Click here to return to Session Program Page
Click here to return to the General Program Page
| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| MOR1.1 | IMPERFECT MONITORING | ||||
| MOR1.1a | Steven A. | Matthews | George J. Mailath, Tadashi Sekiguchi | University of Pennsylvania | Private Strategies in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring |
| MOR1.1b | George J. | Mailath | Stephen Morris | University of Pennsylvania | Repeated Games with Almost Public Monitoring |
| MOR1.1c | Jeffrey | Ely | Northwestern University | Correlated Equilibrium and Private Monitoring | |
| MOR1.1d | Tristan | Tomala | Jerome Renault | Universite Paris Dauphine | A Characterization of Communication Equilibrium Payoffs in RepeatedGames with Imperfect Monitoring |
| MOR1.2 | ALLOCATION AND ASSIGNMENT | ||||
| MOR1.2a | Scott | Shenker | Joan Feigenbaum, Christos Papadimitrio | International Computer Science Institute | Sharing the Cost of Multicast Transmissions |
| MOR1.2b | Andrew | McLennan | University of Minnesota | Ordinal Efficiency and the Polyhedral Separating Hyperplane Theorem | |
| MOR1.2c | Anna | Bogomolnaia | Herve Moulin | Southern Methodist University | A New Solution to the Random Assignment Problem |
| MOR1.2d | Tayfun | Sonmez | Atila Abdulkadiroglu | Koc University | Ordinal Efficiency and Dominated Sets of Assignments |
| MOR1.3 | FIRST AND SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS | ||||
| MOR1.3a | Marciano | Siniscalchi | Pierpaolo Battigalli | Princeton University | Rationalizable Bidding in First-price Auctions |
| MOR1.3b | Todd R. | Kaplan | Shmuel Zamir | The Strategic use of Seller Information in Private-Value Auctions | |
| MOR1.3c | Bernard | Lebrun | Universite Laval | First Price Auctions in the Independent Private Value Model | |
| MOR1.3d | M. Angeles | de Frutos | L. Pechlivanos | Universidad Carlos III de Madrid | Second-Price Common-Value Auctions under Multidimensional Uncertainty |
| MOR1.4 | INTERACTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY | ||||
| MOR1.4a | Adam | Brandenburger | H. Jerome Keisler | Harvard Business School | An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games |
| MOR1.4b | Yossi | Feinberg | Stanford University | Subjective Reasoning in Games | |
| MOR1.4c | Elias | Thijsse | Jan Jaspars, Wiebe van der Hoek | Tilburg University | Characterizing Knowledge States |
| MOR1.4d | Hannu | Salonen | University of Turku | Beliefs, Filters and Measurability | |
| MOR1.5 | COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS WITH SMALL PLAYERS | ||||
| MOR1.5a | Richard P. | McLean | Andrew Postlewaite | Rutgers University | Informational Size, Incentive Compatibility and the Core of a Game with Incomplete Information |
| MOR1.5b | Roberto | Serrano | Rajiv Vohra, Oscar Volij | Brown University | On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies of Asymmetric Information |
| MOR1.5c | Ezra | Einy | Diego Moreno, Benjamin Shitovitz | Ben Gurion University of the Negev | On the Core of an Economy with Differential Information |
| MOR1.5d | Joseph | Ostroy | Louis Makowski | UCLA | Linear Programming and General Equilibrium Theory |
| MOR1.6 | TEAMS, CARTELS AND BANKRUPTCY | ||||
| MOR1.6a | Michael | Bacharach | University of Oxford | Team Games and Personal Decisions | |
| MOR1.6b | Jose M. | Zarzuelo | Gooni Orshan, Federico Valenciano | Universidad del Pais Vasco | The Bilateral Consistent Prekernel, The Core and NTU Bankruptcy Games |
