Atari, a maker of video games, went through several owners over the years winding up controlled by Infogrames, a French publisher of video games. Infogrames later sold Atari shares in a secondary public offering, eventually reducing the parent’s share to 51.6 percent by September 2005 creating a complicated two-tier ownership structure. Two levels of management made it difficult to get things done. The financial structure was a problem for Infogrames because the French company had to consolidate 100 percent of Atari’s results even though it only owned 51 percent of the company. Atari was generating substantial losses, had defaulted on its debt, and was faced with the possibility of filing for bankruptcy without more working capital.

The independent directors of Atari, when confronted with an unsolicited Infogrames buyout offer, had several options: (1) agree to the $1.68 offer (take the money and run); (2) pursue a white knight (a buyout from another investor of company that would be willing to pay a higher price and invest working capital); (3) file a lawsuit to stop the takeover to buy time or perhaps force Infogrames to increase its offer.

MBA students Tim Joyce and Brandon Cornuke had what they believed was a great product concept: a body powder that could be delivered in an aerosol spray. Current market-leading powders such as Gold Bond and Johnson’s Baby Powder involved messy application, as they were only available in “dump-on” form. Worse, because powders deposited on top of the skin didn’t adhere to it, they tended not to last long. Joyce and Cornuke believed an aerosol powder spray would solve these problems. They called their product concept Dry Goods.

However, taking Dry Goods from idea to reality presented some serious challenges. How would two students without access to a lab be able to research and develop a complex chemical/physical process like aerosol delivery, let alone manufacture it once they had a proven prototype? To address these problems, the two entrepreneurs sought out a contract manufacturing partner. After identifying a number of options, Joyce and Cornuke had to decide which partner offered them the best chances of success, given their goals and financial constraints.

The case begins with newly appointed chairman and interim CEO Garo Armen dwelling on the significant issues that Elan Corporation, an Irish pharmaceutical company, faces. Its share price has plummeted 96% after accusations of accounting fraud and the discontinuation of an important clinical trial due to the drug’s severe side effects. As a result, Elan faces insolvency. About $2 billion in debt that could no longer be satisfied in stock will soon mature, and there are questions regarding the company’s structure and various operating concerns. Armen is also concerned about the ethical consequences of the company’s failing and thus not being able to develop potentially life-saving medicines.

Senior managers in Parmalat SpA’s U.S. subsidiary (Parmalat USA)—many of whom were from the Italian parent company or other Parmalat entities—uprooted, cleaned out their offices, and left as the magnitude of the parent company’s fraud became known in late 2003. Parmalat USA had filed for bankruptcy in October 2003. With urgency and desperation, Enrico Bondi, the Extraordinary Commissioner of Parmalat SpA, had contacted the Milan office of AlixPartners, a global restructuring, consulting, and financial advisory firm. Bondi requested AlixPartners’ assistance in determining the cash situation at the U.S. subsidiary and helping lead the struggling division, which was now void of senior management. Jim Mesterharm, a managing director in AlixPartners’ Chicago office, was asked to lead this initiative as the chief restructuring officer. Parmalat SpA, often referred to as the Enron of Italy, was a trophy turnaround assignment at the outset for AlixPartners: for them, the worse the economic problem, the better the assignment.

Ninety days was enough time for Mesterharm and his team to determine what could be cut off and what discussions were needed with the U.S. vendors, customers, and employees. Mesterharm’s team changed the accounting methods from GAAP basis to cash basis. They constructed a 13-week cash flow model. Aggressive efforts were made to delay payables and to accelerate receivables to create cash. The battle to keep Parmalat USA afloat had begun.

The learning objective of the case is to:

1. Understand the circumstances leading to a catastrophic business failure and the required steps toward turnaround;
2. Learn how to manage multiple constituents through a dramatic turnaround situation;
3. Experience the role of a consultant in the turnaround process of a large company;
4. Expose students to international issues in management of turnarounds.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence.

Instead of improving the company’s position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving.

Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy.

Grocery store chain Winn-Dixie had rapidly expanded in an effort to become a national retailer, and by 1999 it had more than 1,000 stores. The company began manufacturing its own products, reasoning that by owning more of the supply chain, it could offer the customer less expensive options. With its new geographic focus and manufacturing facilities, Winn-Dixie attempted to secure a position as a low-cost provider with a national presence.

Instead of improving the company’s position in the market, however, this strategy crippled both the short- and long-term prospects for Winn-Dixie. The company paid a high premium to expand and increased its leverage without ever realizing the purposed synergies. In fact, there were dis-economies of scale because the distribution, marketing, and administrative costs had risen along with the increased revenue. The expansion and inefficient manufacturing added complexity to its distribution network, and with a greater debt load and less cash, the company was unable to reposition itself in the market when its low-cost provider strategy failed. Not only was the company unable to pursue other opportunities but it also did not have the cash to properly maintain many of its existing stores, which quickly became run down. Winn-Dixie was stuck as a general grocer with few options at a time when the industry was rapidly evolving.

Following faulty strategies of expansion, supply chain changes, and increased debt, Winn-Dixie declared bankruptcy.