FINANCE
Professor of Finance, Zell Center Faculty Fellow
Sapienza’s areas of expertise include banking and financial institutions, behavioral economics, behavioral finance, corporate finance, emerging markets and regulation of financial markets. Sapienza has written articles on banking, social capital, trust and financial development. Her work has been published in such journals as the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Journal of Finance, the Journal of Financial Economics, and Science. She won the 2002 Nasdaq award for best paper in capital formation (with Guiso and Zingales).
In 2009, Sapienza launched the Chicago Booth/Kellogg School Financial Trust Index, a measure of confidence Americans have in the private institutions in which they can invest their money, along with Luigi Zingales (University of Chicago Booth School of Business). It is calculated quarterly on a sample of 1,000 American adults. This index was created as a means to study the changes in trust in the financial industry and its impact on investors’ decisions. Information about the study's core topics (e.g. trust) is gathered quarterly; in different quarters, this information is supplemented with data on additional topics (e.g. real estate investment, opinion about recent events). For more information, visit : www.financialtrustindex.org.
Prior to joining Kellogg, Sapienza worked as an economist in the research department of Bank of Italy. She received a bachelor's degree in economics summa cum laude from Università Bocconi in Italy, and an MA and PhD in Economics from Harvard University.
Behavioral Economics (Includes: Behavioral Finance)
Behavioral Finance (Includes: Behavioral Economics)
Corporate
Emerging Markets
Regulation of Financial Markets
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Representative Work
"The Role of Social Capital in Financial Development"
"Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange"
"The Effects of Banking Mergers on Loan Contracts"
- Recent Media Coverage
Handelsblatt (Germany): Testosteron und Finanzen - 11/9/2009
USA Today: More walk away from homes, mortgages - 11/3/2009
Huffington Post: Naissance Capital: New Fund Invests In Companies With Female Managers, Anticipates High Returns - 10/27/2009
DS News: Negative Equity Prompts 'Strategic' Mortgage Defaults: Study - 10/27/2009
See all Kellogg in the Media
- Recent Kellogg News
Trust in stock market stabilizes - 10/19/2009
Gender, testosterone and financial risk - 8/24/2009
‘A trust crisis’ - 1/27/2009
Deal or no deal? - 11/25/2008
See all Kellogg News
How much do cultural biases affect economic exchange? We try to answer this question by using the relative trust European citizens have for citizens of other countries. First, we document that this trust is affected not only by objective characteristics of the country being trusted, but also by cultural aspects such as religion, a history of conflicts, and genetic similarities. We then find that lower relative levels of trust toward citizens of a country lead to less trade with that country, less portfolio investment, and less direct investment in that country, even after controlling for the objective characteristics of that country. This effect is stronger for good that are more trust intensive and doubles or triples when trust is instrumented with its cultural determinants. We conclude that perceptions rooted in culture are important (and generally omitted) determinants of economic exchange.
We study experimentally the effect of expectations on whether trust is repaid. Subjects respond with untrustworthy behavior if they see that little is expected of them. This suggests that guilt aversion plays an important role in the repayment of trust.
We evaluate the net benefits of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) for shareholders by studying the lobbying behavior of investors and corporate insiders to affect the final implemented rules under the Act. Investors lobbied overwhelmingly in favor of strict implementation of SOX, while corporate insiders and business groups lobbied against strict implementation. We identify the firms most affected by the law as those whose insiders lobbied against strict implementation. Lobbying firms appear likely to be characterized by agency problems, rather than primarily motivated by concerns over high compliance costs. We compare the returns of lobbying firms to the returns of less affected firms. Cumulative returns during the five and a half months leading up to passage of SOX were approximately 7 percent higher for corporations whose insiders lobbied against one or more of the SOX disclosure-related provisions than for similar non-lobbying firms. Analysis of returns in the post-passage implementation period indicates that investors’ positive expectations with regards to the effects of these provisions of the law were warranted.
We compare the trading performance of independent directors and other officers of the firm.We find that independent directors earn positive and substantial abnormal returns when they purchase their company stock, and that the di®erence with the same firm's offcers is relatively small at most horizons. The results are robust to controlling for firm-fixed effects and to using a variety of alternative specifications. Executive offcers and independent directors make higher returns in firms with the weakest governance and the gap between these two groups widens in such firms. Independent directors who sit on the audit committee earn higher returns than other independent directors at the same firm. Finally, independent directors earn significantly higher returns than the market when they sell the company stock in a window before bad news and around earnings restatements.
