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| Session | Presenter's First Name | Presenter's Last Name | Co-author(s) | Affiliation | Paper Title |
| FRR1.1 | COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS | ||||
| FRR1.1a | Daniel | Lehmann | Lehmann, Nisan | Hebrew University | Sub-modular Combinatorial Auctions |
| FRR1.1b | Yoav | Shoham | Moshe Tennenholtz | Stanford University | On Rational Computability and Communication Complexity |
| FRR1.1c | Tuomas | Sandholm | Subhash Suri | Washington University | Improved Algorithms for Optimal Winner Determination in Combinatorial Auctions and Generalizations |
| FRR1.1d | Amir | Ronen | Hebrew University of Jerusalem | Computationally Feasible VCG Mechanisms | |
| FRR1.2 | QUANTAL RESPONSE AND EXPERIMENTS | ||||
| FRR1.2a | Tomas R. | Palfrey | Caltech | Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private Value Auctions | |
| FRR1.2b | Jacob K. | Goeree | University of Virginia | A Model of Noisy Introspection | |
| FRR1.2c | Charles A. | Holt | University of Virginia | The Logit Equilibrium: A Perspective on Intuitive Behavioral Anomalies | |
| FRR1.2d | Rosemarie | Nagel | Antoni Bosch-Domenech, Albert Satorra, Jose Garcia-Montalvo | Universitat Pompeu Fabra | One, Two, (Three), Infinity: Newspaper and Lab Beauty-Contest Experiments |
| FRR1.3 | MATCHING | ||||
| FRR1.3a | Marilda | Sotomayor | Universidade de Sao Paulo | The Strategy Structure Of The College Admissions Stable Mechanisms | |
| FRR1.3b | Dorothea | Herreiner | University of Bonn | The Decision To Seek or To Be Sought | |
| FRR1.3c | Ahmet | Alkan | Cardinal Monotonic Choice Functions and the Lattice of Stable Matchings | ||
| FRR1.3d | Jordi | Masso | Ruth Martinez, Alejandro Neme, Jorge Oviedo | Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona | An algorithm to compute the set of many-to-many stable matchings |
| FRR1.4 | EMPIRICAL STUDIES IN SPORTS AND MARKETS | ||||
| FRR1.4a | John | Wooders | Mark Walker | University of Arizona | Minimax Play at Wimbledon |
| FRR1.4b | P. A. | Chiappori | Steve Levitt | University of Chicago | Do soccer players randomize? |
| FRR1.4c | Ignacio | Palacios-Huerta | Brown University | Game Theory in the Grass | |
| FRR1.4d | Alan | Kirman | Wolfgane Hardle | GREQAM | When to Accept and When to Refuse |
| FRR1.5 | DYNAMIC DUOPOLY AND OLIGOPOLY | ||||
| FRR1.5a | Xavier | Vives | Byoung H. Jun | Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica, CSIC | Strategic Incentives in Dynamic Duopoly |
| FRR1.5b | Rajeev R. | Bhattacharya | The University of New South Wales | Short-run constraints and price wars | |
| FRR1.5c | Harrison | Cheng | University of Southern California | Optimal Collusion with Moral Hazards in Repeated Cournot Oligopoly Games | |
| FRR1.5d | Miguel | Aramendia | C. Larrea y L. Ruiz | Universidad del Pais Vasco | Renegotiation in the Repeated Cournot Model |
| FRR1.6 | SPATIAL VOTING | ||||
| FRR1.6a | Gilat | Levy | London School of Economics | Formation of Parties in Multi-Dimensional Policy Space | |
| FRR1.6b | Adam | Meirowitz | Stanford University | Polling Games and Information Revelation in the Downsian Framework | |
| FRR1.6c | Gilbert | Laffond | Jean Laine | Conservatoire National des Arts et Metiers | Strategic Differentiation in Political Competition Games |
| FRR1.6d | Thomas | Palfrey | Enriqueta Aragones | California Institute of Technology | Mixed Strategy Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a Favored Candidate |
