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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| FRR2.1 | AUTHORITY STRUCTURE AND BARGAINING | ||||
| FRR2.1a | Jorge R. | Palamara | Lloyd Shapley | University of California | Simple Games and Authority Structures |
| FRR2.1b | Youngsub | Chun | Seoul National University | The Converse Consistency Principle in Bargaining | |
| FRR2.2 | EQUILIBRIUM IN MARKETS | ||||
| FRR2.2a | Raba | Amir | University of Copenhagen | Market Structure, Scale Economies and Industry Performance | |
| FRR2.2b | Dragan | Filipovich | Colegio de Mexico | Choosing One's Identity | |
| FRR2.3 | KNOWLEDGE AND UNCERTAINTY | ||||
| FRR2.3a | Olivier | Armantier | Jean-Pierre Florens, Jean Francois Richard | SUNY | Nash Equilibrium Approximation in Games of Incomplete Information |
| FRR2.3b | Antonio | Quesada | When common knowledge of rationality is common knowledge of backward induction | ||
| FRR2.4 | BARGAINING AND AUCTIONS IN MARKETS | ||||
| FRR2.4a | Clara | Ponsati | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | Search and Bargaining in Simple Markets | |
| FRR2.4b | Vincent P. | Crawford | Ping-Sing Kuo | University of California, San Diego | A Dual Dutch Auction in Taipei: The Choice of Numeraire and Auction Form in Multi-Object Auctions with Bundling |
| FRR2.5 | EXTENSIVE FORM GAMES | ||||
| FRR2.5a | William | Janss | Mark Walker | University of Arizona | Intertemporal Deployment of a Strategic Resource |
| FRR2.5b | Oliver | Board | Oxford University | Deception and Unreliability: A Generalization of Extensive Form Games | |
| FRR2.6 | STRATEGIC POTENTIAL GAMES | ||||
| FRR2.6a | Nikolai | Kukushkin | Russian Academy of Sciences | Perfect Information and Potential | |
| FRR2.6b | Takashi | Ui | University of Tsukuba | Robust Equilibria of Potential Games | |
| FRR2.7 | MIN-MAX STRATEGIES | ||||
| FRR2.7a | Peter | Grunwald | Phil Dawid | Eurandom | A Game-Theoretic Interpretation of the Maximum Entropy Method |
| FRR2.7b | Anton | Stefanescu | Bucharest University | The Minimax Theorm and the Convexity of Preferences | |
| FRR2.8 | COMPLEXITY IN BARGAINING | ||||
| FRR2.8a | Kalyan | Chatterjee | Pennsylvania State University | N-Person Bargaining and Strategic Complexity | |
| FRR2.8b | Kate | Larson | Tuomas Sandholm | Washington University | Deliberation in Equilibrium: Bargaining in Computationally Complex Problems |
| FRR2.9 | LESSONS FROM HISTORY AND TESTABLE THEORY | ||||
| FRR2.9a | Lin | Zhou | City University of Hong Kong | Testable implications of the theory of Nash equilbrium | |
| FRR2.9b | Christian | Schmidt | Université Paris-Dauphine | What can game theory learn from its history? | |
| FRR2.10 | CHEAP TALK | ||||
| FRR2.10a | Elchanan | Ben-Porath | Tel Aviv University | Cheap Talk in Games with Incomplete Information | |
| FRR2.10b | Peter | Sorensen | Marco Ottaviani | University of Copenhagen | Reputational Cheap Talk |
| FRR2.11 | CORRELATED EQUILIBRIA AND SUNSPOTS | ||||
| FRR2.11a | |||||
| FRR2.11b | Bezalel | Peleg | Hans Keiding | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Correlated Equilibria of Games with Many Players |