GAMES 2000

Friday (FRR1) Sessions

All Sessions are Concurrent

 

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Session Presenter's First Name Presenter's Last Name Co-author(s) Affiliation Paper Title
FRR1.1 COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS
FRR1.1a Daniel Lehmann Lehmann, Nisan Hebrew University Sub-modular Combinatorial Auctions
FRR1.1b Yoav Shoham Moshe Tennenholtz Stanford University On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity
FRR1.1c Tuomas Sandholm Subhash Suri Washington University Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations
FRR1.1d Amir Ronen   Hebrew University of Jerusalem Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms
FRR1.2 QUANTAL RESPONSE AND EXPERIMENTS
FRR1.2a Tomas R. Palfrey   Caltech Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions
FRR1.2b Jacob K. Goeree   University of Virginia A Model of Noisy Introspection
FRR1.2c Charles A. Holt   University of Virginia The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies
FRR1.2d Rosemarie Nagel Antoni Bosch-Domenech, Albert Satorra, Jose Garcia-Montalvo Universitat Pompeu Fabra One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments
FRR1.3 MATCHING
FRR1.3a Marilda Sotomayor   Universidade de Sao Paulo The Strategy Structure Of The College Admissions Stable Mechanisms
FRR1.3b Dorothea Herreiner   University of Bonn The Decision To Seek or To Be Sought
FRR1.3c Ahmet Alkan     Cardinal Monotonic Choice Functions and the Lattice of Stable Matchings
FRR1.3d Jordi Masso Ruth Martinez, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona An algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings
FRR1.4 EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN SPORTS AND MARKETS
FRR1.4a John Wooders Mark Walker University of Arizona Minimax Play at Wimbledon
FRR1.4b P. A. Chiappori Steve Levitt University of Chicago Do soccer players randomize?
FRR1.4c Ignacio Palacios-Huerta   Brown University Game Theory in the Grass
FRR1.4d Alan Kirman Wolfgane Hardle GREQAM When to Accept and When to Refuse
FRR1.5 DYNAMIC DUOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY
FRR1.5a Xavier Vives Byoung H. Jun Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC Strategic Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly
FRR1.5b Rajeev R. Bhattacharya   The University of New South Wales Short-run constraints and price wars
FRR1.5c Harrison Cheng   University of Southern California Optimal Collusion with Moral Hazards in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games
FRR1.5d Miguel Aramendia C. Larrea y L. Ruiz Universidad del Pais Vasco Renegotiation in the Repeated Cournot Model
FRR1.6 SPATIAL VOTING
FRR1.6a Gilat Levy   London School of Economics Formation of Parties in Multi-Dimensional Policy Space
FRR1.6b Adam Meirowitz   Stanford University Polling Games and Information Revelation in the Downsian Framework
FRR1.6c Gilbert Laffond Jean Laine Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers Strategic Differentiation in Political Competition Games
FRR1.6d Thomas Palfrey Enriqueta Aragones California Institute of Technology Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate
FRR1.7 GAMES IN MARKETS
FRR1.7a Vicki Knoblauch Steffen Huck, Wieland Mueller University of London On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games
FRR1.7b Willy Spanjers David Kelsey Universiy of Birmingham Uncertainty in Partnerships
FRR1.7c Marc Dudey   Rice University Quantity Precommitment and Dynamic Price Competititon Can Yield the Bertrand Outcome
FRR1.7d Hassan Benchekroun   Florida Atlantic University On the Effects of Unilateral Quotas on the Harvesting of a Renewable Resource
FRR1.8 STRATEGIC AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION
FRR1.8a Hao Li Sherwin Rosen, Wing Suen University of Toronto Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees
FRR1.8b Marco Battaglini   Northwestern University Multiple referrals and Multidimensional Cheap talk
FRR1.8c Nicola Persico   University of Pennsylvania Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design withEndogenous Information
FRR1.8d Leeat Yariv   Harvard University When Majority Rule Yields Majority Ruin
FRR1.9 ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO COOPERATIVE GAMES
FRR1.9a Sergei Pechersky Elena Yanovskaya St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics Transfer Values for Games with Non Transferable Utilities
FRR1.9b Rene Levinsky Rene van den Brink, Karel Soukenik Charles University Balanced Solutions for TU-games
FRR1.9c Tadeusz Radzik   Technical University of Wroclaw A General Approach to TU-weighted Games
FRR1.9d Stefan Napel Mika Widgren University of Karlsruhe Inferior Players in Simple Games
FRR1.10 STOCHASTIC AND EXTENSIVE GAMES
FRR1.10a Dinah Rosenberg Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille Universite Paris Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies
FRR1.10b Ernst L. Presman   CEMI RAS Nash Equiliubrium Points in an m player Game of "Black Jack"
FRR1.10c Hardy Hanappi E. Hanappi-Eggar, A. Mehlmann University of Technology, Vienna Algorithmic Games: From a New form of Specification to a New Type of Results
FRR1.10d Victor Domansky   St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics Solutions of stopping games for Markov chains
FRR1.11 EVOLUTIONARY PHENOMENA
FRR1.11a William H. Sandholm   University of Wisconsin Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
FRR1.11b Thomas Troeger   ELSE, University College London Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach
FRR1.11c Vikas Kakkar Eric O'N Fisher City University of Hong Kong On the Evolution of Comparative Advantage
FRR1.11d          
FRR1.12 CONVEXITY IN COALITIONAL GAMES
FRR1.12a Jesus Mario Bilbao J. R. Fernandez, A. Jimenez Losada, E. Lebron Escuela Superior de Ingenieros Bicooperative Games
FRR1.12b Encarnacion Algaba J. M. Bilbao, N. Jimenez Jimenez, J. J. Lopez Escuela Superior de Ingenieros Locally Convex (Concave) Games
FRR1.12c Judith Timmer P. Borm, S. Tijs Tilburg University Convexity and Solution Concepts in Stochastic Cooperative Situations
FRR1.12d Holger Meinhardt   University of Karlsruhe Convexity and k-convexity in Cooperative Common Pool Games