| FRR1.7 | GAMES IN MARKETS | ||||
| FRR1.7a | Vicki | Knoblauch | Steffen Huck, Wieland Mueller | University of London | On the Profitability of Collusion in Location Games |
| FRR1.7b | Willy | Spanjers | David Kelsey | Universiy of Birmingham | Uncertainty in Partnerships |
| FRR1.7c | Marc | Dudey | Rice University | Quantity Precommitment and Dynamic Price Competititon Can Yield the Bertrand Outcome | |
| FRR1.7d | Hassan | Benchekroun | Florida Atlantic University | On the Effects of Unilateral Quotas on the Harvesting of a Renewable Resource | |
| FRR1.8 | STRATEGIC AGGREGATION OF INFORMATION | ||||
| FRR1.8a | Hao | Li | Sherwin Rosen, Wing Suen | University of Toronto | Conflicts and Common Interests in Committees |
| FRR1.8b | Marco | Battaglini | Northwestern University | Multiple referrals and Multidimensional Cheap talk | |
| FRR1.8c | Nicola | Persico | University of Pennsylvania | Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design withEndogenous Information | |
| FRR1.8d | Leeat | Yariv | Harvard University | When Majority Rule Yields Majority Ruin | |
| FRR1.9 | ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO COOPERATIVE GAMES | ||||
| FRR1.9a | Sergei | Pechersky | Elena Yanovskaya | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | Transfer Values for Games with Non Transferable Utilities |
| FRR1.9b | Rene | Levinsky | Rene van den Brink, Karel Soukenik | Charles University | Balanced Solutions for TU-games |
| FRR1.9c | Tadeusz | Radzik | Technical University of Wroclaw | A General Approach to TU-weighted Games | |
| FRR1.9d | Stefan | Napel | Mika Widgren | University of Karlsruhe | Inferior Players in Simple Games |
| FRR1.10 | STOCHASTIC AND EXTENSIVE GAMES | ||||
| FRR1.10a | Dinah | Rosenberg | Eilon Solan, Nicolas Vieille | Universite Paris | Stopping Games with Randomized Strategies |
| FRR1.10b | Ernst L. | Presman | CEMI RAS | Nash Equiliubrium Points in an m player Game of "Black Jack" | |
| FRR1.10c | Hardy | Hanappi | E. Hanappi-Eggar, A. Mehlmann | University of Technology, Vienna | Algorithmic Games: From a New form of Specification to a New Type of Results |
| FRR1.10d | Victor | Domansky | St.Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics | Solutions of stopping games for Markov chains | |
| FRR1.11 | EVOLUTIONARY PHENOMENA | ||||
| FRR1.11a | William H. | Sandholm | University of Wisconsin | Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing | |
| FRR1.11b | Thomas | Troeger | ELSE, University College London | Why Sunk Costs Matter for Bargaining Outcomes: An Evolutionary Approach | |
| FRR1.11c | Vikas | Kakkar | Eric O'N Fisher | City University of Hong Kong | On the Evolution of Comparative Advantage |
| FRR1.11d | |||||
| FRR1.12 | CONVEXITY IN COALITIONAL GAMES | ||||
| FRR1.12a | Jesus Mario | Bilbao | J. R. Fernandez, A. Jimenez Losada, E. Lebron | Escuela Superior de Ingenieros | Bicooperative Games |
| FRR1.12b | Encarnacion | Algaba | J. M. Bilbao, N. Jimenez Jimenez, J. J. Lopez | Escuela Superior de Ingenieros | Locally Convex (Concave) Games |
| FRR1.12c | Judith | Timmer | P. Borm, S. Tijs | Tilburg University | Convexity and Solution Concepts in Stochastic Cooperative Situations |
| FRR1.12d | Holger | Meinhardt | University of Karlsruhe | Convexity and k-convexity in Cooperative Common Pool Games | |