measurable Functions in Game Theory | |
| THR2.5d | Marianna S. | Troeva | Oleg A. Malafeyev | Saint Petersburg University | A weak solution of the Hamilton-Jacobi equation for n-person differential games |
| THR2.6 | SOLUTIONS TO STOCHASTIC GAMES | ||||
| THR2.6a | Reinoud | Joosten | Thomas Brenner, Ulrich Witt | Max Planck Institute | On games with frequency-dependent payoffs |
| THR2.6b | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of Perfect Information |
| THR2.6c | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | Using Lemke's Algorithm to Solve Two-person Single-controller Stochastic Games |
| THR2.6d | T.E.S. | Raghavan | Zamir Syed | University of Illinois | A Policy-improvement Type Algorithm for Solving Zero-sum Two-person Stochastic Games of a Special Class |
| THR2.7 | FAIR DIVISION AND ALLOCATION | ||||
| THR2.7a | Steven J. | Brams | Todd R. Kaplan, Jeffrey R. Lax | New York University | Yankee Trading |
| THR2.7b | Julius | Barbanel | Union College | On The Structure of Pareto Optimal Cake Partitions | |
| THR2.7c | Francis Edward | Su | Forest Simmons | Harvey Mudd College and Cornell University | Sperner, Tucker, and Combinatorial Topology for Fair Division Problems |
| THR2.7d | Matthias | Raith | Claus-Jochen Haake, Francis Edward Su | University of Bielefeld | Bidding for Envy-freeness: A Procedural Approach to n-Player Fair-Division Problems |
| THR2.8 | RATIONAL LEARNING | ||||
| THR2.8a | Sudeep | Ghosh | University of Iowa | Optimal Learning in Variable Universe Games | |
| THR2.8b | Thomas | Brenner | Max Planck Institute | Reinforcement Learning for 2-Armed Bandits and 2x2-Games: Studying the Stationary Probability Distribution | |
| THR2.8c | Mari | Rege | Statistics Norway | Networking Strategy: People Cooperate Today in Order to Meet More Cooperators Tomorrow | |
| THR2.8d | Kichool | Park | University of California | Two Player Continuous Time Bandit Problem | |
| THR2.9 | THE STABILITY OF GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES | ||||
| THR2.9a | Shlomo | Weber | Michel Le Breton | Southern Methodist University | The Art of Making Everybody Happy: How to Prevent a Secession? |
| THR2.9b | Katri | Sieberg | College of William and Mary | Contract Enforcement in Post-Soviet Russia | |
| THR2.9c | Stefano | Vannucci | Universita di Siena | Effectivity Functions and Stable Governance Structures | |
| THR2.9d | |||||
| THR2.10 | RATIONALIZABILITY, AWARENESS AND BELIEFS | ||||
| THR2.10a | Salvatore | Modica | University of Palermo | Unawareness, priors and posteriors | |
| THR2.10b | Arnis | Vilks | Thorsten Clausing | Leipzig Graduate School of Management | Backwards Induction in General Belief Structures with and without Strategies |
| THR2.10c | Licun | Xue | University of Aarhus | Consistent Rationalizability | |
| THR2.10d | Leeat | Yariv | Muriel Niederle | Harvard University | Seeing is Not Believing: A Simple Model of Confirmatory Bias and Cognitive Dissonance |
| THR2.11 | QUALITY ISSUES IN TRADE | ||||
| THR2.11a | Thomas | Kittsteiner | K. Fieseler, B. Moldovanu | University of Mannheim | Partnerships, Lemons, and Efficient Trade |
| THR2.11b | Shunlong | Luo | Academia Sinica, Beijing | The Value of Information in Insider Trading | |
| THR2.11c | Muriel | Niederle | Rudolf Kerschbamer, Josef Perktold | Harvard University | Quality Enforcement as a Public Good |
| THR2.11d | Eric | Van Tassel | University of Queensland | Product Quality Under Confidential Pricing | |
| THR2.12 | TIMING IN STRATEGIC INTERACTION | ||||
| THR2.12a | Thomas | Noe | Tulane University | Fooling all of the people some of the time:A theory of endogenous sequencing in confidential negotiations | |
| THR2.12b | Lutz-Alexander | Busch | Ignatius J. Horstmann | University of Western Ontario | The Game of Negotiations: Ordering Issues and Implementing Agreements |
| THR2.12c | Nicolas | Sahuguet | Johannes Horner | University of Pennsylvania | The timing of bids in all-pay auctions |
| THR2.12d | |||||