We test a catering theory describing how stock market mispricing might influence individual firms' investment decisions. We use discretionary accruals as our proxy for mispricing. We find a positive relation between abnormal investment and discretionary accruals; that abnormal investment is more sensitive to discretionary accruals for firms with higher R&D intensity (opaque firms) or share turnover (firms with shorter shareholder horizons); that firms with relatively high abnormal investment subsequently have relatively low (high) stock returns; and that the larger the relative price premium, the stronger the abnormal return predictability. We show that patterns in abnormal returns are stronger for firms with higher R&D intensity or higher share turnover.
We study the effect that a general lack of trust can have on stock market participation. In deciding whether to buy stocks, investors factor in the risk of being cheated. The perception of this risk is a function of the objective characteristics of the stocks and the subjective characteristics of the investor. Less trusting individuals are less likely to buy stock and, conditional on buying stock, they will buy less. In Dutch and Italian micro data, as well as in cross-country data, we find evidence consistent with lack of trust being an important factor in explaining the limited participation puzzle.
There is a long standing debate on the source of the observed gender gap in math scores and its implications for women representation in math and science faculty. By using data from the Program for International Student Assessment study of 15-year-old stu
To explain the extremely long-term persistence (more than 500 years) of positive historical experiences of cooperation (Putnam 1993), we model the intergenerational transmission of priors about the trustworthiness of others. We show that this transmission tends to be biased toward excessively conservative priors. As a result, societies can be trapped in a low-trust equilibrium. In this context, a temporary shock to the return to trusting can have a permanent effect on the level of trust. We validate the model by testing its predictions on the World Values Survey data and the German Socio Economic Panel. We also present some anecdotal evidence that these priors are reflected in novels that originate in different parts of the country.
Economists have been reluctant to rely on culture as a possible determinant of economic phenomena. The notion of culture is so broad and the channels through which it can enter the economic discourse so vague that it is difficult to design testable hypotheses. In this paper we show this does need to be the case. We introduce a narrower definition of culture that allows for a simple methodology to develop and test cultural-based explanations. We also present several applications of this methodology: from the choice to become entrepreneur to that of how much to save, to end with the political decision on income redistribution.
We study the effects of differences in local financial development within an integrated financial market. We construct a new indicator of financial development by estimating a regional effect on the probability that, ceteris paribus, a household is shut off from the credit market. By using this indicator we find that financial development enhances the probability an individual starts his own business, favors entry of new firms, increases competition, and promotes growth. As predicted by theory, these effects are weaker for larger firms, which can more easily raise funds outside of the local area. These effects are present even when we instrument our indicator with the structure of the local banking markets in 1936, which, because of regulatory reasons, affected the supply of credit in the following 50 years. Overall, the results suggest local financial development is an important determinant of the economic success of an area even in an environment where there are no frictions to capital movements.
This paper studies the effects of government ownership on bank lending behavior. Using information on individual loan contracts, I compare the interest rate charged to two sets of companies with identical characteristics borrowing respectively from state-owned and privately owned banks. State-owned banks charge lower interest rates than do privately owned banks to similar or identical firms, even if the company is able to borrow more from privately owned banks. State-owned banks mostly favor firms located in depressed areas and large firms. The lending behavior of state-owned banks is affected by the electoral results of the party affiliated with the bank: the stronger the political party in the area where the firm is borrowing, the lower the interest rates charged. This result is robust to including bank and firm fixed effects.
To identify the effect of social capital on financial development, we exploit social capital differences within Italy. In high-social-capital areas, households are more likely to use checks, invest less in cash and more in stock, have higher access to institutional credit, and make less use of informal credit. The effect of social capital is stronger where legal enforcement is weaker and among less educated people. These results are not driven by omitted environmental variables, since we show that the behavior of movers is still affected by the level of social capital of the province where they were born.
Since Max Weber, there has been an active debate on the impact of religion on people’s economic attitudes. Much of the existing evidence, however, is based on cross-country studies in which this impact is confounded by differences in other institutional factors. We use the World Values Surveys to identify the relationship between intensity of religious beliefs and economic attitudes, controlling for country fixed effects. We study several economic attitudes toward cooperation, the government, working women, legal rules, thriftiness, and the market economy. We also distinguish across religious denominations, differentiating on whether a religion is dominant in a country. We find that on average, religious beliefs are associated with "good" economic attitudes, where "good" is defined as conducive to higher per capita income and growth. Yet religious people tend to be more racist and less favorable with respect to working women. These effects differ across religious denominations. Overall, we find that Christian religions are more positively associated with attitudes conducive to economic growth.
This paper studies the effects of banking mergers on individual loan borrowers. Using information on individual loan contracts between banks and companies, I analyze the consequences of banking consolidation on banks' credit policies. I find that (i) in-market mergers are beneficial to borrowers if these mergers involve the acquisition of banks with small market shares. In these cases, interest rates charged by the consolidated banks decrease, consistently with the view that horizontal mergers generate efficiency gains. However, as the local market share of the acquired bank increases, the efficiency effect is offset by market power; (ii) mergers have different distributional effects across borrowers of different sizes; (iii) small borrowers of target banks are less likely to borrow in the future from the consolidated bank than borrowers of similar banks not involved in mergers. The decision to deny credit to small borrowers does not seem to be based on the quality of the borrower, confirming potential adverse welfare effects of the banking consolidation on the availability of credit to small businesses.
