Mehmet Ekmekci
Mehmet Ekmekci

MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS & DECISION SCIENCES
Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics & Decision Sciences

Print Overview
Mehmet Ekmekci is an Assistant Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences. He joined the faculty at the Kellogg School of Management in 2006, after completing his PhD in Economics at Princeton University. His research interests include repeated games, political economy and economic theory. Professor Ekmekci is currently working on models of bargaining and search frictions generating inefficiency

Areas of Expertise
Economic Theory
Economics of Uncertainty
Game Theory
Information Economics
Microeconomics
  • Recent Media Coverage

    The Economist Intelligence Unit: Executive Briefing--A rating system that forgets: Dropping some reputation ratings may help both buyer and sellers

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Print Vita
Education
PhD, 2006, Economics, Princeton University
BS, 2000, Industrial Engineering, Bogazici University, Turkey

Academic Positions
Assistant Professor, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2007-present
Donald P. Jacobs Scholar, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences Department, Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, 2006-2007

 
Print Research
Research Interests
Microeconomic theory, game theory, political economics, repeated games and reputations, bargaining and search

Articles
Ekmekci, Mehmet, Olivier Gossner and Andrea Wilson. Forthcoming. Impermanent Types and Permanent Reputations.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. Forthcoming. Reputation in Long-Run Relationships.
Ekmekci, Mehmet. 2011. Sustainable Reputations with Rating Systems. Journal of Economic Theory. 146(2): 479-503.
Ekmekci, Mehmet. 2009. Manipulation through Political Endorsements. Journal of Economic Theory. 144(3): 1227-1248.
Working Papers
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. Reputation in the Long-Run with Imperfect Monitoring.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. A Two-sided Reputation Result with Long Run Players.
Atakan, Alp Enver and Mehmet Ekmekci. 2012. Bargaining and Reputation in Search Markets.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Nenad Kos. 2012. Information in Tender Offers with a Large Shareholder.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Alp Enver Atakan. 2012. Auctions, Actions and the Failure of Information Aggregation.
Ekmekci, Mehmet and Andrea Wilson. Maintaining a Permanent Reputation with Replacements.
Dalkiran, Nuh Aygun and Mehmet Ekmekci. On Continuity of Equilibrium Payoff Set in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information under Imperfect Public Monitoring.

 
Print Teaching
Teaching Interests
Statistics; contract theory and mechanism design
Full-Time / Part-Time MBA
Microeconomic Analysis (MECN-430-0)

This course counts toward the following majors: Managerial Economics.

Among the topics this core course addresses are economic analysis and optimal decisions, consumer choice and the demand for products, production functions and cost curves, market structures and strategic interactions, and pricing and non-price concepts. Cases and problems are used to understand economic tools and their potential for solving real-world problems.

Doctoral
Selected Topics in Economic Theory (MECS-468-2)
Students are exposed to the classic and cutting-edge papers in the area of repeated games with incomplete information, or more commonly known as reputation models. The course begins with the classic papers (Kreps, Wilson, Milgrom and Roberts) with further study focusing on Fudenberg and Levine's model, bargaining games (Abreu and Gul), and the recent developments in repeated games equally patient players. The first half of the class consists of lectures; the second half shifts to student presentations, drawing from applied or theory papers. Grading is based on student presentations and class participation.