GAMES 2000

Friday (FRR2) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
FRR2.1 AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND BARGAINING
FRR2.1a Jorge R. Palamara Lloyd Shapley University of California Simple Games and Authority Structures
FRR2.1b Youngsub Chun   Seoul National University The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining
FRR2.2 EQUILIBRIUM IN MARKETS
FRR2.2a Raba Amir   University of Copenhagen Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance
FRR2.2b Dragan Filipovich   Colegio de Mexico Choosing One's Identity
FRR2.3 KNOWLEDGE AND UNCERTAINTY
FRR2.3a Olivier Armantier Jean-Pierre Florens, Jean Francois Richard SUNY Nash Equilibrium Approximation in Games of Incomplete Information
FRR2.3b Antonio Quesada     When common knowledge of rationality is common knowledge of backward induction
FRR2.4 BARGAINING AND AUCTIONS IN MARKETS
FRR2.4a Clara Ponsati   Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets
FRR2.4b Vincent P. Crawford Ping-Sing Kuo University of California, San Diego A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling
FRR2.5 EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES
FRR2.5a William Janss Mark Walker University of Arizona Intertemporal Deployment of a Strategic Resource
FRR2.5b Oliver Board   Oxford University Deception and Unreliability: A Generalization of Extensive Form Games
FRR2.6 STRATEGIC POTENTIAL GAMES
FRR2.6a Nikolai Kukushkin   Russian Academy of Sciences Perfect Information and Potential
FRR2.6b Takashi Ui   University of Tsukuba Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
FRR2.7 MIN-MAX STRATEGIES
FRR2.7a Peter Grunwald Phil Dawid Eurandom A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of the Maximum Entropy Method
FRR2.7b Anton Stefanescu   Bucharest University The Minimax Theorm and the Convexity of Preferences
FRR2.8 COMPLEXITY IN BARGAINING
FRR2.8a Kalyan Chatterjee   Pennsylvania State University N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity
FRR2.8b Kate Larson Tuomas Sandholm Washington University Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems
FRR2.9 LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND TESTABLE THEORY
FRR2.9a Lin Zhou   City University of Hong Kong Testable implications of the theory of Nash equilbrium
FRR2.9b Christian Schmidt   Université Paris-Dauphine What can game theory learn from its history?
FRR2.10 CHEAP TALK
FRR2.10a Elchanan Ben-Porath   Tel Aviv University Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information
FRR2.10b Peter Sorensen Marco Ottaviani University of Copenhagen Reputational Cheap Talk
FRR2.11 CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND SUNSPOTS
FRR2.11a          
FRR2.11b Bezalel Peleg Hans Keiding Hebrew University of Jerusalem Correlated Equilibria of Games with Many Players