There is a large body of literature documenting both a preference for immediacy and a tendency to procrastinate. O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999a,b, 2001) and Choi et al. (2005) model these behaviors as the two faces of the same phenomenon. In this paper, we use a combination of lab, field, and survey evidence to study whether these two types of behavior are indeed linked. To measure immediacy we had subjects choose between a series of smaller-sooner and larger-later rewards. Both rewards were paid with a check in order to control for transaction costs. To measure procrastination we use the subjects' actual behavior in cashing the check and completing tasks on time. Our results lend support to the hypothesis that subjects who have a preference for immediacy are indeed more likely to procrastinate.
Is social capital long lasting? Does it affect long term economic performance? To answer these questions we test Putnam’s conjecture that today marked differences in social capital between the North and South of Italy are due to the culture of independence fostered by the free city states experience in the North of Italy at the turn of the first millennium. We show that the medieval experience of independence has an impact on social capital within the North, even when we instrument for the probability of becoming a city state with historical factors (such as the Etruscan origin of the city and the presence of a bishop in year 1,000). More importantly, we show that the difference in social capital between towns that in the Middle Ages had the characteristics to become independent and towns that did not exists only in the North (where most of these towns did become independent) and not in the South (where the power of the Norman kingdom prevented them from doing so). Our difference in difference estimates suggest that at least 50% of the North-South gap in social capital is due to the lack of a free city state experience in the South.
This paper shows that there is a positive and statistically significant correlation between the short-term discount rate over a monetary reward and the short-term discount rate over a primary reward (chocolate). In particular, for subjects who like chocolate and are hungry. This suggests that monetary rewards are suitable for the study of inter-temporal choice. In fact, given the problems associated with the use of primary rewards (differing tastes for the good, hunger, and possible satiation), we argue that measurement with monetary rewards is more reliable.
Several papers study the effect of trust by using the answer to the World Values Survey (WVS) question "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?" to measure the level of trust. Glaeser et al. (2000) question the validity of this measure by showing that it is not correlated with senders’ behavior in the standard trust game, but only with his trustworthiness. By using a large sample of German households, Fehr et al. (2003) find the opposite result: WVS-like measures of trust are correlated with the sender’s behavior, but not with its trustworthiness. In this paper we resolve this puzzle by recognizing that trust has two components: a belief-based one and a preference based one. While the sender behavior’s reflects both, we show that WVS-like measures capture mostly the belief-based component, while questions on past trusting behavior are better at capturing the preference component of trust.
We use exogenous variation in the degree of restrictions to bank competition across Italian provinces to study both the effects of bank regulation and the impact of deregulation. We find that where entry was more restricted the cost of credit was higher and - contrary to expectations- access to credit lower. The only benefit of these restrictions was a lower proportion of bad loans. Liberalization brings a reduction in rate spreads and an increased access to credit at the cost of an increase in bad loans. In provinces where restrictions to bank competition were most severe, the proportion of bad loans after deregulation raises above the level present in more competitive markets, suggesting that the pre-existing conditions severely impact the effect of liberalizations.
This course counts toward the following majors: Analytical Finance, Finance.
This course is the sequel to FINC-430. The primary objective is to examine the financial decisions of firms with regard to their capital budgeting decisions (which investments to make), dividend decisions and capital structure decisions (how to raise capital). We first examine these decisions in an idealized frictionless world in which the firm cannot change its value by altering its dividend or capital structure policy. We then explore the effect of frictions (e.g. taxes, bankruptcy costs, inefficient or uncompetitive financial markets, or self-interested managers) on the firm's financial decisions and how these decisions can affect a firm's value.
Prerequisites: FINC-430. Corequisite: DECS-434 or equivalent. ACCT-430 and MECN-430 are recommended.
This course counts toward the following majors: Finance
This course prepares Ph.D. students to do research in empirical corporate finance. The course is organized around published and working papers in the field with an emphasis on econometric methods. Rather than providing an exhaustive overview of the field, the course focuses on selected topics in depth to illustrate different empirical approaches to the same or related questions. Using papers on corporate finance, the course highlights the following empirical themes: endogeneity, difference in difference estimators and event studies.
General Seminar for PhD Candidates (FINC-520-0)
Current research in topics such as international finance, empirical finance, capital structure and financial markets are analyzed. The seminar usually requires in-class presentations by students, as well as individual research projects.
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