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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| THR1.1 | VALUE AND POWER INDICES | ||||
| THR1.1a | Annick | Laruelle | Federico Valenciano | Universidad de Alicante | The Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf indices revisited: A transparent axiomatization |
| THR1.1b | Federico | Valenciano | Annick Laruelle | Universidad del Pais Vasco | Power indices and the veil of ignorance |
| THR1.1c | Vincent | Merlin | Annick Laruelle | Universite de Caen | Different Least Square Values, Different Rankings |
| THR1.1d | Rene | van den Brink | Tilburg University | An Axiomatization of the Shapley Value using a Fairness Property | |
| THR1.2 | COLLUSIONS IN AUCTIONS | ||||
| THR1.2a | Andrzej | Skrzypacz | Hugo Hopenhayn | University of Rochester | Bidding Rings in Repeated Auctions |
| THR1.2b | Anthony M. | Kwasnica | Penn State University | Collusion in Multiple Object Simultaneous Auctions: Theory and Experiments | |
| THR1.2c | Sandro | Brusco | G. Lopomo | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Collusion Via Signalling in Open Ascending Auctions with Multiple Objects and Complementarities |
| THR1.2d | Kevin | Leyton-Brown | Yoav Shoham, Moshe Tennenholtz | Stanford University | Bidding Clubs: Institutionalized Collusion in Auctions |
| THR1.3 | VOTING THROUGH PARTIES | ||||
| THR1.3a | Guillermo | Owen | Bernard Grofman | Naval Postgraduate School | Two stage electoral competition |
| THR1.3b | Michael | Ting | James Snyder | University of North Carolina | Parties as Informative "Brands" |
| THR1.3c | Mauricio Soares | Bugarin | Universidade de Brasilia | Vote splitting, reelection and electoral control: a unified model | |
| THR1.3d | Alessandro | Lizzeri | Nicola Persico | Princeton University | The Drawbacks of Electoral Competition |
| THR1.4 | LEARNING: THEORY AND EXPERIMENTS | ||||
| THR1.4a | Barry | Sopher | A. Schotter | Rutgers University | Social Learning and Coordination Conventions in Inter-generational Games: An Experimental Study in Lamarckian Evolutionary Dynamics |
| THR1.4b | Jose Ramon | Uriarte | Alfonso Barriuso | Universidad del Pais Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea | Perception Dynamics |
| THR1.4c | Rimawan | Pradiptyo | York University | Loss Aversion Fictitious Play | |
| THR1.4d | Mikhael | Shor | Eric J. Friedman, Scott Shenker, Barry Sopher | Rutgers University | Learning in Limited Information Environments |
| THR1.5 | MECHANISMS AND IMPLEMENTATION | ||||
| THR1.5a | Jean-Pierre | Benoit | New York University | A Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem for Correspondences | |
| THR1.5b | Arieh | Gavious | Aner Sela | Ben Gurion University | Auctions With Bounds |
| THR1.5c | Peter | Faynzilberg | Northwestern University | Participation Rights and Mechanism Design | |
| THR1.5d | |||||
| THR1.6 | CONTESTS, ENTRY AND R&D | ||||
| THR1.6a | Jean Pierre | Ponssard | Eric Louvert | Ecole Polytechnique, Paris | A strategic model of hit and run |
| THR1.6b | Isaac | Sonin | University of North Carolina | The Existence and Uniqueness of Nash Equilibrium Point in an m -player Game: Shoot Later, Shoot First! | |
| THR1.6c | |||||
| THR1.6d | Reinhilde | Veugelers | Bruno Cassiman, David Perez-Castrillo | Katholique University, Leuven | Endogenizing know-how flows through the nature of R&D investments |
| THR1.7 | REPEATED GAMES WITH AND WITHOUT COMPLETE INFORMATION | ||||
| THR1.7a | Akira | Okada | Kyoto University | Social Development Promoted by Cooperation: A Simple Game Model | |
| THR1.7b | Daniel | Probst | Matthias Blonski | Mannheim University | The Emergence of Trust |
| THR1.7c | Ichiro | Obara | V. Bhaskar | University of Pennsylvania | The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring |
| THR1.7d | Rida | Laraki | Modal'X, University-Paris-10 & Laboratoire D'Econometrie-Ecole Polytechnique | Variational inequalities, system of functional equations and incomplete information repeated games | |
| THR1.8 | EVOLUTION WITH LOCAL INTERACTION | ||||
| THR1.8a | Moez | Kilani | University of the Centre | Evolution and the Complexity of Finite Automata | |
| THR1.8b | Jacek | Miekisz | University of Warsaw | Statistical Mechanics of Simple Spatial Games | |
| THR1.8c | Martha | Saboya | Axel Ostmann | Universidad Autonoma de Madrid | Symmetric homogeneous local interaction |
| THR1.8d | Andreas | Blume | Ted Temzelides | University of Iowa | On the Geography of Conventions |
| THR1.9 | SPECIAL CLASSES OF COALITIONAL GAMES | ||||
| THR1.9a | Stef | Tijs | Ana Meca Martinez, Marco Antonio Lopez Cerda | Holding games are strong big boss games | |
| THR1.9b | Pedro | Calleja | Peter Borm, Herbert Hamers, Flip Klijn | University of Barcelona | On the Balancedness of a Multi Machine Sequencing Game |
| THR1.9c | Natividad | Llorca-Pascual | Joaquin Sanchez-Soriano, Stef Tijs, Judith Timmer | Miguel Hernandez University | Infinite Continuous Transportation Games |
| THR1.9d | Tamas | Solymosi | T. E. S. Raghavan, Stef Tijs | Budapest University of Economic Sciences | The bargaining set, kernel and nucleolus of permutation games |
| THR1.10 | FOUNDATIONS OF BARGAINING AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS | ||||
| THR1.10a | Lones | Smith | Ennio Stacchetti | University of Michigan | Aspirational Bargaining |
| THR1.10b | David | Perez-Castrillo | David Wettstein | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona | Bidding for the surplus: A non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value |
| THR1.10c | Marco | Slikker | Henk Norde | Eindhoven University of Technology | Incomplete stable structures in symmetric convex games |
| THR1.10d | Giovanni | Rossi |
University |
Axiomatizations of Value Functions for Communication Situations | |
| THR1.11 | SIGNALING AND INFORMATION TRANSMISSION | ||||
| THR1.11a | Klaus | Ritzberger | Helmut Bester | Institute for Advanced Studies | Strategic Pricing, Signalling, and Costly Information Acquisition |
| THR1.11b | Jerome | Renault | Université PARIS IX DAUPHINE | Information transmission in a way robust to unilateral deviations: A characterization | |
| THR1.11c | Bart | Taub | University of Illinois | Dynamic Strategic Information Control | |
| THR1.11d | Mogens | Jensen | Danish Competition Authority and Institute of Economics,University of Copenhagen | Repeated Signalling Games, Long-run Sender and Short-run Receivers | |
| THR1.12 | EQUILIBRIA OF EXTENSIVE GAMES | ||||
| THR1.12a | Avi | Pfeffer | Daphne Koller, Ken T. Takusagawa | Harvard University | State-space Approximations for Extensive Form Games |
| THR1.12b | Bernhard | von Stengel | London School of Economics | Improved equilibrium computation for extensive two-person games | |
| THR1.12c | Pierfrancesco | La Mura | Stanford University | Game Networks | |
| THR1.12d | Rani | Spiegler | Nuffield College | Reason-Based Choice and Justifiability in Reason-Based Choice | |