GAMES 2000

Thursday (THR1) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
THR1.1 VALUE AND POWER INDICES
THR1.1a Annick Laruelle Federico Valenciano Universidad de Alicante The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited: A transparent axiomatization
THR1.1b Federico Valenciano Annick Laruelle Universidad del Pais Vasco Power indices and the veil of ignorance
THR1.1c Vincent Merlin Annick Laruelle Universite de Caen Different Least Square Values, Different Rankings
THR1.1d Rene van den Brink   Tilburg University An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value using a Fairness Property
THR1.2 COLLUSIONS IN AUCTIONS
THR1.2a Andrzej Skrzypacz Hugo Hopenhayn University of Rochester Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions
THR1.2b Anthony M. Kwasnica   Penn State University Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments
THR1.2c Sandro Brusco G. Lopomo Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Collusion Via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities
THR1.2d Kevin Leyton-Brown Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University Bidding Clubs: Institutionalized Collusion in Auctions
THR1.3 VOTING THROUGH PARTIES
THR1.3a Guillermo Owen Bernard Grofman Naval Postgraduate School Two stage electoral competition
THR1.3b Michael Ting James Snyder University of North Carolina Parties as Informative "Brands"
THR1.3c Mauricio Soares Bugarin   Universidade de Brasilia Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: a unified model
THR1.3d Alessandro Lizzeri Nicola Persico Princeton University The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition
THR1.4 LEARNING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS
THR1.4a Barry Sopher A. Schotter Rutgers University Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-generational Games: An Experimental Study in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics
THR1.4b Jose Ramon Uriarte Alfonso Barriuso Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea Perception Dynamics
THR1.4c Rimawan Pradiptyo   York University Loss Aversion Fictitious Play
THR1.4d Mikhael Shor Eric J. Friedman, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher Rutgers University Learning in Limited Information Environments
THR1.5 MECHANISMS AND IMPLEMENTATION
THR1.5a Jean-Pierre Benoit   New York University A Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Correspondences
THR1.5b Arieh Gavious Aner Sela Ben Gurion University Auctions With Bounds
THR1.5c Peter Faynzilberg   Northwestern University Participation Rights and Mechanism Design
THR1.5d          
THR1.6 CONTESTS, ENTRY AND R&D
THR1.6a Jean Pierre Ponssard Eric Louvert Ecole Polytechnique, Paris A strategic model of hit and run
THR1.6b Isaac Sonin   University of North Carolina The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m -player Game: Shoot Later, Shoot First!
THR1.6c          
THR1.6d Reinhilde Veugelers Bruno Cassiman, David Perez-Castrillo Katholique University, Leuven Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments
THR1.7 REPEATED GAMES WITH AND WITHOUT COMPLETE INFORMATION
THR1.7a Akira Okada   Kyoto University Social Development Promoted by Cooperation: A Simple Game Model
THR1.7b Daniel Probst Matthias Blonski Mannheim University The Emergence of Trust
THR1.7c Ichiro Obara V. Bhaskar University of Pennsylvania The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
THR1.7d Rida Laraki   Modal'X, University-Paris-10 & Laboratoire D'Econometrie-Ecole Polytechnique Variational inequalities, system of functional equations and incomplete information repeated games
THR1.8 EVOLUTION WITH LOCAL INTERACTION
THR1.8a Moez Kilani   University of the Centre Evolution and the Complexity of Finite Automata
THR1.8b Jacek Miekisz   University of Warsaw Statistical Mechanics of Simple Spatial Games
THR1.8c Martha Saboya Axel Ostmann Universidad Autonoma de Madrid Symmetric homogeneous local interaction
THR1.8d Andreas Blume Ted Temzelides University of Iowa On the Geography of Conventions
THR1.9 SPECIAL CLASSES OF COALITIONAL GAMES
THR1.9a Stef Tijs Ana Meca Martinez, Marco Antonio Lopez Cerda   Holding games are strong big boss games
THR1.9b Pedro Calleja Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn University of Barcelona On the Balancedness of a Multi Machine Sequencing Game
THR1.9c Natividad Llorca-Pascual Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano, Stef Tijs, Judith Timmer Miguel Hernandez University Infinite Continuous Transportation Games
THR1.9d Tamas Solymosi T. E. S. Raghavan, Stef Tijs Budapest University of Economic Sciences The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus of permutation games
THR1.10 FOUNDATIONS OF BARGAINING AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS
THR1.10a Lones Smith Ennio Stacchetti University of Michigan Aspirational Bargaining
THR1.10b David Perez-Castrillo David Wettstein Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Bidding for the surplus: A non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value
THR1.10c Marco Slikker Henk Norde Eindhoven University of Technology Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games
THR1.10d Giovanni Rossi  

University
of Siena

Axiomatizations of Value Functions for Communication Situations
THR1.11 SIGNALING AND INFORMATION TRANSMISSION
THR1.11a Klaus Ritzberger Helmut Bester Institute for Advanced Studies Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Costly Information Acquisition
THR1.11b Jerome Renault   Université PARIS IX DAUPHINE Information transmission in a way robust to unilateral deviations: A characterization
THR1.11c Bart Taub   University of Illinois Dynamic Strategic Information Control
THR1.11d Mogens Jensen   Danish Competition Authority and Institute of Economics,University of Copenhagen Repeated Signalling Games, Long-run Sender and Short-run Receivers
THR1.12 EQUILIBRIA OF EXTENSIVE GAMES
THR1.12a Avi Pfeffer Daphne Koller, Ken T. Takusagawa Harvard University State-space Approximations for Extensive Form Games
THR1.12b Bernhard von Stengel   London School of Economics Improved equilibrium computation for extensive two-person games
THR1.12c Pierfrancesco La Mura   Stanford University Game Networks
THR1.12d Rani Spiegler   Nuffield College Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Reason-Based Choice