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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| MOR2.1 | BOUNDED REPEATED GAMES | ||||
| MOR2.1a | Abraham | Neyman | Daijiro Okada | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Strategy Space Restriction in Repeated Games |
| MOR2.1b | Olivier | Gossner | Université Paris X - Nanterre | Games Played by Turing Machines | |
| MOR2.1c | Justin | Smith | St. Peters' College | Complexity and the Difficulty of Remembering Strategies | |
| MOR2.1d | Mikio | Nakayama | Keio University | Kinship-Recognition and Self-Sacrifice in Prisoners' Dilemma | |
| MOR2.2 | EQUILIBRIUM AND AUCTIONS | ||||
| MOR2.2a | Jeroen | Swinkels | Matthew Jackson | Washington University | Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions and Discontinuous Bayesian Games: Endogenous and Incentive Compatible Sharing Rules |
| MOR2.2b | Sushil | Bikhchandani | Joseph Ostroy | Anderson School of Management at UCLA | Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions |
| MOR2.2c | Aner | Sela | E. Einy, R. Orzach | Ben-Gurion University of the Negev | Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information |
| MOR2.2d | Vlad | Mares | Rutgers University | Mergers in Common Value Auctions | |
| MOR2.3 | EXPERIMENTS WITH REPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION | ||||
| MOR2.3a | Robert W. | Rosenthal | Donald J. Dale, John Morgan | Boston University | Coordination Through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment |
| MOR2.3b | Barry | Sopher | Andrew Schotter | Rutgers University | Creating Culture in the Laboratory: Equilibrium Conventions in an Intergenerational Ultimatum Game |
| MOR2.3c | Martin | Sefton | Tony Burton | University of Newcastle | Communication and Equilibrium |
| MOR2.3d | Brit | Grosskopf | Gary Charness | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination |
| MOR2.4 | COALITION FORMATION IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS | ||||
| MOR2.4a | Steven J. | Brams | Michael Jones, D. Marc Kilgour | New York University | The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions |
| MOR2.4b | Ines | Macho-Stadler | Maria Paz Espinosa | Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona | Endogenous Formation of Partnerships with Moral Hazard |
| MOR2.4c | Rod | Garratt | Cheng-Zhong Qin | University of California, Santa Barbara | Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation |
| MOR2.4d | Armando | Gomes | University of Pennsylvania | A Theory of Negotiations and Formation of Coalitions | |
| MOR2.5 | COOPERATION, FAIRNESS AND PUBLIC GOODS | ||||
| MOR2.5a | Howard | Rosenthal | Wojciech Olszewskia | Princeton University | Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods |
| MOR2.5b | Dirk | Engelmann | Martin Strobel | Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin | An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt |
| MOR2.5c | |||||
| MOR2.5d | Shmuel | Zamir | Klaus Abbink, Abdolkarim Sadrieh | Crest--LEI/ENPC | Fairness and Public Good Aspects of Punishment Behavior |
| MOR2.6 | EXTENSIONS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS | ||||
| MOR2.6a | Zvika | Safra | Eran Hanany | Tel Aviv University | Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes |
| MOR2.6b | Frans | Spinnewyn | Katholieke Universiteit LEUVEN | The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution and Related Solution Concepts in Repeated Bargaining Games | |
| MOR2.6c | Seung-Hoon | Lee | Seoul National University | Extended Nash Bargaining Solution with Open Outside Opportunities and its Application to Market Allocation and Team Production | |
| MOR2.6d | Naoki | Yoshihara | Hitotsubashi University | Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions In Production Economies without Welfarism | |
| MOR2.7 | CORE AND CONSISTENCY | ||||
| MOR2.7a | Victor | Zakharov | Arina Akimova | St.Petersburg State University | Properties of the Subcore |
| MOR2.7b | Peter | Sudholter | Y.-A. Hwang | University of Bielefeld | An Axiomatization of the Core |
| MOR2.7c | Yukihiko | Funaki | Waseda University | The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization | |
| MOR2.7d | Takehiko | Yamato | Yukihiko Funaki | Tokyo Metropolitan University | The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core by Means of Consistency |
| MOR2.8 | ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND BEST RESPONSE LEARNING | ||||
| MOR2.8a | Jean-Francois | Laslier | R. Topol, B. Walliser | Ecole Polytechnique | A Behavioral Learning Process in Games |
| MOR2.8b | Hans | Haller | Alexander Outkin | Virginia Polytechnic Institute | Best Response Dynamics and Neural Networks |
| MOR2.8c | Dana | Heller | Rajiv Sarin | University of Chicago | Parametric Adaptive Learning |
| MOR2.8d | Rajiv | Sarin | Dana Heller | Texas A&M University | Adaptively learning mixed equilibrium |
| MOR2.9 | EXPERTS AND COMMUNICATION IN GAMES | ||||
| MOR2.9a | John | Morgan | Vijay Krishna | Princeton University | Communicating with Experts |
| MOR2.9b | Dino | Gerardi | Northwestern University | Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information | |
| MOR2.9c | Yong-Gwan | Kim | Sung Kyun Kwan University | Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest | |
| MOR2.9d | Takashi | Matsuhisa | Ibaraki National College of Technology | Communication leading to Nash equilibrium | |
| MOR2.10 | INCENTIVE ISSUES IN MARKETS | ||||
| MOR2.10a | Jose Luis | Ferreira | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Strategic Interaction Between Futures and Spot Markets | |
| MOR2.10b | |||||
| MOR2.10c | Cheng-Zhong | Qin | Hong Kong University of Science and Technology | Credible Commitment: Ex Ante Deterrence and Ex Post Compensation | |
| MOR2.10d | Juan-Jose | Ganuza | Marco Celentani | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | Corruption and competition in procurement |
| MOR2.11 | STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN MARKETS AND POLITICS | ||||
| MOR2.11a | Andrea | Prat | A. Rustichini | London School of Economics | Games Played Through Agents |
| MOR2.11b | Yutaka | Suzuki | Hosei University | Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Organizations | |
| MOR2.11c | Shyh-Fang | Ueng | Academia Sinica | A Non-stationary Finite-period Interactive Markov Race | |
| MOR2.11d | |||||
| MOR2.12 | THE STRUCTURE OF EQUILIBRIA | ||||
| MOR2.12a | Joseph | Abdou | Hans Keiding | Universite Paris | On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strong Solvability of Game Forms |
| MOR2.12b | Dries | Vermeulen | M. J. M. Jansen | Maastricht University | On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria |
| MOR2.12c | Stefano | Demichelis | Fabrizio Germano | Universita' di Pavia | On the Indices of Zeros of Nash Fields |
| MOR2.12d | Jean-Francois | Mertens | Francesco De Sinopoli (author) | CORE | On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games |