Three studies contrasting Indian and American negotiators tested hypotheses derived from theory proposing why there are cultural differences in trust and how cultural differences in trust influence negotiation strategy. Study 1 (a survey) documented that Indian negotiators trust their counterparts less than American negotiators. Study 2 (a negotiation simulation) linked American and Indian negotiators’ self-reported trust and strategy to their insight and joint gains. Study 3 replicated and extended Study 2 using independently-coded negotiation strategy data, allowing for stronger causal inference. Overall, the strategy associated with Indian negotiators’ reluctance to extend interpersonal (as opposed to institutional) trust produced relatively poor outcomes. Our data support an expanded theoretical model of negotiation, linking culture to trust, strategies, and outcomes.

Negotiation occurs whenever people cannot achieve their own goals without the cooperation of others. Our review highlights recent empirical research that investigates this ubiquitous social activity. We selectively review descriptive research emerging from social psychology and organizational behavior. This research examines negotiation behavior and outcomes at five levels of analysis: intrapersonal, interpersonal, group, organizational, and virtual. At each level, we review research on negotiation processes and outcomes, and we discuss the implications of various processes and outcomes for the two functions of negotiation: value creation (integrative negotiation) and value claiming (distributive negotiation).

A laboratory experiment examined whether one structural feature of groups – members’ physical positioning – may produce asymmetry in their perceived contribution to a task. In particular, we investigated asymmetry in group members’ (often excessive) claims of credit for collective tasks (“the self-serving attributional bias”). Consistent with the availability account of this bias, group members located in the middle of a group, with easy visual access to their partners’ contributions, demonstrated less bias than outside members (who demonstrated bias consistent with prior research) – but no less satisfaction. Further analyses suggested that these results reflected bias reduction among middle members, and did stem from visual availability. We conclude that the visual constraints imposed by physical positioning influence the availability of information and thus generate asymmetric attributional bias – with implications for conflict and its reduction.

Individuals often honor sunk costs by increasing their commitment to failing courses of action. Since this escalation of commitment is fueled by self-justification processes, a widely offered prescription for preventing escalation is to have separate individuals make the initial and subsequent resource allocation decisions. In contrast to this proposed remedy, four experiments explored whether a psychological connection between two decision-makers leads the second decision-maker to invest further in the failing program orchestrated by the initial decision-maker. Across three different contexts (financial investments, personnel decisions, and auctions), we found that multiple forms of psychological connectedness (perspective-taking, shared attributes, and interdependent mindsets) led decision-makers to vicariously justify others’ initial decisions and escalate their own commitment to these decisions – even in the face of direct financial costs to themselves, and even among economics students trained in the irrationality of honoring sunk costs. The ability of subtle psychological connections to undermine the conventional prescription for de-escalation has important implications for organizations, public policy, and theories of escalation.

An experiment tested whether groups lie more than individuals. Groups lied more than individuals when deception was guaranteed to maximize economic outcomes, but lied relatively less than individuals when honesty could be used strategically. These results suggest that groups are more strategic than individuals in that they will adopt whatever course of action best serves their economic interest.

This research investigated the role of contemplation, conversation (which we conceptualized as social contemplation), and explanations in the resolution of right-wrong decisions. Several theories suggest that contemplation or morally-oriented conversations will promote ethical decisions and that immediate choice or self-interested conversations will not; other theories suggest that individuals’ explanations will reinforce their decisions. An experimental task tempting people to lie supported all of these predictions. In addition, truth-tellers viewed the situation as morally-oriented and non-truth-tellers viewed it as economically-oriented, both before and after their decisions. These findings provided the basis for a new, process model of moral decision making.