GAMES 2000

Monday (MOR1) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
MOR1.1 IMPERFECT MONITORING
MOR1.1a Steven A. Matthews George J. Mailath, Tadashi Sekiguchi University of Pennsylvania Private Strategies in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
MOR1.1b George J. Mailath Stephen Morris University of Pennsylvania Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring
MOR1.1c Jeffrey Ely   Northwestern University Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring
MOR1.1d Tristan Tomala Jerome Renault Universite Paris Dauphine A Characterization of Communication Equilibrium Payoffs in RepeatedGames with Imperfect Monitoring
MOR1.2 ALLOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT
MOR1.2a Scott Shenker Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitrio International Computer Science Institute Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions
MOR1.2b Andrew McLennan   University of Minnesota Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem
MOR1.2c Anna Bogomolnaia Herve Moulin Southern Methodist University A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem
MOR1.2d Tayfun Sonmez Atila Abdulkadiroglu Koc University Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments
MOR1.3 FIRST AND SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS
MOR1.3a Marciano Siniscalchi Pierpaolo Battigalli Princeton University Rationalizable Bidding in First-price Auctions
MOR1.3b Todd R. Kaplan Shmuel Zamir   The Strategic use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions
MOR1.3c Bernard Lebrun   Universite Laval First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model
MOR1.3d M. Angeles de Frutos L. Pechlivanos Universidad Carlos III de Madrid Second-Price Common-Value Auctions under Multidimensional Uncertainty
MOR1.4 INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY
MOR1.4a Adam Brandenburger H. Jerome Keisler Harvard Business School An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games
MOR1.4b Yossi Feinberg   Stanford University Subjective Reasoning in Games
MOR1.4c Elias Thijsse Jan Jaspars, Wiebe van der Hoek Tilburg University Characterizing Knowledge States
MOR1.4d Hannu Salonen   University of Turku Beliefs, Filters and Measurability
MOR1.5 COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS WITH SMALL PLAYERS
MOR1.5a Richard P. McLean Andrew Postlewaite Rutgers University Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information
MOR1.5b Roberto Serrano Rajiv Vohra, Oscar Volij Brown University On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies of Asymmetric Information
MOR1.5c Ezra Einy Diego Moreno, Benjamin Shitovitz Ben Gurion University of the Negev On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information
MOR1.5d Joseph Ostroy Louis Makowski UCLA Linear Programming and General Equilibrium Theory
MOR1.6 TEAMS, CARTELS AND BANKRUPTCY
MOR1.6a Michael Bacharach   University of Oxford Team Games and Personal Decisions
MOR1.6b Jose M. Zarzuelo Gooni Orshan, Federico Valenciano Universidad del Pais Vasco The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, The Core and NTU Bankruptcy Games
MOR1.6c Joachim Rosenmuller   University of Bielefeld Cartels and Linear Production Games
MOR1.6d Ursula F. Ott   Loughborough University International Joint Ventures: A Common Agency Game
MOR1.7 EVOLUTION, COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
MOR1.7a Igal Milchtaich   Bar-Ilan University How Does Selfishness Affect Well-Being?
MOR1.7b Ted Bergstrom   University of California, Santa Barbara Evolution of Behavior in Family Games
MOR1.7c Arthur Robson Philippe Gregoire University of Western Ontario Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation
MOR1.7d Julian Jamison   Northwestern University Assigning and Trading Tasks
MOR1.8 NETWORKS AND COALITION FORMATION
MOR1.8a Alison Watts Matthew O. Jackson Vanderbilt University On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games
MOR1.8b Fernando Vega-Redondo Sanjeev Goyal Universidad de Alicante Learning, Network Formation and Coordination
MOR1.8c Anne van den Nouweland Marco Slikker University of Oregon Network Formation Models with Costs for Establishing Links
MOR1.8d Gerhard van der Laan P. Jean-Jacques Herings, A. J. J. Talman Free University Cooperative Games in Graph Structure
MOR1.9 VOTING
MOR1.9a Alvaro Sandroni Tim Feddersen Northwestern University A theory of citizen duty and voting turnout
MOR1.9b Ken Shotts   Northwestern University A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections
MOR1.9c John Conley Ali Toossi, Myrna Wooders University of Illinois Evolution and Voting: How Nature Makes Us Public Spirited
MOR1.9d Ronny Razin   Princeton University Two Candidates with Heterogeneous Voters
MOR1.10 PRINCIPAL-AGENT AND DELEGATION
MOR1.10a Tatsuro Ichiishi Semih Koray Ohio State Job Matching: A Multi-Principal, Multi-Agent Model
MOR1.10b Varda Yaari Joshua Ronen Ben-Gurion University Renegotiation-proof Contracts with Unobservable Outcome
MOR1.10c Frank H. Page   University of Alabama Competitive Selling Mechanisms: The Delegation Principle and Farsighted Stability
MOR1.10d Silvia Sonderegger Imran Rasul London School of Economics Countervailing Contracts
MOR1.11 ITERATED DOMINANCE AND EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION
MOR1.11a Christian Ewerhart   University of Mannheim Chess-like Games are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps
MOR1.11b Martin Dufwenberg Mark Stegeman Stockholm University Existence and uniqueness of maximally reduced games under iterated strict dominance
MOR1.11c Mario Gilli   Bocconi University/Bari University Iterated Admissibility as a Solution Concept in Game Theory
MOR1.11d Hidetoshi Tashiro   Hitotsubashi University Compuability and Computational Enumerability of Nash Equilibria and Backward Induction Solutions of a Game with Computable Payoff Functions
MOR1.12 EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION
MOR1.12a Joerg Oechssler Frank Riedel University of Bonn The Insufficiency of Static Evolutionary Stability Conditions
MOR1.12b Richard Vaughan   University College London Evolutive Equilibrium Selection II: Quantal Response Mechanisms
MOR1.12c Tosh Maruta   Osaka Prefecture University Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice
MOR1.12d Myrna Wooders   University of Warwick Female Competition, Near-Monogamy and Sexual Dimorphism; An Evolutionary and Game-Theoretic Approach