| MOR1.6c | Joachim | Rosenmuller | University of Bielefeld | Cartels and Linear Production Games | |
| MOR1.6d | Ursula F. | Ott | Loughborough University | International Joint Ventures: A Common Agency Game | |
| MOR1.7 | EVOLUTION, COOPERATION AND COORDINATION | ||||
| MOR1.7a | Igal | Milchtaich | Bar-Ilan University | How Does Selfishness Affect Well-Being? | |
| MOR1.7b | Ted | Bergstrom | University of California, Santa Barbara | Evolution of Behavior in Family Games | |
| MOR1.7c | Arthur | Robson | Philippe Gregoire | University of Western Ontario | Imitation, Group Selection and Cooperation |
| MOR1.7d | Julian | Jamison | Northwestern University | Assigning and Trading Tasks | |
| MOR1.8 | NETWORKS AND COALITION FORMATION | ||||
| MOR1.8a | Alison | Watts | Matthew O. Jackson | Vanderbilt University | On the Formation of Interaction Networks in Social Coordination Games |
| MOR1.8b | Fernando | Vega-Redondo | Sanjeev Goyal | Universidad de Alicante | Learning, Network Formation and Coordination |
| MOR1.8c | Anne | van den Nouweland | Marco Slikker | University of Oregon | Network Formation Models with Costs for Establishing Links |
| MOR1.8d | Gerhard | van der Laan | P. Jean-Jacques Herings, A. J. J. Talman | Free University | Cooperative Games in Graph Structure |
| MOR1.9 | VOTING | ||||
| MOR1.9a | Alvaro | Sandroni | Tim Feddersen | Northwestern University | A theory of citizen duty and voting turnout |
| MOR1.9b | Ken | Shotts | Northwestern University | A Signaling Model of Repeated Elections | |
| MOR1.9c | John | Conley | Ali Toossi, Myrna Wooders | University of Illinois | Evolution and Voting: How Nature Makes Us Public Spirited |
| MOR1.9d | Ronny | Razin | Princeton University | Two Candidates with Heterogeneous Voters | |
| MOR1.10 | PRINCIPAL-AGENT AND DELEGATION | ||||
| MOR1.10a | Tatsuro | Ichiishi | Semih Koray | Ohio State | Job Matching: A Multi-Principal, Multi-Agent Model |
| MOR1.10b | Varda | Yaari | Joshua Ronen | Ben-Gurion University | Renegotiation-proof Contracts with Unobservable Outcome |
| MOR1.10c | Frank H. | Page | University of Alabama | Competitive Selling Mechanisms: The Delegation Principle and Farsighted Stability | |
| MOR1.10d | Silvia | Sonderegger | Imran Rasul | London School of Economics | Countervailing Contracts |
| MOR1.11 | ITERATED DOMINANCE AND EQUILIBRIUM COMPUTATION | ||||
| MOR1.11a | Christian | Ewerhart | University of Mannheim | Chess-like Games are Dominance Solvable in at Most Two Steps | |
| MOR1.11b | Martin | Dufwenberg | Mark Stegeman | Stockholm University | Existence and uniqueness of maximally reduced games under iterated strict dominance |
| MOR1.11c | Mario | Gilli | Bocconi University/Bari University | Iterated Admissibility as a Solution Concept in Game Theory | |
| MOR1.11d | Hidetoshi | Tashiro | Hitotsubashi University | Compuability and Computational Enumerability of Nash Equilibria and Backward Induction Solutions of a Game with Computable Payoff Functions | |
| MOR1.12 | EVOLUTIONARY SELECTION | ||||
| MOR1.12a | Joerg | Oechssler | Frank Riedel | University of Bonn | The Insufficiency of Static Evolutionary Stability Conditions |
| MOR1.12b | Richard | Vaughan | University College London | Evolutive Equilibrium Selection II: Quantal Response Mechanisms | |
| MOR1.12c | Tosh | Maruta | Osaka Prefecture University | Binary Games with State Dependent Stochastic Choice | |
| MOR1.12d | Myrna | Wooders | University of Warwick | Female Competition, Near-Monogamy and Sexual Dimorphism; An Evolutionary and Game-Theoretic Approach | |