GAMES 2000

Monday (MOR2) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
MOR2.1 BOUNDED REPEATED GAMES
MOR2.1a Abraham Neyman Daijiro Okada Hebrew University of Jerusalem Strategy Space Restriction in Repeated Games
MOR2.1b Olivier Gossner   Université Paris X - Nanterre Games Played by Turing Machines
MOR2.1c Justin Smith   St. Peters' College Complexity and the Difficulty of Remembering Strategies
MOR2.1d Mikio Nakayama   Keio University Kinship-Recognition and Self-Sacrifice in Prisoners' Dilemma
MOR2.2 EQUILIBRIUM AND AUCTIONS
MOR2.2a Jeroen Swinkels Matthew Jackson Washington University Existence of Equilibrium in Auctions and Discontinuous Bayesian Games: Endogenous and Incentive Compatible Sharing Rules
MOR2.2b Sushil Bikhchandani Joseph Ostroy Anderson School of Management at UCLA Ascending Price Vickrey Auctions
MOR2.2c Aner Sela E. Einy, R. Orzach Ben-Gurion University of the Negev Dominance Solvability of Second-Price Auctions with Differential Information
MOR2.2d Vlad Mares   Rutgers University Mergers in Common Value Auctions
MOR2.3 EXPERIMENTS WITH REPUTATION AND COMMUNICATION
MOR2.3a Robert W. Rosenthal Donald J. Dale, John Morgan Boston University Coordination Through Reputations: A Laboratory Experiment
MOR2.3b Barry Sopher Andrew Schotter Rutgers University Creating Culture in the Laboratory: Equilibrium Conventions in an Intergenerational Ultimatum Game
MOR2.3c Martin Sefton Tony Burton University of Newcastle Communication and Equilibrium
MOR2.3d Brit Grosskopf Gary Charness Universitat Pompeu Fabra Cheap Talk, Information, and Coordination
MOR2.4 COALITION FORMATION IN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS
MOR2.4a Steven J. Brams Michael Jones, D. Marc Kilgour New York University The Paradox of Disconnected Coalitions
MOR2.4b Ines Macho-Stadler Maria Paz Espinosa Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona Endogenous Formation of Partnerships with Moral Hazard
MOR2.4c Rod Garratt Cheng-Zhong Qin University of California, Santa Barbara Potential Maximization and Coalition Government Formation
MOR2.4d Armando Gomes   University of Pennsylvania A Theory of Negotiations and Formation of Coalitions
MOR2.5 COOPERATION, FAIRNESS AND PUBLIC GOODS
MOR2.5a Howard Rosenthal Wojciech Olszewskia Princeton University Politically Determined Income Inequality and the Provision of Public Goods
MOR2.5b Dirk Engelmann Martin Strobel Humboldt-Universitaet zu Berlin An Experimental Comparison of the Fairness Models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt
MOR2.5c          
MOR2.5d Shmuel Zamir Klaus Abbink, Abdolkarim Sadrieh Crest--LEI/ENPC Fairness and Public Good Aspects of Punishment Behavior
MOR2.6 EXTENSIONS OF BARGAINING SOLUTIONS
MOR2.6a Zvika Safra Eran Hanany Tel Aviv University Existence and Uniqueness of Ordinal Nash Outcomes
MOR2.6b Frans Spinnewyn   Katholieke Universiteit LEUVEN The Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution and Related Solution Concepts in Repeated Bargaining Games
MOR2.6c Seung-Hoon Lee   Seoul National University Extended Nash Bargaining Solution with Open Outside Opportunities and its Application to Market Allocation and Team Production
MOR2.6d Naoki Yoshihara   Hitotsubashi University Characterizations of Bargaining Solutions In Production Economies without Welfarism
MOR2.7 CORE AND CONSISTENCY
MOR2.7a Victor Zakharov Arina Akimova St.Petersburg State University Properties of the Subcore
MOR2.7b Peter Sudholter Y.-A. Hwang University of Bielefeld An Axiomatization of the Core
MOR2.7c Yukihiko Funaki   Waseda University The Core and Consistency Properties: A General Characterization
MOR2.7d Takehiko Yamato Yukihiko Funaki Tokyo Metropolitan University The Uniqueness of a Reduced Game in a Characterization of the Core by Means of Consistency
MOR2.8 ADAPTIVE BEHAVIOR AND BEST RESPONSE LEARNING
MOR2.8a Jean-Francois Laslier R. Topol, B. Walliser Ecole Polytechnique A Behavioral Learning Process in Games
MOR2.8b Hans Haller Alexander Outkin Virginia Polytechnic Institute Best Response Dynamics and Neural Networks
MOR2.8c Dana Heller Rajiv Sarin University of Chicago Parametric Adaptive Learning
MOR2.8d Rajiv Sarin Dana Heller Texas A&M University Adaptively learning mixed equilibrium
MOR2.9 EXPERTS AND COMMUNICATION IN GAMES
MOR2.9a John Morgan Vijay Krishna Princeton University Communicating with Experts
MOR2.9b Dino Gerardi   Northwestern University Unmediated Communication in Games with Complete and Incomplete Information
MOR2.9c Yong-Gwan Kim   Sung Kyun Kwan University Evolution of Communication with Partial Common Interest
MOR2.9d Takashi Matsuhisa   Ibaraki National College of Technology Communication leading to Nash equilibrium
MOR2.10 INCENTIVE ISSUES IN MARKETS
MOR2.10a Jose Luis Ferreira   Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Strategic Interaction Between Futures and Spot Markets
MOR2.10b          
MOR2.10c Cheng-Zhong Qin   Hong Kong University of Science and Technology Credible Commitment: Ex Ante Deterrence and Ex Post Compensation
MOR2.10d Juan-Jose Ganuza Marco Celentani Universitat Pompeu Fabra Corruption and competition in procurement
MOR2.11 STRATEGIC INTERACTION IN MARKETS AND POLITICS
MOR2.11a Andrea Prat A. Rustichini London School of Economics Games Played Through Agents
MOR2.11b Yutaka Suzuki   Hosei University Incomplete Contracts, Collusion and Authority Delegation in Organizations
MOR2.11c Shyh-Fang Ueng   Academia Sinica A Non-stationary Finite-period Interactive Markov Race
MOR2.11d          
MOR2.12 THE STRUCTURE OF EQUILIBRIA
MOR2.12a Joseph Abdou Hans Keiding Universite Paris On Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Strong Solvability of Game Forms
MOR2.12b Dries Vermeulen M. J. M. Jansen Maastricht University On the computation of stable sets and strictly perfect equilibria
MOR2.12c Stefano Demichelis Fabrizio Germano Universita' di Pavia On the Indices of Zeros of Nash Fields
MOR2.12d Jean-Francois Mertens Francesco De Sinopoli (author) CORE On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games